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THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT WAYS
OF COMMUNICATION ON
BICOMMUNAL RELATIONS
IN CYPRUS

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:.....

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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX

CHRISTIANA KARAYIANNI, DPHIL IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES

THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT WAYS OF COMMUNICATION ON
BICOMMUNAL RELATIONS IN CYPRUS

SUMMARY

This thesis examines how the relationship between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities has been shaped by the way the media and related structures mediate their communication. This is a multi-method study based on data gathered from interview, print, broadcast and online material offering a new synthesis and analysis of the mediation of a century of turbulent bicommunal relations.

The thesis begins by developing a theoretical framework to address these questions of mediation and offers a critical review of the historiography of bicommunal relations on the island. Three core empirical chapters follow. The first aims to understand the role of face-to-face communication in bicommunal relations based on interviews with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The second focuses on the representation of the Turkish-Cypriot community in the Greek-Cypriot print and broadcast media based on textual and discourse analyses of both extraordinary events and mundane coverage. This empirical study identifies the shifts of the hegemonic discourses in the Greek-Cypriot public sphere and the media rituals that are/were enacted in order for the discourses to be legitimised. Finally, the third chapter analyses samples of online bicommunal communication before and after the easing of 'border' restrictions in 2003. It highlights the ways the new media can be used to move beyond those media rituals that confirm certain myths and to re-enhance the normalisation of bicommunal coexistence.

Overall, the thesis's findings suggest that the Greek-Cypriot print and broadcast media's symbolic power increased in certain historical periods of conflict and that through this power they territorialised people's reality and the process of assigning meanings to *the other*. It should be noted though, that this territorialisation is not homogenous, it is rather a product of conflict among local discourses. Finally, putting together the findings deriving from all three empirical studies leads to the suggestion that new media tools help/ed overcome a territorialisation process and in a sense recapture the dynamics of oral everydayness of the common past of the two Cypriot communities.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

The Motivation

Born in 1981 in Limassol, a city in the south coast of Cyprus, terms like ‘occupation’, ‘invasion’, ‘the Cyprus problem’ and ‘Turks’ had a very solid but at the same time a very narrow meaning for me. These were terms to which I was exposed very often, mostly at school. During my school years, my exercise books¹ had pictures of occupied places with the slogan *Den xechno* which means ‘I do not forget’ in the caption and even my school classrooms were decorated with such pictures. I used to be taught in several lessons about the *Attilas*² who came and occupied Cyprus after killing, raping and forcing innocent people out of their homes. I also used to recite poems and sang songs about the Turkish invasion in school celebrations of national days. I even had school field trips to the Green Line, from where I could see the Turkish soldier holding his gun ready to shoot any of *us* that would try to cross to the other side. In other words, I knew from a very young age that the Turks invaded and occupied Cyprus and I also knew that there were places in my country that I could not go because of “the Cyprus problem”. This was something that I remember made me sad since I considered myself an unlucky Greek who was born in Cyprus instead of Greece. The Greeks of Greece were the lucky ones since they managed to free their land from the Turks in 1821. Oh, and I also knew about *Denktash*, the ‘evil’ Turk with whom *our* president always had handshakes with on TV and he was responsible for not allowing *us* to have *our* occupied lands back.

But there were many other things I did not know and many more that confused me. For example, I must say that I find it astonishing now to realise that I did not know about the existence of any other communities in Cyprus – and especially the Turkish-Cypriot

¹ These exercise books are still provided for free by the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Cyprus, to every elementary student.

² *Attilas* is a word often used by the Greek-Cypriot community to refer to the Turkish invasion and by extension to Turks (of Turkey usually rather than the Turkish-Cypriots) in order to describe their ‘barbaric’ behaviour and their intention for expansionism. The term comes from how the Turkish invasion was named by the Turkish military. It should be noted however that the Greek-Cypriots use the term to denote barbarism while the Turks used it to link to the Attila the Hun.

community – except from *us* the ‘Greeks’ until high school! *Katechomena*, ‘the occupied areas’, for me meant ghost cities that were created after *we*, the Greeks, were forced by the Turks to abandon them. I remember that I only heard about the ‘Turkish-Cypriots’ when asking my parents – around the age of fifteen – about the people who live in the occupied areas after realising that *katechomena* (the occupied areas), apart from the ghost city of *Varosia*, were inhabited. I come from a family with a rightist/liberal ideological background and even though my parents are not nationalists I remember that whenever we had to fill in any documents for travelling abroad we would write ‘Greek’ in the blank field next to the word ‘Nationality’. However, I cannot say that the Cyprus problem or the occupation was mentioned often in our house since we were living quite far from the Green Line, and neither of my parents is a refugee. But I remember that what used to confuse me the most was my grandmother’s contradictory references to the Turks. For example, she would often refer to her *Tourkou*³ neighbour who made the most delicious *ekmek kataif*⁴ or again in a very friendly and nostalgic tone, how another *Tourkou* neighbour would visit her to have coffee and then ‘read the cup’ together, but then whenever the news mentioned that the talks on the Cyprus problem reached another dead end she would curse and call the Turks *shilli*.⁵ It is also one of my grandmother’s stories which worked as the catalyst for demolishing my original Greek consciousness; she would talk about some old rumours suggesting that my grandfather – who was given for adoption right after he was born – was the child of a mixed couple consisting of a Christian (Greek-Cypriot) man and a Muslim (Turkish-Cypriot) woman. It was then that suddenly *my other* became part of *my identity* and urged me to find out how these contradictory meanings became legitimised.

The Topic

The topic of my thesis resulted from my personal history – which I briefly introduced above – since it led to an interest in how local, family or personal historical narratives compete with official or mediated narratives about the island’s history.

³ *Tourkou* is a word of the Cypriot dialect used mainly by old Greek-Cypriots that used to live together with Turkish-Cypriots to refer in an affectionate way to a Turkish-Cypriot woman. Literally it means: “little Turkish woman”.

⁴ *Ekmek kataif* is a traditional Turkish dessert.

⁵ A word used in the Cypriot dialect to mean wild dogs.

The dynamics involved in this topic are complex and include the different perceptions/narratives with which the two communities – and even different sections within them – conceptualise the history of ethnic conflict and the need for coexistence. As Bryant (2001) put it recently, the contradictory perceptions of the two communities may end up as conflicts between different rival concepts of “justice” and “respect”. To complicate things even more there are alternative perceptions in both communities and historical narratives that come into conflict with the dominant discourses in each community. It should be noted that I adopt Jäger’s definition of *discourse* as “the flow of knowledge – and/or all societal knowledge stored – throughout all time and, which determines individual and collective doing and/or formative action that shapes society, thus exercising power” (2006 [2001], p.34).

This thesis’ aim is to explore the intersection of the impact of different media uses and institutions with the conflict of rival discourses in the public sphere or the differentiation of alternative and hegemonic public spheres. The theme that will be explored in the above context will be bicomunal relations, i.e. how opposing discourses emerged and competed and continue to compete on the defining of these relations and the image of the *other*. It is hoped that the conclusions of this work will help in the understanding of how meaning has been constructed through conflict and how different media and forms of communication have fed into the broader social and cultural history of Cypriot society and more specifically the development of bicomunal relations, an area which has exerted the most profound influence on the modern history of the island.

These questions will be explored through the examination of three different forms of bicomunal communication – face-to-face, the traditional mainstream print and broadcast, and new media – which will be related to different historical periods in which each medium has been ‘dominant’⁶ as a mode of communication in Cyprus. The wide-ranging nature of the research questions demand a multi-method research, and so my arguments will be based on data gathered from published histories, interviews, and the analysis of print, broadcast and online texts.

⁶ Dominant is in scare marks because all the above mentioned media continue to exist and to have some sort of dominance for different reasons or occasions and because it is quite hard to demonstrate new media’s dominance yet.

Cyprus' bicomunal conflict and partition is not unique. There are other areas of bicomunal conflict both in the nearby area of Eastern Mediterranean like Israel or Lebanon, or in broader context of Europe like Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Kosovo. Conflict and partition in those areas emerged either on the basis of ethnic, religious or ideological differences and as Cockburn (2004, pp.36-37) contends there are equal competing accounts that support either that the partition in those areas was necessary in order to prevent further violence or that go against it pointing to the undemocratic conditions that partition causes. The focus of this study however is the way the media act to politicise religious or other differences and create forms of antagonistic identity – or which media forms seem to encourage forms of coexistence.

It could be argued that the most similar case of conflict to the Cyprus one is that of Bosnia, both because this was also an area which has been characterised by peaceful coexistence for long periods of time (and especially prior to the massacres of the early 1990's) among different communities – Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats – without religious or ethnic identities becoming reasons of conflict for years, and because the media's role has been significant in the reinforcement of those religious and ethnic differences as elements of conflicting identities during the period of conflict.

In Cyprus, due to the lack of physical interaction between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots since 1974, the communication between the two communities has been mediated by different means. The concept of the *other* has been largely the result of this mediated communication and that is why this thesis examines how the relations of the two communities are affected by the way their communication is facilitated. The *other* is used in this thesis in its singular form in order to emphasise the explicitness with which it has been used by the Greek-Cypriot⁷ and Turkish-Cypriot communities to refer to the 'opposite' community since the time the nationalist violence broke out in the island and especially during the period of separation. In other words, when the *other* is used in this thesis it is meant to limit dimensions of difference and define only the opposite community.⁸ Even though the Cyprus problem and several aspects of bicomunal relations have been

⁷ In the following chapters of this thesis I will be using GC(s) to refer to Greek Cypriot(s) and TC(s) to refer to Turkish Cypriot(s).

⁸ The opposite community in an expanded form that includes also the people of the two 'motherlands', Greeks and Turks.

explored in the past few years, there have been few studies⁹ focusing on how the changes in the communication media used by the two communities have affected their relations and negative perceptions about the *other*.

The relative easing of the post-1974 absolute separation of the two communities in 2003 has created trends that need to be studied and analysed. The younger generations of the two communities have been brought up almost without any kind of interaction, since communication channels did not exist for 29 years; while the older generations had to negotiate between memories of friendly/peaceful coexistence and bicommunal conflicts between 1956 and 1974 – and the nationalist perceptions disseminated by the dominant media. Thus the focus of the empirical studies of this thesis is also on a comparative exploration of the impact of different media both before and after separation and also after the easing of restrictions regarding free movement across the Green Line, offering in this way a new synthesis and analysis of the mediation of a century of turbulent bicommunal relations in Cyprus.

The Cypriot dialect is a very significant component for the communication of the Cypriot communities since it is the linguistic code – used in face-to-face/oral interaction – on which the Cypriots heavily relied for their communication during the 19th century. More specifically, until the end of the 19th century the dominant mode of communication in Cyprus was face-to-face and it was facilitated through the use of the Cypriot dialect, despite the fact that each community had also its own distinct language. Even though print media were introduced to the island as early as 1878¹⁰ – with the emergence of the first Cypriot newspaper *ΚΥΠΡΟΣ* - *CYPRUS* – until the end of the 19th century the dominant mode of communication on the people's level was still face-to-face. Until the middle of the 20th century less than half of the population could be considered literate thus writing was a form of communication largely confined to power, i.e. state or the church. The print media were adopted by the rising middle and upper classes and the procedure of these media forms becoming dominant were part of the wider process of 'modernisation' in Cyprus. Modernisation refers to the period when the Cypriots have been exposed to new ideas

⁹ A report on media narratives about the Cyprus problem was done in 2010 but it covered a very narrow timeframe in 2002 and 2007-2008 (Christophorou, Sanem and Pavlou, 2010).

¹⁰ For more details on the Cyprus media landscape refer to Appendix C.

caused by processes like: (a) colonisation, (b) urbanisation and (c) university education of the younger generations. One of the key questions explored by this thesis is how the growing dominance of the print media first created a de facto segregation of the public sphere in Cyprus due to the fact that the press ‘imposed’ the use of different written languages in the print media developed by the two communities (Panayiotou, 2006c, p.289). In the Greek-Cypriot community, the dominance of the print media with the use of the Greek language, and not the Cypriot dialect, provided a legitimisation for the argument that the Cypriot Christians were Greeks and, as Panayiotou suggests, this also supported the claim that they should be closer to “the colonising West rather than the colonised native Middle Easterns” (ibid).

Broadcast media appeared on the island in the 1950s. During the British rule the *Cyprus Broadcasting Service* was established – as the public broadcaster of the island – which aired its first radio programmes in 1953 and in 1957 its first television programmes. In 1960, after the independence of Cyprus, *Cyprus Broadcasting Service* became *Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation* (CyBC) which is until today the public broadcaster of the Republic of Cyprus. By the end of 1980, the first private radio broadcasters had appeared in the Republic of Cyprus and the first private television channels began broadcasting in the early 1990s. Even though the emergence of broadcast media followed the path already traced by the print media, in terms of adopting the same dominant discourse, there were certain – but limited – moments in the context of broadcast media where alternative discourses could be expressed. The most important of these examples was the Cypriot Sketch¹¹ – a form of theatrical radio play written in the Cypriot dialect – that was broadcast every Sunday noon by CyBC¹² since the 1950s.¹³ Apart from these few exceptions, the radio and television programmes’ content followed the trend of conveying the dominant discourse, something that, in the 1990s after the privatisation of broadcast media according to Panayiotou, – “played a significant role in the construction of the moral panics of the period”, and which

¹¹ The use of the term “sketch” here does not imply the comic component that is denoted by the English term. “Cypriot sketch” is the way I translate in English the Greek term *Kipriotiko Sketch*.

¹² CyBC, in Greek *RIK*, stands for Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation and is the public broadcaster of the Republic of Cyprus.

¹³ Another example is the programme called *I Ora tis Ipethrou* (translated in English as “Rural Times”) which also broadcast specimens of the Cypriot dialect since it included a few short interviews of peasants and was broadcast right before *The Cypriot Sketch*. However, the language used by the broadcaster of the programme was Greek. It should be noted that both programmes *I Ora tis Ipethrou* and *The Cypriot Sketch* are broadcast until today on the same weekly basis.

in many cases guided people to organise nationalistic demonstrations across the Green Line (2006(c), p.30). It should be noted, however, that after the easing of restrictions regarding free movement across the Green Line, there have been efforts to incorporate bicommunal content in the Greek-Cypriot television such as the daily programme *BIZ/Εμείς*¹⁴ (the Turkish and Greek words for ‘Us’).

Even though this thesis includes a chapter (6) that analyses print and broadcast material, the chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive history but it is designed to give a broad overview and to examine the spaces for alternative voices within the mainstream media.

The Path

The thesis begins by developing a theoretical framework to address these questions of mediation and offers a critical review of the historiography of bicommunal relations on the island. In the attempt to develop my theoretical model two traditions are critically reviewed: the tradition of analysis focusing on the impact of the media as forms or as institutions and the tradition of analysis focusing on the way the media become vehicles for the articulation of rival – dominant and counter-hegemonic – discourses in the public sphere.

The exploration of the first tradition begins from Carey’s (2009 [1989]) definitions of “transmission” and “ritual” models of communication and moves to the evaluation of approaches that focus on the impact of the media in shaping the environment within which information is transmitted and interpreted (such as McLuhan, 1965) and those that emphasise the non-intended social uses and impacts of the media (such as Williams, 1981). For Couldry (2003b) the power of the media lies in the rituals they entangle in order to create the “myth of the mediated centre”, i.e. to establish the idea that the media represent the moral ‘centre of society’ due to the privileged relationship they have with it. Thus when examining how media discourses influence bicommunal relations in Cyprus I am acknowledging the impact of the media as forms but situating it in the context of

¹⁴ *Biz/ Εμείς* is a bilingual (in Greek and Turkish) programme broadcast daily by the second channel (RIK2) of CyBC.

institutional and cultural dynamics by utilising Couldry's theory of "the myth of the mediated centre" (2003b, p.2).

The second tradition draws inspiration from the work of Habermas (1992 [1989]) and his critics, particularly those who develop models of alternative and multiple public spheres, to engage with questions of the public sphere in Cyprus. Thus, when examining the exclusion of certain groups from the official public sphere(s) in Cyprus, I am looking on the one hand how certain media rituals serve as instruments for such exclusion and on the other, the way new media are used by these groups in order to overcome the exclusion, i.e. the contribution of new media in generating alternative public spheres.

The Structure of the Thesis

A wide range of socio-anthropological accounts attest to the existence of rival discourses on the history of Cyprus. Papadakis (1995) identifies the existence of multiple *mythhistories* created by the different discourses that the dominant institutions of the island adopt. Peristianis (1995), Mavratsas (1998) and Panayiotou (2011) suggest that the identity or the Cypriots' consciousness has never been static, on the contrary they have been always characterised by a historical fluidity. Drawing upon such accounts and work of anthropologists and sociologists such as Loizos (1986) and Attalides (2003 [1979]; 1986; 1977), in Chapter 3 I attempt to outline the complexity of the history of bicomunal relations in the twentieth century in Cyprus.

In Chapter 4, I describe the methods and the analytical framework of my research. I explain why an eclectic approach was adopted in relation to the methods used. The analytic method used in my research is a synthesis between the generic analytic discourse and critical discourse analysis, since on the one hand I am examining how the texts are producing or reproducing representations and on the other hand, I examine the power conflicts involved in the interaction of discourses. The discourse of bicomunal relations is examined in this research through a multidimensional approach, i.e. through the analysis of different kinds of data: interview, print, broadcast and online material. When analysing the interviews, I am looking to the participants' interpretations around concepts related to

the other community and how these change both in specific historical contexts and after the participants' bicomunal face-to-face experiences. When examining print and broadcast media material I am looking for the rival discourses, their interaction and the meanings they (re)produce. In the case of the analysis of online material the focus is on the way non-dominant discourses about bicomunal relations are expressed and confront the dominant ones through the use of Internet tools.

This thesis includes three empirical studies that attempt to deal with the confrontation of the Cypriots' 'reality' versus mediated experience. Of course 'reality' should not be considered as something indisputable since it is also something culturally mediated. However, in relation to Couldry's argument about "the myth of the mediated centre" the media seem to construct another form of the 'sacred' and thus their mediation can be used by power to distance people who are otherwise close both experientially and in terms of history. In Cyprus, this confrontational and in many cases conflicting relation between the 'reality' and the mediated experience can be identified if one sees how old neighbours – or rather the children of those neighbours – found themselves separated by histories and wars taught via the print/book medium in school and reproduced through the dominant discourses of print and broadcast media.

The first empirical study of my research in Chapter 5, analyses the bicomunal face-to-face communication experience in Cyprus. Face-to-face experiences before and after the absolute separation of 1974 and after the free movement regulations of 2003 from both Greek and Turkish Cypriot participants are reported and compared. In my analysis I highlight the shocking experience of abandoning the stereotypes about the *other* of the participants that communicated face-to-face with the other community for the first time after 1974.

In the light of the historical literature review included in Chapter 3, the recurrent openness towards having face-to-face communication with the other community that it is observed among the leftist participants is not surprising. However, in my analysis I emphasise that this openness becomes a common theme after the first face-to-face bicomunal communication among the participants independently of their ideological background, age and educational status. In other words, reality becomes a key variable here, since once there

is an experiential link with reality people are more likely to see each other positively or less confrontationally.

As will become apparent, face-to-face communication between the two communities, even though it was a favourable way of relating to the other community, had not been always possible due to the political restrictions by the authorities of both sides. That is why I also underline the significance of the alternative ways chosen by the participants in order to communicate with the other community. An analytical emphasis is also given to depicting the devices producing these negative stereotypes about the *other* that the participants – especially the Greek-Cypriots – who have not been in contact with the other community before 1974 used to have before their face-to-face bicomunal encounter.

The second empirical study of this thesis is reported in Chapter 6. This empirical study examines the bicomunal representation in the Greek-Cypriot print and broadcast media material. The emphasis here is on the dominance of mediated communication and how this mediation facilitated nationalism in certain historical periods. However, attention is also drawn on the fact that despite nationalist hegemony there were strong remnants/residuals of coexistence which emerged in rival – to the dominant – discourses, e.g. the leftists but also in everyday life, like the maintenance of forms of face-to-face memory through the use of Cypriot dialect. These forces resurface at various points in the north and south parts of the island questioning in the process the power of the ‘sacredness’ of the mediated centre.

In the analysis I underline the significance of the historical context within which these discourses have been produced, for example during the long period of separation, when these discourses mediated the communication between the two communities completely. Chapter 6 is looking not only at a range of media but also at a range of genres; that is why it examines broadcasting cases which provide politics by entertainment, as well as the case of using a medium for official policy pronouncements. It should be noted that, the selections of the media material examined in this chapter are not random, but nor are they trying to be representative. Rather they are indicative of media strategies through which bicomunal relations were represented/reproduced.

The analysis aims at identifying the discourses about bicomunal relations that Greek-Cypriot media produced in these different contexts and to understand how these discourses – even though hegemonic – are questioned in certain historical periods that people get the chance to have an experiential link to reality.

Chapter 7 includes the last empirical study of this research. This empirical study analyses bicomunal communication through the Internet. In the light of the discussions included in the previous two empirical studies, the discussion in Chapter 7 begins by considering that the Cypriots' bicomunal experienced reality – both face-to-face and online – is a form of opposition to “the myth of the mediated centre” of the mass media of modernity. In doing so, I analyse bicomunal communication through two different Internet tools in two different periods: 1. Email communication in the period of separation and 2. Facebook Groups in the period of free movement. Analytical emphasis is put again on the specificity and the social uses of these tools within these different historical contexts. In the light of Williams' account (1990 [1974]) of the intended and non-intended social uses of the media I suggest that the Internet – and these online tools in particular – allow space for non-intended social uses. A non-intended social use in these cases as I suggest, is the creation of alternative public spheres from those groups excluded by the official public sphere. Furthermore, I underline the alternative discourses and media rituals produced within these online contexts that can question “the myth of the mediated centre” (Couldry, 2003b), or create new forms of discussion and public sphere. But at the same time I discuss the possibility of the alternative to the power hierarchy created by “the myth of the mediated centre” – that could eventually dominate the new media too – to be ‘the vision’ of a democratic open public sphere.

The concluding chapter (8) is the time when I pause and look back to my thesis as a whole, aiming to draw threads that have been developed by the discussions of the rest of the chapters. After acknowledging the contribution of my thesis – as an effort to study the relatively unexplored area of bicomunal communication in Cyprus through a multidisciplinary scope of media, cultural and regional studies – I attempt to find ways to further expand my arguments in future research.

Finally, if I were asked to introduce my project within a few sentences, I would do so by saying that: it is a journey that explores how personal narratives and mediated discourses compete about this island's history and how the dominance of the latter usually aims in creating identities that 'deny' the *cultural* complexity and hybridism that characterise the identity of Cyprus' citizens.

Chapter Two

SETTING UP THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to set up a theoretical framework for the project. As already mentioned in the introductory chapter (1) this research is multidisciplinary, since its focus – an analysis of the impact of different forms of communication on bicomunal relations in Cyprus – touches issues from areas of several disciplines like media studies, cultural studies, social and political sciences. As a result, a theoretical framework that will cover aspects of those areas needs to be constructed. In such an attempt, the current chapter will be divided into two broad areas of discussion (a) highlighting relevant theories of media studies and (b) focusing on the role of media in the sphere of politics.

I should first of all state here that I am attempting an analysis of bicomunal communication which focuses neither too closely on the text, on the medium nor on the audience but on a dynamic interaction across and between them. For doing so, a ritual approach is preferable to other media theory accounts but I will first explain why this is so by critically reviewing some of the most important approaches in the field of media studies. Thus the first section will refer to: (a) theories of medium specificity, having the work of McLuhan (1965) as the centre of the discussion, (b) accounts on the social uses of the media with the work of Williams (1990 [1974]) as the centre of discussion and (c) Couldry's (2000b; 2003b; 2006) ritual approach to communication. Couldry's critique of media power (2000b) and his arguments on media rituals (2003b) will also be extensively discussed since his work is central to this thesis. The section will end with an attempt to indicate the usefulness of the proposed theoretical approach in relation to the case under studied of this research.

The second section will focus on the role of media in the sphere of politics and that is why it will begin by briefly reviewing the work of Habermas (1992 [1989]) on the public sphere. The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical approach suitable to study the role of media in the reconstitution of individual citizens into a public body thus, in such an attempt, the review of Habermas' theory of the public sphere will be followed by a discussion of the criticism that the Habermasian concept received. My review of the criticism will focus on the

existence of multiple/alternative public spheres that function parallel and counter to the dominant one. When using the term 'dominant public sphere', I will be referring to the public sphere which functions dominating towards the other public spheres that exist in a society, through the use of discourses and other mechanisms that claim that they represent the centre of that particular society. Again, this section will end with an attempt to indicate the usefulness of the emergent theoretical approach in relation to Cyprus.

2.2. Theories of media

2.2.1. The question: locating *power* in the process of communication

This section raises questions that are central to this thesis regarding the relationship between the media, the audience¹⁵ and the text, particularly in terms of power. The term ‘power’ will be used in this thesis to refer to what Bourdieu defines as *symbolic power*, i.e. as the power to construct reality and to establish the ‘gnoseological order’¹⁶ (1991, p.166). In other words, *power* will refer to the dynamic process that makes one meaning dominant over others and finally establishes the status of the source of production of meaning as “source of social knowledge” (Couldry, 2000b, p.4). In the attempt to understand where the power is located in this relationship the communication process has to be put into some sort of model. At the same time though, the model used to describe the communication process will depend on where one sees this source of power to be located.

For example, in the American tradition in the field of communication, the relationship fits into a model that locates the power in the process of transmitting information, making the sender the source of power. This is illustrative in Shannons and Weaver’s “information theory” (1948) model when the dynamic – and as a result the *success* – of communication lies on this route that the information follows in order to be transmitted from the “transmitter” to the “receiver”. In other words, this tradition sees the significance of communication in the transmission of information, i.e. on the one who sends the information and leaves the other three main components – media, text and audience – without any power in this process. The rationale behind such an approach makes more sense after one realises that it has its origins in religion, Christianity in particular, i.e. ‘the words of God’ is the information that should be transmitted fast, safely and unquestionably to the world (Carey, 2009 [1989]).

Then again, from a more secularised point of view, the information that is being transmitted is certainly not ‘moral’ but it is rather a version of knowledge with particular meanings embedded in it. Thus, in this approach *what* is being transmitted – the text – is significant because it is

¹⁵ The use of the term *audience* here instead of ‘users’ or ‘public’ does not mean to presuppose any limits about its power and participation in the process of communication. It is rather a preference that has to do with the term’s typical meaning and translation in Greek – *κοινό* which is synonymous with the translation of the term ‘public’ (Madianou, 2005b, pp.225-228).

¹⁶ ‘Gnoseological order’ refers to the cognitive schemata through which we make sense, i.e. know and interpret (Bourdieu, 1991).

assigned, and as a result it conveys, a particular meaning which might have a manipulative impact on the audience. Such a tradition that places the text in the powerful position in the process of communication raises questions in relation to how one could identify the manipulative purpose of certain texts in relation to others. In other words, it cannot overcome what it criticises in the first place which is “the preferred reading”. Couldry¹⁷ (2000a, p.136) indicates this as a weak point of this approach and he rejects the “automatic authority of the textual critic who can ‘magically’ read the nature of society off the certain surface of privileged texts”. He criticises the way textual research scholars insist on their reading and analysis of media texts as the only way of reading them. A similar point is being made by Morley when he poses the rather rhetorical question: “is the preferred reading a property of the text, the analyst or the audience?” (1992, p.122). On the contrary, as Hall argues, the text should be seen as “a complex structure of dominance” because at each stage of the communication process it is “imprinted by institutional power relations” (1993 [1973], p.90) and that is why it cannot be isolated and ‘demonised’ when communication is examined.

When studying the media however, it looks quite paradoxical to ignore or not take into consideration the importance of the media themselves as both the afore-mentioned approaches do. Thus, the following section will focus on reviewing that school of thought which attempts to study the media by locating *power* in the specificity of the medium, often having it as the only entity of their analysis. Within this school, the technology of each medium has a different impact. It is an approach in other words, which argues that the technology of a medium is what shapes culture and society.

2.2.2. Attempting to address the question through the media dynamic approach

Even though fathers of this school of thought are considered to be both Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan, McLuhan became most known for his persistence on assigning to the technology of a medium the causality for social and cultural change.

Innis however was among the first to draw attention to the specificity of the media by focusing on how the form or technology of a medium affects the stability of a society, on how it maintains or shifts social power. Through his study on the impact of media on the economic

¹⁷ A more extensive reference to Couldry’s work will follow, since his arguments are central to my thesis.

and political power historically, Innis (1999 [1950]) had been led to the conclusion that there are two kind of media: (a) those which are “time biased” due to the fact that they are made out of material that can last longer in time and (b) those which their material is made out of material that can travel across different spaces easily, thus they are “space biased”. His main argument was that the “time biased media” maintain stable, small societies where history and tradition are emphasised, when the “space biased media” lead to large societies characterised by social change and instability (ibid).

McLuhan’s work, which was influenced by Innis’ arguments, attempted to relate how the dominance of a particular medium in a society leads to a shift in social power. He did so by dividing history into three phases, according to the culture created by the medium which was dominant in each phase: (a) oral culture, (b) written/print culture and (c) electronic culture.

When focusing on the first phase McLuhan (1965) argued that the culture created by the dominance of oral medium is integrative due to the fact that “the spoken word” places both the speaker and the listener in an active state. “The spoken word” according to McLuhan is always public, it directs at someone rather than anyone and that is why it requires a reaction – some sort of participation.

In contrast to the case of oral culture, when McLuhan focuses on the phase of the written word and print domination, he argues that the culture it creates leads to the alienation of people from reality due to the process of representation that this medium establishes. As he asserts, the written word – and to an extent the print medium – are processes of storing information in order to expedite their accessibility. This expedition of information however has two negative effects for McLuhan: (a) the exclusion of aspects of the information communicated due to the selectivity required when the information is being stored and (b) the establishment of the knowledge transmitted as the absolute truth which is caused by the ease with which stored information spreads in the world (McLuhan, 1965, p.172). As Lister et al., write, when reviewing McLuhan’s ideas about print culture: “Fixed points of view and measured, separating distances come to structure the human subject’s relation to the world” (2009 [2003], p.82).

McLuhan’s views on print culture have significant implications for nationalism which is a significant element of this thesis. He argues, that modern nationalism is a social effect of the

print culture due to the homogenisation that this medium requires. Nationalism theorists such as Gellner (1983) and Anderson¹⁸ (1991 [1983]) do also point to the impact of print culture on the rise of nationalism. Anderson summarises the conclusions of his attempt to stress the origins of nationalism into the following:

[T]he convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation (1991 [1983], p.46).

It should be noted however that Anderson is much less technologically determinist than McLuhan since technology for him is dialectically embedded in material (economic) relations.

Gellner's reference is not as targeted to print technology as Anderson's. He initially makes a more general reference to the role of all mass media in the dissemination of the nationalist idea by saying that:

[T]he pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralised, standardised, one to many communication, which itself automatically-engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted (1983, p.127).

Then, however Gellner moves further to refer more specifically to the importance of the language and style – two attributes that determine print culture – of the message transmitted. In his own words:

The core message is that the language and style of the transmissions is important, that only he who can understand them, or can acquire such comprehension, is included in a moral and economic community, and that he who does not and cannot, is excluded (ibid).

As far as the third (electronic) phase, McLuhan emphasises the great impact on society of the dynamic of radio and television. His main argument in relation to the radio is that it has again an integrative effect due to the fact that the listeners of a broadcast radio programme become involved to one another.

An interesting aspect of McLuhan's arguments on the impact of the radio is his suggestion that it is a medium with democratic' or decentralising dimensions as it helps in reviving languages and dialects marginalised by nationalism of the print medium, but at the same time it can also be used by authoritarian leaders – as in the period of the interwar years 1920-40. Even though

¹⁸ A more extensive reference to Anderson's and Gellner's work on nationalism in relation to the print technology is included in Chapters 3 and 6.

McLuhan starts by discussing at the beginning of his chapter the alleged authoritarian tendencies of radio (1965, p.297) – due to its use – and ends the chapter by referring to radio as “a decentralising pluralistic force, as it is really the case with all electric power and media” (1965, p.306), he avoids providing evidence for this latter mentioned impact of the radio since he remains trapped in the limitations of the medium theory that does not allow him to discuss his hypothesis/arguments in connection with historical agency.

When referring to the medium of television, McLuhan (1965) considers it the most powerful medium in the genre of electronic media. His arguments centre on the dynamic of the medium to cause the participation of the viewers due to the fact that they need to complete the “meshed” – low definition – image that television presents while emphasising the intimacy that it also causes. However, McLuhan leaves unquestioned the participation of the audience in the age of high definition television while he also ignores that this intimacy is not necessarily a characteristic exclusive to television (Loviglio, 2005 makes a similar argument for radio’s intimacy).

The section that follows focuses on the problems of the theoretical approach that concentrates on the medium specificity and discusses more exclusively the main sources of criticism it received.

2.2.3. Criticism of technological determinism: moving towards a cultural studies approach

If considering the content of the media as the only important element within the process of communication leads to textual determinism, then considering the media – while at the same time defining the media as technology – as the only important element leads to technological determinism. Medium theorists, even though they drew attention to an important element of the media – that of technology – which is absent in the transmission model or media content theory, they ignored all other factors and elements of the communication process and as a result they did not avoid the pitfall of determinism. The approach that media technology determines culture and society cannot avoid being looked at suspiciously since a more careful reflection on the way different social groups use in different ways the same media technology makes such an argument unconvincing.

This approach – that media technology determines culture and society – has been critically responded to and rejected by Raymond Williams (1990 [1974]). Williams' argument is that there is nothing in technology that can determine culture and society, on the contrary it is the different ways in which those media technologies are being used by different social groups in specific historical contexts that empower cultural and social change. As Williams characteristically puts it:

If the effect of the medium is the same, whoever control or uses it, and whatever apparent content he may try to insert, then we can forget ordinary political and cultural argument and let technology run itself (1990 [1974], p.131).

Williams, criticises McLuhan's view of a technology's causes as effects. He criticises the fact that McLuhan sees the *effects* of a medium but does not see *intention* in a medium's invention. Williams specifically suggests (1990 [1974], p.124) that effects can only be studied in relation with real intentions and condemns the fact that McLuhan ignores that a medium is invented aiming to satisfy a specific social need.

Despite the fact that Williams criticises McLuhan's media effects theory and his technological centralism, he does not reject the view that media technology is a significant element in the process of communication but while he recognises that, he also considers that the different characteristics of the media are related with specific historical and cultural situations and intentions. That is why Williams (1981, p.108) suggests that technology should not be studied as something monolithic – in the way medium theorists do – but when studied it should be differentiated into: (a) technical inventions and techniques, to describe tools like the alphabet on which the technology of print depends; (b) substantive technology, to refer to the distribution tools of a medium's technology like newspapers and books in the case of print; (c) technology in social use, to refer to the practice of writing and the social aspect of the distribution of technology like the spreading of language again as a practice for social needs purposes. Through this differentiation Williams indicates that when technology is defined simply as a monolithic technique as in McLuhan's medium theory, its meaning is reduced. The aspect of the social use of technology is also crucial – and could not be seen just as an effect of technology – in order to understand it as a medium, i.e. as a technology of communication. Thus, for Williams a technology cannot be separated from practice.

On the other hand, even though intention is something that should be taken into consideration when studying the media, as Williams contends it should not be let to become another element of determinism. According to him when looked at exclusively, intention could lead to the idea of “determined technology” (Williams, 1990 [1974], p.133), i.e. that the effects of a technology are only the ones intended when the technology was invented. In other words, Williams agrees that all technologies have been invented and developed with the intention to help or to cause certain social practices but this is not exclusive since the opposite often happens: social groups with practices outside the intended ones “adopt and develop the technology, often with different purposes and effects” (Williams, 1990 [1974], p.129).

Williams gives an example of these uses outside the intended ones with the medium of television. As he explains, television was a technology invented for specific military, administrative and commercial intentions but in times of transition those complex intentions interacted with other social interests and the initial intentions became effects which opened other possibilities of intentions and uses (1990 [1974], p.134).

When McLuhan analyses the medium of radio, he highlights the ability of its technology to connect people together through live broadcasting but ignores the different uses that it can be put to. Williams on the other hand, refers to the significance of radio as a medium conceived in a post-war period together with other related and rivaling systems, within a phase of general social transformation and to the development of different uses caused to the medium. He comments on this transformation of intentions, uses and its impact on the development of a medium:

The decisive and earlier transformation of industrial production, and its new social forms, which had grown out of a long history of capital accumulation and working technical improvements, created new needs but also new possibilities, and the communication systems, down to television, were their intrinsic outcome (Williams, 1990 [1974], p.19).

However, perhaps the most interesting example that Williams gives is that of literacy, since it is an example that responds to the deterministic arguments of McLuhan which blames the technology of print for the development of nationalism. According to Williams, at the beginning of the industrial revolution in Britain, the ruling class taught the working people to read but not to write. The intention of this was to enable them to understand new kinds of instructions as well as to read the Bible for their moral improvement. This intention however

of selective reading, was impossible to exclude another practice that was not intended, that of reading the radical press. As a result, in this case “[a] controlled intention became an uncontrolled effect” (Williams, 1990 [1974], pp.134-135).

Even though in today’s media studies there is an apparent victory of Williams’ s position with McLuhan’s views being ignored or rejected (Lister, et al., 2009 [2003], p.79 and p.85) the debate between medium specificity and the social use of technology becomes central again when the focus is on new media. The reason for this, is that new media – by definition – draw the attention to technology since it is because of the invention of new or the development of an old technology that they are characterised as ‘new media’. In addition to this, the definition of new media implies the optimistic ideology that something ‘new’ will be better than the ‘old’ as Lister, et al., contend “[...] there is a powerful utopian and positive ideological charge to the concept of ‘new’” (2009 [2003], p.10). However, new media as all other media – even though they are emphasised for their technology – should be looked at neither simply as technology, nor as practices of specific intentions but as media open to alternative definitions and practices.

Williams contributions helped to shape the emerging field of cultural studies, especially his emphasis to the complexity of a culture and its relation to issues of power, social representation and participation. As Couldry puts it: “cultural studies think of culture in relation to [...] the power relations which affect who is represented and how, who speaks and who is silent, what counts as ‘culture’ and what does not” (2000a, p.2). In other words when examining media ‘products’ the focus should be neither on their technology effects, their content or the audience, but on the fact that they are processes that involve constraints in terms of whose voice is heard and whose is muted, who sees an image with which s/he can identify with and who is not. Having a cultural studies approach when studying the media allows us on the one hand, to pose more questions than when adopting an approach which centres on one component of the process of communication and on the other, to look for the significance of non-dominant media products. As Couldry put it when discussing the advantages of the cultural studies approach:

First, it enabled us to ask of a work of art, or literature, or music, a whole set of questions not available in conventional aesthetic theory: How does the work relate to the shared living conditions of its time? What meanings does it have when absorbed into the lives of its audiences? [...] The

second advantage is that those questions apply equally well to *any* work, whether so-called ‘high’ or ‘low’ culture; there is no question of ‘high’ culture being more worth investigating from this point of view (2000a, p.24).

Another scholar, Livingstone (2005) studies the relationship between the media and the audience and she is specifically concerned with the debate on the way the audience engages with a medium. She begins the discussion on this matter by posing the question: when an audience engages actively and as a result could be considered a public and when is not and it should be considered an audience? Livingstone argues that audiences’ media practices are not predetermined¹⁹ by the technology of media but rather the audiences’ alternative uses of certain technologies open new possibilities for the audience’s definition. By taking the example of young people who are listening to the radio using their headphones in public spaces or are participating in public discussions hosted in online spaces while being themselves in private spaces like their bedrooms, Livingstone argues that the definitions of audience and public merge or at least their differentiation becomes more complex.

A cultural approach does not see the purpose of communication as the transmission information in specific ways – through specific media – but rather as all the practices – intended and alternative – aiming for social and cultural maintenance and/or development. This approach however should not consider culture as something homogenous defined by the common characteristics of people from a particular nation because then the process of communication becomes a process of exclusion. In other words, when culture is considered as something homogenous shared by a whole nation, the belief that it can be expressed through a single discourse remains unquestioned and becomes naturalised. The idea of a homogenous culture however, is impossible even in extreme cases like the one described by Couldry (2000a, pp.103-104). As he describes in the case of the death of Princess Diana, the majority of the British media conveyed the discourse of “the nation in grief”, representing on the one hand those who were indeed grieving but on the other exerting some sort of power on the rest who did not in the sense that ‘they should be grieving if belonging in the same nation, if sharing the same culture’. In other words, the media’s discourse of “the nation in grief” projects the audience as a homogenised entity that must share the same feelings, thought and beliefs; in this way its discourse becomes a ritual through which the shared/common culture is celebrated.

¹⁹ There are of course certain technological constraints as a result of particular media but the emphasis here is on the tension between structure and agency.

Thus, the cultural studies approach that I adopt in this research sees media as mechanisms of representation and exclusion for the sake of producing and maintaining a culture. In the remainder of this section I will discuss this approach and its usefulness in this research.

2.2.4. A new model: towards a ritual model of communication

As a result, this new approach should rely a lot on the audience's participation in the communication process, the way the audience creates – or participates in – rituals around media. A new model of communication, which manifests this approach, is usually referred to as a ritual model of communication.

Communication in the ritual model is seen as the process in which society is being maintained in time. In comparison to the transmission model, which sees it as the process of transmitting information, this model sees communication as the process of representation of shared beliefs. As Carey (2009 [1989], p.15) explains, the label in front of this model, i.e. 'ritual', indicates the model's connection to religion. A connection however that is not as direct as in the case of the transmission model, in the sense that it does not refer to the expansion of religion in space but to the 'sacred ceremony' which aims in the representation of shared beliefs of a community and as a result the maintenance of religion. Thus, when communication is seen through the lens of the ritual model it is seen as the 'sacred' process through which "an ordered, meaningful cultural world that can serve as a control and container for human action" is constructed and maintained (ibid).

Durkheim's theory on the role of the ritual in a community is often referred to as the context in which this communication model has been developed, since one of the arguments of his theory is that society through material communicative forms projects a community's ideals – shared beliefs – in order to provide confirmation of itself (Durkheim, 1953, p.95 cited in Carey, [2009] 1989, p.15).

Couldry (2003b) introduces the term "media rituals" to describe the power effects of the process of mediating the social world. Media in this sense become mechanisms that produce 'rituals' through which people imagine themselves connected to the social world (Couldry, 2003b, p.2). In other words, media discourses become the rituals in which the audience participates in order to 'celebrate' their shared culture.

As a result, the act of watching the news from this perspective, is not about receiving information which enlightens you. Thus what is being learned in this process is not so much about learning something new but on the contrary what is being done in this kind of communicative form is that shared views on certain issues about the world are represented and confirmed. It is this confirmation that constitutes the basis on which Couldry (2003b, p.45) develops his concept of “the myth of the mediated centre”. According to Couldry (*ibid*), the myth of the mediated centre is created because is believed that there is a centre of truth – a centre which contains the truth, meaning the norms and ideals of this world – with which the media have a special relationship and as a result they naturally own the right to represent it (the centre). Briefly said, the myth is that the media represent the natural truth. Now, since Couldry adopts the ritual view of communication, he argues that this privileged relationship is nothing but a myth. However, this does not necessarily mean that Couldry suggests that the information the media transmit is untrue but what it rather means is that what the media really do, is that they maintain the idea that they represent this centre of truth, even though what they really represent is not the centre of truth in the sense of the natural reality but the centre of the ideals constructed by and within a certain society and/or culture itself.

Hence, when analysing the act of watching, listening or reading the news from the ritual point of view one should not see it as an action gaining new information but as an action which provides the satisfying feeling of validation of one’s beliefs about the world; a validation that comes from the fact that an individual’s beliefs are represented by the media as the shared ideals on which social life is or should be constructed.

Carey sums up the meaning of news – and by extension the meaning of communication in general – from the ritual point of view:

Under a ritual view, then, news is not information but drama. It does not describe the world but portrays an arena of dramatic forces and action; it exists solely in historical time; and it invites our participation on the basis of our assuming, often vicariously, social roles within it (2009 [1989], p.17).

In other words, through this approach communication is defined neither by the new or biased information transmitted nor by the technical characteristics of the media but by the audience’s participation and the rituals created – through media practice – in projections of the so called centre of truth. In comparison to the models described in the previous sections of this chapter,

this model provides a more balanced approach to study the media that could avoid becoming deterministic since it recognises the importance of the content in the sense of shared ideas, the significance of the specificity of the media in the sense that the technology of each medium offers different possibilities for celebrating those ideas without however relying exclusively on either. At the same time, this model draws attention to the crucial aspect of the audience's participation in society through media practice the way the audience participates is not something steady but it changes according to the historical time in which it exists and most importantly that this media practice is critical for a society's condition. It is also useful to make clear at this point that I am referring to "a society's condition" and not to a "society's order or stability". This is because I agree with Couldry's argument (2006, p.181) that considering that media practice is producing social order and stability is a highly problematic account since social stability and order is not something that could be clearly defined or considered as the desired status for a society. Furthermore, adopting the functionalist idea that media practice or media rituals produce or maintain social order and stability is impossible when studying bicomunal communication in Cyprus since even with a single glimpse on Cyprus' s history one realises why such an approach is problematic: Which phase in the history of Cyprus is to be considered as stable and ordered and which not? And who can decide – and based on what – which of the two should be the desired status for the society of Cyprus? Thus, I want to argue against functionalism even though I will be studying media in Cyprus through a ritual model of communication. Put less abstractly, I want to combine the ritual model with Couldry's notion of "the myth of the mediated centre" in order to analyse media rituals as pressures towards not social order but the 'mythical' social orders which have been created depending on the historical circumstances of a specific period.

Moreover, through this new model I attempt to follow another of Couldry's suggestions (2006, p.182) and reject the idea of "centricism", i.e. the idea that the focus should be on the largest media institutions since the audience's relationship with them is what deserves research attention. This will be attempted through the inclusion in this research of marginal media or ways of communication that were considered alternative during the historical time under study.

2.2.5. A ritual model of communication in the Cypriot bicomunal context

Adopting a ritual model of communication means viewing communication as the process of representation of shared ideals and paying attention to the impact of this on society. Thus, when studying communication between the two main communities in Cyprus, this thesis will see it as the process which validates of those shared beliefs and the impact of this on their relationship. However, as Carey's quote above points out, news – and communication in general – when looked at from the ritual point of view “exists solely in historical time”; as a result bicomunal communication in Cyprus will be studied in relation to the historical time it occupied. That is why the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter 3) will be dedicated to providing a historical framework for this study and the later empirical analyses will be developed around specific historical times, either in the form of the broad division of time in the period of coexistence, separation and free movement – as in the case of the analysis of the interpersonal face-to-face and Internet communication in Chapters 5 and 7 – or in the form of specific significant dates like the case of the analysis of print and broadcast communication in Chapter 6.

However, adopting the ritual view of communication does not mean that the transmission model of communication is not useful to this research. One of the arguments I want to examine in this thesis is that what causes problems in communication – and in particular in bicomunal communication which is the focus of this study – is that communication is being looked at from the transmission point of view, i.e. it is considered as the process of transferring information/knowledge, while at the same time adopting a functionalist ritual approach of communication. To explain it differently, the ‘new’ knowledge that is transferred through the communication process remains undoubted and unquestioned because it is considered as the one necessary to maintain social order. Couldry's concept of “the myth of the mediated centre” (2003b, p.45) comes again into the picture since this myth is actually the result of this parallel adoption of the transmission model on the one hand and a functionalist approach of the ritual model on the other hand. In other words, this parallel adoption of the interpretation of communication based on the one model and a functionalist ritual model leads to the belief that the process of communication aims to the transmission of new knowledge from the centre of truth of the particular society or community in which the communication takes place and aiming to maintain social order, i.e. protect the common good, that is why the transmitted knowledge remains “naturally” unquestioned.

Now by studying bicomunal communication in Cyprus under a ritual view, means to analyse communication data in order to identify those shared beliefs that have been represented and celebrated in media in each historical period. Thus, in the case of studying face-to-face bicomunal communication through the analysis of the interviews I will attempt to understand whether face-to-face communication that took place in different historical times – the period of coexistence, the period of separation and that of free movement – manifested ideals that were/are shared by both communities targeted to the maintenance or re-establishment of a certain social stage – a mythical social order – in Cyprus. In the case of studying bicomunal communication through print and broadcast media, the analysis of the media data will aim to identify the shared ideals that were projected in each historical time that has been significant to the relationship of the two communities. Finally, the study of Internet bicomunal communication will identify how those shared beliefs are represented in the context of a medium that allows interpersonal communication while taking once again into consideration, the significance of the historical times in which the communication under study takes place. The identification of those shared ideals that have been represented within these different media will also provide indication of the rituals created by each medium – meaning the way these shared ideals have been celebrated/represented by the different media – and the mythical social order that was attempted to be achieved through their practice in those different significant historical times.

2.3. Media in the sphere of politics

2.3.1. The question: what is the role of media in the political sphere?

The previous discussion on how media rituals work for the maintenance or re-establishment of a 'mythical social order' bring to the surface another question regarding the relationship of the media and the political sphere: How do these media rituals influence the relationship between the state and private life?

If media practice produces rituals that promote a certain 'mythical social order' then this is also the case in the political sphere of a society. Put less abstractly, the politics of a society are directed – at least in part – through media practice according to the intended 'mythical social order' of the specific historical context in which they exist. Thus, the problem now becomes how media practice connects with the politics of a society. The discussion of this problem is particularly significant for this research since it is undertaken with the media's connection to a political problem of the Cypriot society, the relationship and conflict of the GC and TC communities.

In order to be able to discuss this we need to address the question with a theory which is concerned with the sphere in which media practice takes place. The starting point for any such discussion in recent years has been the work of Jürgen Habermas and his notion of the public sphere. Habermas (1992 [1989]) argues that the public sphere is a realm that emerged in the 18th century between the state and the private sphere – of the family and the economy – and in which “public opinion is formed”.

The purpose of this discussion will be firstly to examine whether in a case like Cyprus, where the establishment of what might called a public sphere – in Habermas' sense – emerged with the introduction of the technology for printing newspapers in the late 19th century, helped

actually in the rise of ideologies like nationalism and led to the creation of separate ethnic public spheres between the two communities of the island.²⁰

Moreover, in light of Habermas' admission of the existence of multiple public spheres (Habermas, 1992, p.427), this thesis will examine whether there were alternative forms of the public sphere in Cyprus before the separation of the two communities in 1974 – given the fact that there were until the 1960s at least – forms of political and ideological resistance to nationalism and efforts at bicomunal cooperation.

In addition to that, a discussion of the public sphere will identify ways of analysing and decoding the efforts of *rapprochement* in the 1990s. Could these efforts also be considered as a different form of public sphere from the one(s) that existed in the island during that period? Are there still two different public spheres in the island, one for each community? Furthermore, are there some alternative public spheres that also exist separately for each community at the same time? Or does a common alternative public sphere exist now in Cyprus that somehow 'reunifies' the two communities? If alternative public discussions exist in Cyprus how are they facilitated? The answers for most of these questions will be given through empirical research; however a review of Habermas' work on the public sphere and on the criticism his views received, is needed in order to set the framework for such an empirical research.

2.3.2. The Habermasian theory of the public sphere

The concept of the public sphere has been introduced into academic discourse by Jürgen Habermas – even though as J.D. Peters (2000 [1999]) notes, the theoretical underpinnings of the concept have been around in several forms before and after Habermas' *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1992 [1989]). It seems, however, that Habermas managed to condense a variety of components of work and the respect caused by the development of his work over the past three decades, has created a greater legitimacy for his formulation. The crisis of state socialist societies in the late 1980s has added in many ways to the status of Habermas' work since it bridges liberal and the neomarxist models of analysing the media, and

²⁰ Even though nationalism in principle is a unifying ideology, as will be explained more thoroughly in the next chapter (3), Cyprus experienced an anomaly of nationalism in the sense that each of the two major communities expressed an ethnic nationalism which as a result conflicted with each other.

offers a synthetic framework which both helps to explain historical development while at the same time holds onto a normative vision for society and the function of the media.

In this context, examining the concept of the public sphere and its historicity – as developed initially by Habermas – is useful in two ways:

1. It places the discussion and research, which will follow, in a theoretical terrain that examines the development of the media in relation to democracy, public discussion, and popular participation.
2. It proposes a historical narrative of the development of the impact of the media – and their interaction with committed/ideological forms of journalism and public discourse on the one hand, and the structural and systemic transformations of capitalism on the other.

This narrative, of course, has been questioned and in part Habermas himself came later to qualify some of his initial claims. When applying the concept outside the empirical focus of his study – Britain, France, and Germany – to a place like Cyprus that was actually a British colony, one needs to see the different cultural and historical context. Nationalism, as mentioned in a previous footnote had a rather different and more complex role during modernisation in the periphery rather than in the heart of the world system. But if the question is to examine the experience of modernity and modernisation in relation to the media, then inevitably one has to confront the western experience which “exported modernisation”, we may say, through colonialism. Thus examining the western experience provides a beginning framework with which to explore and compare the local variants of modernity.

Habermas refers to three phases of transformation of the public sphere: 1.Industrial, 2.Literary journalism and 3.Commercial.

During the first phase, the newspaper industry was organised in the form of small handcraft units and the interest of the publisher was focused on the profit of his business. The publisher’s only activity and concern was limited in organising and assembling the ‘news’²¹ (Habermas, 1992 [1989], p.181). During this period the publisher understood ‘news’ as

²¹ The use of scare marks is to point out that this term was being defined in this process.

commodities that could select from his environment and then without any serious editing. “His activity was confined essentially to the organization of the flow of news” (ibid) and his focus was on selling his printed edition.

The second phase of transformation, the era of literary journalism, (Habermas, 1992 [1989], p.182) began as soon as the press developed from a simple business that used to “simply report” the news, to one expressing different points of view and ideologies. The new element was political in the broader sense as well, since a competitive atmosphere of different ideologies and viewpoints was raised between the press businesses. Habermas quotes Bucher:

From mere institutions for the publication of news, the papers became also carriers and leaders of public opinion, and instruments in the arsenal of party politics. For the internal organization inserted between the gathering and publication of news: the editorial function. For the newspaper’s publisher, however, this meant that he changed from being a merchant of news to being a dealer of public opinion”(Bucher, 1917, p.257 cited in Habermas, 1992 [1989], p.182).

This new “instrument” was used by the authors of that period as a revolutionary instrument, a medium to publish their critical thoughts expressed with pedagogical intentions in order to persuade the public. As a result, the first ‘scholarly journals’ appeared and the profitable side of the press business started fading away, businesses that were formed then were starting with money losses.

One could consider this period as the first time that the public sphere had a political function. This kind of journalism can be found mainly during periods of revolution. The readers – the public – are not simply informed about the news but they are at the same time pursued and mobilised by the writers’ political beliefs. According to Habermas (1992 [1989], p.183), this is the first time that private people functioned as a public. That was the time when the public, through literary journalism, achieved a critical role towards the state. The turnaround that came with the growth of the periodical press was that a new region was created between the private and the state. This new region facilitated public discussion on social and political matters which was often critical towards the state and which eventually formed the public opinion.²² Habermas takes his discussion on this phase of the public sphere a step further to argue that the public discussion that was triggered by the literary journalism has gradually influenced the constitutional structure of the contemporary state (Thompson, 1995, p.126).

²²Public opinion in this context could be defined as the shared beliefs/opinions of the majority of a population that results after their participation and critical engagement in debate and discussion about politics.

The third phase of the public sphere is the commercial one. During this phase the need for “revolutionary journalism” decreased due to the establishment of the contemporary constitutional state and the legalisation of this kind of journalism. As a result the press businesses could focus again on the profitable side of the industry. The significant difference at that time was that the industries could use this new instrument – the editorial/political side – in order to increase their profit. The publishers did not use news reporting to sell their copies but the editorial texts. They started publishing classified ads next to best selling articles thereby increasing their sales and consequently their earnings. These efforts made the press a profitable business again. Habermas is quoting Bucher again to express this third phase of transformation of the public sphere:

[T]he paper assumes the character of an enterprise which produces advertising as a commodity that is made marketable by means of an editorial section (Bucher, 1917, cited in Habermas, 1992 [1989], p.184).

In the middle of the 19th century many newspaper businesses were organised in the form of a stock company and it is important to point out that this transformation took place in the period of advanced capitalism.

However, since the moment the newspaper was developed as a capitalist business, it has been used as an item for people with different privileged interests. The press started being manipulated by the owners in order to be commercial. The consequences of this phase of transformation of the press, and consequently the transformation of the public sphere, is one of Habermas’ central concerns. His argument is that since the selling process of the editorial part is directly linked with the selling process of the classifieds ads part, then the press transforms from being an institution where individuals act as a public into an institution of a portion of public that act as individuals. In his own words: “the press becomes a gate through which privileged private interests invaded the public sphere” (Habermas, 1992 [1989], p.185).

One of the results of this transformation is that the relationship between the publisher – the businessman – and the journalist had been also transformed. The journalist had lost his journalistic freedom and he worked many times under pressure in order to shape and present the news the way they would increase the selling copies. Habermas (1992 [1989], p.186) also points out that in the case of the journalists of newspapers with a more political trend there was not much freedom in writing either, even though the writing style was still political. The

transformation in these cases was that – even though the texts were structurally and stylistically similar to the ones of the second stage, i.e. the literary journalism stage – they were written in such a form in order to facilitate their political interests, since in many cases the journalists themselves were politicians. That is why Habermas calls the journalist of that period “an employee subject to directives” (ibid).

The development of new media – radio, movies and television – in the 20th century enhances even more this new cultural consuming public. Due to the high costs that the owning of these media required, in many countries such media were created and/or controlled by the state.²³ Habermas considers that this results in the transformation of the private institutions of a public composed of private people individuals into public corporations (Habermas, 1992 [1989], p.187). During this period the publishing institutions – if we compare them with the previous phases – have been vastly transformed, if not “reversed” to use Habermas’ expression. Habermas refers to this process of corruption of the reason-based functioning of the public sphere as “refeudalisation”. According to the liberal model of the public sphere the institutions of the public were protected from the interference of the state, since they were in the hands of private people acting as a public. However, since they have been commercialised they have been transformed into composites with social authority/power. According to Habermas, this resulted in the public institutions moving further out of the public sphere and re-entering the once private sphere of commodity exchange (1992 [1989], p.188). This denoted that as the public institutions’ effectiveness increased the more vulnerable they became to the pressure of private interests. Thus, Habermas identifies at this point a central contradiction in the transformation of the public sphere: that on the one hand capitalism provides those conditions for the emergence of a democratic public sphere and on the other hand that it also creates conditions that weaken the democraticness of the public sphere.

2.3.3. Criticisms of the existence of a singular bourgeois public sphere

In Habermas’ historical reconstruction of the public sphere however, there is an abstraction of a normative theory with self-transformative potential. Such an abstraction will not be helpful for conducting this research which is so historically specific. Thus the aim of this section is to

²³ Habermas argues also against the big capitalist media organisations that were and are enhancing the commodification of the public sphere.

focus on the discussion that was developed around this abstraction when Habermas' work was taken up post 1989 when his work was translated into English.

Habermas' focus firstly on the bourgeois public sphere and then on a singular public sphere which operates in a national level and has a transformative potential to universal and equal access for everyone triggered criticism. Habermas' norm of the public sphere has been mainly criticised as not inclusive since in many cases access to the public sphere has not been equal and widely available to certain social groups. Based on the identification of this unequal distribution of access to the public sphere scholars (Negt and Kluge, 1993 [1972];²⁴ Fraser, 1990; Thompson, 1995; Garnham, 2000; Curran 2002, among others) criticised the functioning of a singular public sphere in the Habermasian sense and suggest in various ways the existence of multiple/alternative/counter public spheres.

Negt and Kluge (1993 [1972]) were among the first to criticise the Habermasian concept of the public sphere. They argued the norm was based on a classical bourgeois concept of the public sphere that was not inclusive for those who do not participate in bourgeois politics because they cannot afford to (p.10). Negt and Kluge mainly focused on the exclusion of the working class from the participation in the bourgeois public sphere and argued against the existence of a singular public sphere since they believed that the workers themselves due to this exclusion formed another public sphere, which the authors called "the proletariat". As they specifically suggested there is an exclusion of the working class from the bourgeois public sphere in the sense that the proletarian context of living affects its social experience as a totality (Negt & Kluge, 1993 [1972], pp.28-29), implying this way that this proletarian public sphere could only be formed and exist within that specific setting. In addition, Negt and Kluge drew attention to the language barriers that the bourgeois concept of the public sphere raises. As they contend, "[a]ll bourgeois forms of the public sphere presuppose special trainings, both linguistic and mimetic" (Negt & Kluge, 1993 [1972], p.45) since all public forms of speech assume that the audience has a precise knowledge of the situation while they are also expected to be grammatically correct (Negt & Kluge, 1993 [1972], p.46). In other words, they questioned whether Habermas' bourgeois public sphere in its democratic/"revolutionary" phase, was indeed democratic and open to all, e.g. lower classes, non-literate – who could not read in the

²⁴ Their work was part of the discussion which followed the events of 1968 in Germany and the West in general.

established language.²⁵ The big differentiation however between Negt and Kluge's and Habermas's conception of the public sphere – even after the reviewed version of the latter's conception – is that Negt and Kluge saw that the existence of forms of proletarian public sphere as crucial for the organisation of the interests of the workers in contrast to Habermas who saw proletarian public sphere as derivative of the bourgeois public sphere and unworthy of much attention (Downey & Fenton, 2003, p.187).

Another aspect of the Habermasian public sphere which has attracted criticism is that of the exclusion of women from the political public sphere. Fraser's reading (1990) of Habermas' *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, draws attention to this aspect of women's exclusion of the bourgeois public sphere. As she contends:

the view that women were excluded from the public sphere [is] ideological; it rests on a class- and gender-biased notion of publicity, one which accepts at face value the bourgeois public's claim to be the public (Fraser, 1990, p.61).

Nancy Fraser (1990), through her paper *Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy* shows that alternative public spheres can be found in history while arguing that Habermas's idea of the public sphere is not completely satisfactory if it is to be applied on an actually existing democracy. In her critique she contends that in Habermas's thesis there is only a bourgeois conception of the public sphere and no indication for the existence of an alternative conception of the public sphere. More specifically, the problem lies on the fact that the Habermasian public sphere is seen as exclusively maintained by males and in which women denied access and participation while Fraser uses feminist historiography to argue that women had an active role in the public sphere from the beginning of the bourgeois era. As she suggests, women participated in public movements and groupings that were marginalised from the political male bourgeoisie but this marginalisation was essential to liberal public spheres (Fraser, 1990, p.60). Fraser cites the work of Joan Landes (Fraser, 1990, p.59) to demonstrate how in France the republican public sphere formally excluded women since the behaviour and style of public speech that was promoted was characterised as “rational”, “virtuous” and “manly”.

²⁵ It could be argued of course that Habermas was arguing about the principle of a public sphere which would be potentially open to all rather than referring to a specific social group that could participate through literacy.

Fraser, apart from gender as a key axis of exclusion from the official public sphere, also identifies class and ethnicity as important factors for such exclusion. Through Mary Ryan's historiography (Fraser, 1990, p.61) she demonstrates how women of different classes and ethnicities due to their exclusion from the official public sphere, have led to the formation of alternative public spheres in order to participate – through their involvement in male-dominated working class protest activities or their involvement in women-only voluntary associations – in public political life. Fraser proves in this way that alternative forms of public sphere always existed parallel to the bourgeois public sphere. It is important to note however, that even though Fraser refers to the existence of these alternative forms of the public sphere she chooses to refer to them as “subaltern counterpublics” in order to stress her argument that this kind of publics exist parallel and counter to the public sphere that circulate official discourses. In her own words:

This history records that members of subordinated social groups – women, workers, people of color, and gays and lesbians – have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute alternative publics. I propose to call these *subaltern counterpublics* in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs (Fraser, 1990, p.67).

Furthermore, and besides the criticism on the aspects of singularity and exclusion, the Habermasian concept of the public sphere has attracted criticism regarding its normative function. This kind of criticism can be found in Curran's reading of Habermas (2002), in which he argues that Habermas conceives a normative model of the public sphere in which information is widely available, discussion and participation is equal for all and most importantly as a process facilitated by the media. In other words, according to Curran in the Habermasian public sphere the media are the normative facilitators that are “reconstituting the private citizens as a public body in the form of public opinion” (2002, p.233). On the contrary, as he suggests a view of the democratic role of the media in the twenty-first century should be linked to the collective and institutional forms of the modern political system since such structures of society represent the people (ibid).

Thus, the criticism of the Habermasian concept of the public sphere points towards an alternative approach when examining the role of the media in the political sphere – the reconstitution of the private citizens into a public body. This alternative approach should accept that apart from the existence of the public sphere that circulates in the official

discourses²⁶ of a society, there are alternative public spheres²⁷ which exist in parallel and in many cases counter to the official one. The approach of the existence of alternative public spheres – which are formed by social groups that are oppressed, subordinated and excluded by the official public sphere – presupposes however that the official public sphere is not of a normative model. Nevertheless, Habermas was the one who pointed towards a model of democracy where discussion does not stay only into the political sphere but moves outside it in order for the private individuals to also participate and consequently take part into the decision making. The section that follows, refers more extensively to how scholars drew upon Habermas' model to argue for existence of multiple/alternative public spheres.

2.3.4. Alternative publics

Accepting Habermas' position that the role of the media should be to encourage democratic participation in the public sphere, then the question regarding the existence and the function of the public spheres – to provide spaces for democratic participation in discussion of public matters that can lead to consensus – becomes a question about the role of media as facilitators or not of this function. A central question of this research – in relation to the role of media in the political sphere – is whether the media are indeed the tools for reconstituting the private citizens into a public body. Now when trying to answer this question through the approach of the alternative publics, the question is being transformed from a straightforward 'yes or no question' to a more complicated one. More complicated in the sense that more questions emerge within it, in relation to how do the media facilitate the official public sphere but cannot overcome the problem of exclusion of certain social groups? Then, do certain media facilitate the formation of the alternative publics – through both their specificity and the use they can be put to – and if so, how?

In an attempt to answer these questions, the work of Scannell (1989) – even though it does not refer to the existence of alternative public spheres – is worth mentioning since it is concerned with the role of the media and public broadcasting in particular in the facilitation of the public sphere. Scannell (1989) attempts to revalue the social role of public service broadcasting from

²⁶ I will be referring to the public sphere that circulates official discourses as 'official public sphere'.

²⁷ I will be referring to these other public spheres that exist in parallel to the official public sphere as 'alternative public spheres'. I will be using 'alternative' instead of 'counter' since it will allow me to have an even more open approach when doing my research in the sense that an 'alternative' public sphere does not necessarily presupposes that it puts itself against the official public sphere.

which, at least in Western European societies, the dominant public domain was constituted throughout much of the 20th century. He specifically argues that public service broadcasting achieves a new kind of shared public life through its two basic acts: 1.By making its channels available nationally, meaning available to all and 2.By offering mixed programmes, targeting this way the majority of people. In this way, as Scannell contends, the fragmented public life that used to exist before the 1920s constitutes a general public that is accessible to all. He supports his arguments by focusing on the case of BBC that as he explains created a public domain which included news, current affairs, magazine programmes, entertainment and cultural shows, documentaries on a variety on topics and sports programmes. The BBC created, as Scannell characteristically notes, a “national calendar of public events” (1989, p.141). The concept underpinning the public domain, created by the public service broadcasting, is that all the above were not private commodities of privileged publics anymore but have been made equally/democratically available to all. Nevertheless, Scannell recognises that the opinions of private individuals are characterised by powerlessness in comparison to the opinions of public persons. As he contends, this powerlessness has to do with the imbalance between the status of the public persons and the private individuals (Scannell, 1989, p.163). In other words, even if broadcasting includes the participation of private individuals in public debates this confirmation – that is routinely broadcast – of the authority and generalising power of the opinion of public persons provides a sense of a “mediated centre” and some sort of dominance.

Downey and Fenton (2003), discuss whether the new media are the ones that facilitate the formation of alternative public spheres. More specifically, they argue that the new communication technologies – the Internet in particular – in societies where the print and broadcast media trigger public discussion with the representation and engagement of only a portion of the citizens, the Internet provides alternative space for public discussion with the participation of groups of citizens with more radical – including both alternative and conformist – ideas and beliefs. However, in the unfolding of their discussion, they refer to some scholars (Habermas, 1998; Hill & Hughes, 1998; Sunstein, 2001, all cited in Downey & Fenton, 2003, pp.189-190) who express their concerns towards the Internet and its potential for inclusive and critical- rational public discussion. According to Downey and Fenton, these scholars support their concerns with the argument that the greater pluralism that the Internet

achieves may be considered as a risk for deliberative democracy (2003, p.189). Those same scholars agree that the Internet cannot be considered as an inclusive form of communication since it facilitates public discussions among those of similar views in sites that remain closed off from sites with different views. Habermas is also concerned that this may have as a result the fragmentation of civic society (1998, pp.120-121 cited in Downey & Fenton, 2003, p.189). Even though Sunstein has similar concerns to Habermas, i.e. that this might lead to group polarisation, at the same time he admits that this polarisation enhanced important movements like the antislavery, civil rights, and sex equality movements (2001, p.75 cited in Downey & Fenton, 2003, p.190). If we were to relate this back to Couldry's idea of the "myth of the mediated centre", it could be said that the Internet in these cases helped individuals to be organised as publics and create in a way multiple centres.²⁸

In an attempt to respond to those who suggest that alternative publics are closed off and as a result their democratic action is reduced, Asen (2000) argues that it is certain readings and theories that reduce the significance of those publics and leave space for such criticism. Readings that suggest that the significance of those publics rely either on one of the following three characteristics: the participation of certain groups/persons, the places in which they are formulated or the topics around which they are organised. Put less abstractly, Asen (2000, p.430) argues that the significance (or even the constitution I would add) of counter publics – as he deliberately calls alternative publics – cannot and should not depend only on one of the followings: (a) the exclusion of persons from the official public sphere, (b) on the alternativeness of the places in which the publics are formed, (c) on the particular topics that those publics are formed around. What he rather proposes is that the discursive qualities of those counter publics should rely on the way they put themselves against the official public sphere or the state (Asen, 2000, p.437).

Downey and Fenton (2003) on the same side of the discussion, refer to other scholars (Atton, 2002; Curran, 2002; Downing, 2001, all cited in Downey & Fenton, 2003) in order to argue that the Internet has a radical political potential that can reach out beyond the activists' ghetto. Based on the huge success of certain websites²⁹ that facilitated international communication

²⁸ Whether however these centres can escape being constructed along the "myth of the mediated centre", and expand alternatively forms of democratic participation, remains to be seen.

²⁹ Like the Zapatista's website, the McSpotlight website and the Indymedia website (Downey & Fenton, 2003, pp.196-197).

between millions of people and engaged public discussion and movements on both local and global political and environmental issues, they prove the potential of the Internet's public discussion to have an impact on a society's dominant public sphere. Downey and Fenton give an example that illustrates successfully how certain groups – that feel that print and broadcast media present the news collectively and based on private interests – use the Internet to form alternative publics that might eventually have an impact on the public opinion of the society, i.e. act as alternative publics. The example is that of the Electronic Intifada website (<http://electronicintifada.net>) that was formed by four activist-academics, based in Palestine and in North America, and its purpose was to inform the public and more specifically the journalists about the history of the Israel - Palestine conflict and about the myths regarding the conflict that are too often presented as true historical events by the traditional media (Downey & Fenton, 2003, p.197).

It is important to point out that one of the reasons that the Internet could possibly be considered as a powerful medium for the formation of alternative public spheres, is that it is difficult to be controlled or stopped. Even though, this might also be said about older media forms like Samizdat pamphlets, the Internet due to its specificity and the fact that it is a medium with a technology that can be used in many ways and applied on many devices, it is even more difficult to be controlled. For example, the German Internet service providers try to stop the extreme Right websites by blocking access to them. However, the creators of extreme Right websites have solved this problem by either setting themselves up as ISPs or by providing instructions of how to bypass the blocks (Downey & Fenton, 2003, p.198). As this example shows, the Internet could provide a space available for alternative public discussion – political or not – that remains out of the control of private people who aim to satisfaction of their private interests.

However, there are still problems of censorship faced by many people online – as well as in other media – around the world like for example the recent cases of banning social networking tools like Twitter and Facebook in China and Iran. In the case of China these tools were banned in July 2009 after groups were created which supported the independence of Xinjiang and encouraged protests outside China embassies around the world. In the case of Iran, prior to the 2009 presidential elections it has been reported that Facebook had been banned as an attempt to prevent President Ahmadinejad's rival from spreading their message. In addition to

this, during and after the election period YouTube and the BBC website were also banned in Iran as a way to control the protests and the spreading of images of the Iranian protestors clashing with the police that followed Ahmadinejad's victory.

The Internet and the new media in general are not the only contexts in which alternative public spheres can be formed. As previously mentioned, Fraser (1990) demonstrates through the use of historiography how during the 19th century when North American women were excluded from the bourgeois public sphere managed to gain access into public political life through alternative ways. As she contends, feminist historiography documents that bourgeois women gained access through the building of alternative women-only philanthropic voluntary associations while women with less economic privileges accessed public political life with their participation – in supporting roles – in male-dominated working class protests (Fraser, 1990, p.61).

Finally, Dahlgren (1994) draws attention to the smaller civic media as contexts in which alternative public spheres could be formed. In such an attempt, Dahlgren makes a distinction between the common domain and the advocacy domain (1994 cited in Downey & Fenton, 2003, p.188), in which the common domain is the party that targets the general public and includes the dominant media. The advocacy domain on the other hand, includes the smaller civic media created by movements, alternative groups and political parties.

2.3.5. Alternative public spheres in the Cypriot bicomunal context

The historical trajectory of the public sphere, as written by Habermas, is important to this thesis since it can be compared firstly to the Cypriot experience of the development of the public sphere in the 20th century – since the first Cypriot newspaper appeared only in 1878 – and secondly to the situation and issues confronting the public sphere in Cyprus today.

Putting Habermas' historical phases of the public sphere alongside the historical trajectory of the public sphere in Cyprus will identify whether the three stages of transformation that Habermas detects in his study also appeared in the colonial Cypriot society. As the discussion in Chapter 3 will make clear, nationalism and modernisation had a different and more complex role in Cyprus than in most of the Western countries due to the colonisation of the island and the division in the religious beliefs of the inhabitants. Thus, I will be looking to see if the broad shape of the emergence and structural transformations of the public sphere are similar in

Cyprus. Furthermore, I will be discussing whether any transformation of the public sphere had and/or continues to have any effects on the relationship between the TC and GC communities, or when both communities were in conflict with a third party – the British authority of the island – whether the two communities had a common public sphere expressed through the form of literary journalism.

Then, during the period post 1974 with the separation of the two communities it will be seen how the public spheres have been separated as well. Despite the separation, the everyday/ordinary life situation in Cyprus is rather stable and ‘peaceful’ today so it would be interesting to see if this is also identifiable in the GC official public sphere.

Livingstone closes her discussion on audiences and publics with two questions that can inspire a discussion about the Cyprus case and consequently to link the above review with this thesis.

Surely there can be mediated spaces, which invite and valorize participation from more diverse publics? And surely these can not only encompass debate on minority or alternative topics but also contest the very norms of rational – critical debate or consensus politics themselves (Livingstone, 2005, p.34)?

Could one argue that bicommunal communication in the post-separation period, constitute an alternative form of public sphere even if major political issues were not/are not the topic? Could the very contact and interaction of people from the two communities be considered ‘political’ and public in the current atmosphere, of still no solution or of occasional nationalist hysteria?

Furthermore, if according to Livingstone (2005) the concept of the *public* is open to interpretation can one make the claim that in an age of rising nationalism³⁰ in Cyprus the very use of *kypriaka* – the Cypriot dialect – to communicate bicommunally (or even the act of bicommunal communication itself) was a form of de facto resistance? In other words, could it be considered as a de facto form of politics and evidence for the existence of or potential for an alternative public sphere?

Then again, Downey & Fenton’s (2003) article emphasises how political groups consciously use the Internet to express their alternative views and the possible impact of this on the public opinion. Even though political groups will not be the only focus of my research study, the

³⁰ Nationalism historically – throughout the 20th century in Cyprus – implicitly but clearly suggested the abandonment of the local oral language/dialect.

political use of the Internet by groups – mainly GC groups – of Cyprus will be studied as part of the research on the use of the Internet by the supporters of reunification and the ‘rejectionists’.³¹ Preliminary primary research studies³² on GC groups using the Internet for political purposes have provided data that could support the possibility of existing alternative public spheres in Cyprus. These alternative public spheres appear to be formed either because the specific groups have extreme views or simply because certain groups feel excluded from the current public discussion due to the possibility of the dominant public sphere which is expressing views that serve private interests. Thus, this thesis will also investigate empirically this indication of existence of online alternative public spheres.

On the other hand, one could argue that the existence of Internet-formed alternative public spheres in Cyprus supports Habermas’ concerns (1998, cited in Downey & Fenton, 2003, p.189) that this may cause a further fragmentation of the public if their existence does not appear to influence the public opinion and consequently the dominant public sphere of Cyprus, if in other words they do not function counter to the dominant public sphere of Cyprus. Habermas, accepts the existence of alternative public spheres as far as these function in order to make the dominant public sphere more inclusive and that eventually they will be unified to one public sphere. However, the public sphere in Cyprus’s historical experience does not appear to follow the pattern described by Habermas. Thus, could one consider Cyprus’s public sphere and the function of the alternative public sphere as an anomaly or could they be considered in what Fraser describes as *strong publics*? Fraser, contends that in the bourgeois conception the public sphere’s function is not to encompass decision-making but to encompass opinion-formation since the opposite would decrease the sharp separation between the state and the public something that would threaten the autonomy of the public opinion and the public would become the state (1990, p.75). According to Fraser, publics with such function are *weak publics* but in existing democracies this separation between the decision making and opinion-formations is blurred and as a result many publics function in the form of self-managing institutions, they are *strong publics* (1990, pp.75-76).

³¹ The term “rejectionists” refers to the GC political parties, and their supporters, who reject any compromising solution that is based on the model of a consociational federation. These are usually the supporters of the extreme right, centre right, centre left-wing political parties.

³² Preliminary research studies from the archive of the Journalism Department of Frederick University in Cyprus.

And to take this discussion on the existence of other forms of the public sphere on the Internet a step further, could the specificity of this medium and the use it can be put to work towards breaking down the boundaries of different living spaces, different languages and even breaking down the myths of each community regarding the Cypriot history and conflict? If the data of this thesis manage to support the above assumptions then this study could be considered as a contribution to the relevant literature.

Furthermore, the possibility of alternative public spheres opens up the discussion as to whether there have been alternative forms of the public sphere in Cyprus during modernisation, during which the official and dominant public sphere was segmented/fragmented according to ethnic lines. One possibility is whether the split between the official – written – language used in the press within the GC community, i.e. the Greek language, and the everyday language of Cyprus, *kipriaka* – which as mentioned before for the generations until 1950-70 was understood by the majority in both communities – can be linked actually to the existence of dominant and alternative public spheres.

In other words, this thesis is also interested to explore whether the dominant public sphere of the island excluded – or even still excludes – groups of people because of the official language that was/is being used in the dominant discourses of print and broadcast media. Issues to be explored in connection with this will be whether the differences – in terms of the context in which each linguistic form was used, but also in relation to its status/power – between oral and written language³³ can be linked to the current discussion on different forms of the public sphere.

Finally, another research question that derives from the above discussion and specifically from Scannell's work (1989) on public service broadcasting and the public sphere, is how did the appearance of the public service broadcasting influenced the public sphere in Cyprus? Did it have the two essential characteristics – accessible to all, mixed programmes – that Scannell (1989, p.137) identifies in the UK's public service broadcasting case and did they enhance the democratisation of public life? Or did its attempt to create “a national calendar” – that would unified all Cypriot communities together – failed and as a result not constitute a shared public

³³ This leads back to McLuhan's analysis of the dynamics of written and oral language.

life due to the fragmented strands of nationalism – Greek and Turkish – that existed in Cyprus?

2.4. Concluding note

This chapter aimed to review the main theories of media in order to sketch the theoretical map within which my research on media in the Cypriot bicomunal context will ‘travel’. The conclusion is that a theoretical map that includes all the aspects with which media studies are concerned is wide and so it should be since, according to Couldry (2006), whenever media studies stood too close to a particular centre – technology, content, audiences or social uses – the research questions and as a result their answers were narrowed down.

Thus, having reviewed the dominant traditions related to this multidisciplinary topic, this research will adopt a ritual model when studying communication since it constitutes a ‘wide approach’. It is a wide approach in the sense that this model sees the process of communication as a ritual ceremony in which the audience participates actively in order to satisfy its needs of belonging in a society/community. As a result, the specificity of the medium becomes significant not for being the determining factor for shaping culture and society but for its options to be used by specific groups of audience in order to participate in ritual ceremonies and form publics. It is the coexistence and/or interaction of these ritual ceremonies performed by the publics that shape culture and society. The plurality of the media uses – something that depends vastly on the socio-historical circumstances in which they take place – creates multiple ritual ceremonies that inevitably lead to the formation of multiple public spheres. There are different dynamics among these multiple public spheres – in the sense that some are more dominant than the others – and the dynamic of each public sphere depends again on the socio-historical conditions in which they perform, however this research will examine the ways in which these less dominant public spheres are created and the media they use to become from private individuals to publics.

Before moving into the empirical parts of this thesis that will allow me to do so, the very focus of this research on bicomunal relations in Cyprus, together with the emphasis I gave on the importance of the historical context in which these ritual ceremonies are performed, are pointing towards the need to set up a historical framework for this research. Thus, the chapter that follows will attempt to set the historical framework that will allow to better understand the arguments that will derive from the empirical parts of the research.

Chapter Three

SETTING UP THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK: THE BICOMMUNAL EXPERIENCE IN CYPRUS

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the socio-historical framework for the subsequent discussions of the research. I will offer a concise (reflective) review of the available literature as regards the history of Cyprus. This review revolves around three dimensions:

(a) Bicommunal relations since Ottoman times, with a focus on the dynamics of coexistence and/or conflict. Special emphasis will be given to shifts in the orientation of the kind of conflicts, e.g. cultural-religious versus class or political-ideological, and how each conflict constructed a different identity for the Cypriots. This will demonstrate how identities are socially constructed and that the primary conflicts in Cyprus were not essentially ethnic-cultural for the largest part of its recent history.

(b) Modernisation and the rise of nationalism, with a focus on media and institutions that encouraged its growth.

(c) The cultural political context that developed after 1974, which is the framework within which the experiences and perspectives sought in the research/interviews emerged.

In order to ease the progress of reviewing these dimensions the structure of the current chapter will be organised according to the historical periods in which each of the above phenomenon has been dominant. The first section will describe the emergence of the coexistence of the GC and TC communities under the Ottoman rule. Then the next section will focus on the bicommunal relations in the British colonial period which will be divided into two phases: the first phase, 1878-1931 and the second phase, 1931-60. The

third section will examine the first years after the independence of Cyprus – 1960 – until 1974, which is considered as the time when the two communities were physically separated. In the historical period following 1974 the two communities lived separately and consequently they developed different historical narratives. Additionally, more historical narratives emerged – or have been enhanced – within this period of separation in both communities so these will be described in section five. However, within the same period – after 1974 – there had been initiatives for rapprochement and reconciliation which in many cases had been developed in periods when nationalistic discourses were dominant in both communities. In an attempt to outline such initiatives, section six will focus on the major bicomunal activities developed in the post-1974 period.

Before moving forward in constructing the historical framework, a ‘pause’ for a brief critical reflection on my own bibliographical choices made for this purpose is necessary. As section 3.5 will suggest, multiple historical narratives exist in Cyprus, especially after the 1974 period each one referring to a specific interpretation of events. In an attempt to reconstruct a historical context as reflectively as possible in which bicomunal relations existed I will draw on academic rather than popular histories that focus more on socio-anthropological aspects of the historical events rather than on a partisan version of the events. Many of the sources used in this chapter are by sociologists and/or anthropologists (Loizos; Attalides; Panayiotou; Mavratsas; Peristianis; Papadakis) in an attempt to comprehend in an interdisciplinary context specific social trends that characterised the historical period under study. In addition to this, literature written by non GC authors (Bryant; Broome; Nevzat) has been also used in order to have a more spherical picture around specific historical events.

3.2 The Ottoman Period

The arrival of the Ottomans from Southern Europe to Cyprus in 1570 can be considered as the beginning of the creation of the two major communities in Cyprus, known today as the GC and the TC communities. During the period preceding the Ottoman conquest³⁴ in 1571, the inhabitants of the island lived under a feudal system³⁵ which was politically controlled by the Venetians. Many people – especially the lower classes of the Orthodox Christian group – had been hoping that the Ottomans would ‘liberate them’ from the hard feudal system of the Venetians. According to Kyrris, the Christians were deeply unhappy with the Venetians since they had been treating them as slaves, so they were willing to cooperate with the Ottomans in order to change this (1984, p.65). Catholics, who until then had composed the elite and most of the upper classes of the island, were prohibited from practicing their faith – and thus sustaining their community – after the Ottoman conquest. The Ottomans, in their attempt to gain the loyalty of the locals – the Orthodox Christians – permitted only two religions and ‘millets’³⁶ in the island, Orthodox and Muslim. This meant the Catholics had to become either Muslim or Orthodox in order to continue living in Cyprus. This was the historical origin of the two³⁷ major communities of modern Cyprus – they started as religious communities/millets and were transformed into national/ethnic groups in the 20th century (Kyrris, 1984, pp.67-69). In other words, the communities – known today as the ‘GCs and TCs’ – emerged with a relationship of

³⁴ The significance of the use of the term ‘conquest’ rather than the term ‘arrival’ lies on the fact that the Ottomans captured Cyprus after fighting the Venetians who had the control of the island during that time.

³⁵ The Cypriot middle ages can be divided into two phases – until the crusades the island was part of the Byzantine empire. After 1191 the island passed to western rulers who instituted a form of feudalism. At that time the island’s population was divided into Orthodox Christians and Catholics – with the latter being obviously favoured by the existing power (Grekos, 1980, vol.1).

³⁶ ‘Millet’ is an Ottoman Turkish term for a community defined by religion; religious community (Shaw, 1976, Vol.1, p.341).

³⁷ There are some other – smaller – religious communities in Cyprus, recognised in the 1960 constitution: the Maronites, who were a large community under the Catholics since they are also Syriac Eastern Catholics, the Armenians and Latins who are Catholic leftovers in Cyprus. During the Ottoman and the early years of the British colonial period, in addition to these, another religious group that of *Linovamvaki* existed in Cyprus – “a group of professed Muslims who practised Christian rites” (Bryant, 2004, p.64). Moreover, during the early years of the British colonial period there was a small presence of Jews in Cyprus. Their presence can be traced back in 1897 when “a number of Jewish families – recent arrivals in London from Russia – formed a society called *Avahat Zion* (the Love of Zion) for the purpose of settling on British-controlled Cyprus”; their settlement had a very brief life span (Roman, 2001, p.28).

interdependence: on the one hand, the locals/Orthodox Christians depended on the Ottomans/Muslims in saving them from serfdom to the Venetians and on the other hand, the Ottomans/Muslims depended on the local/Orthodox Christians in maintaining both the control of the island in relation to Westerners, and its administration.³⁸

In the meantime, according to Kyrris, within the period 1572-1668 there had been several attempts by the remaining bourgeois Catholic inhabitants of Cyprus (who had been forced to become Muslims or Orthodox Christian) – together with the support of western powers like Venice, Savoy, France, Spain, Austria or even Russia, to regain the island and liberate it from the Ottomans (1984, p.70).

During the same period, after another decision from Constantinople, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus regained its old privileges such as its autonomy³⁹ and its role as a representative of the local Orthodox Christians. In effect the Ottomans relied on the church – that is why they gave it back its rights such as the right to appeal their grievances directly to the Sultan in Constantinople– to maintain the loyalty of the locals versus the Catholics and any possible attempt by the Catholic great powers to recapture the island (Kyrris, 1984, p.75). As a result, during the Ottoman period, there were two dominant powers in Cyprus: the Ottoman administration and the Church.⁴⁰

The fact that the Ottomans actually strengthened the Church meant it became a form of local administrative power for the Christians – with economic, political⁴¹ as well as cultural/religious influence – and this created a dynamic of cooperation between the

³⁸ The Orthodox Church played a significant role in the administration of the island during the Ottoman period.

³⁹ The Church of Cyprus is autonomous and autocephalous on equal standing with the patriarchates since the early Byzantine era. It is in effect the only local church with such status, other autonomous churches (e.g. Greek and other Balkan Churches) were declared in the 19th and 20th century under the influence of nationalism. Refer to Herzfeld's "Ours Once More" (1982) for further clarification on the extent of this kind of nationalism.

⁴⁰ When referring to the "Church" or the "Church of Cyprus" I mean the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.

⁴¹ Especially in the period of the early 19th century the Church was seen by many as stronger than the Ottoman Governor. Turner's famous quote illustrates the power of the Archbishop during that period: "Cyprus, though nominally under the authority of a Bey appointed by the Qapudan Pasha, is in fact governed by the Greek Archbishop and his subordinate clergy" (Cobham, 1986 cited in Nevzat, 2005, p.65).

existing power structures which was also projected somehow in the people. This enhancement has also been the source of the Church's subsequent power, which during the British colonial period the British tried to limit – at least on a political and economic level. The integration of the Church in the Ottoman administrative structures explains also in part the next point – the relatively peaceful coexistence of that period, in the sense that, apart from the fact that the locals were a fairly stable community, the existing power structures had their own dynamics of cooperation to the point that by the 18th century class-specific economic conflicts (e.g. about taxation) were more common than religious rivalry, a significant point to which I will return below.

The Muslims were the superiors regarding the state structure since the administration of the state was mainly in their hands. According to the data provided by Attalides even after the Tanzimat⁴² in 1872, there were only twenty-six Christians in public employment and all in low positions (2003 [1979], p.39).

Focusing now on the dynamics of coexistence between the two communities religion and 'ethnicity' were never reasons for conflict. Most analysts of the period emphasise the generally peaceful coexistence (Attalides, 1977; Panayiotou, 2006b). A significant indication for the coexistence of the Muslims and Christians in Cyprus were the common uprisings of the 18th and early 19th centuries against unfair taxation (Kyrris, 1984, p.79). A typical example of these uprisings was the one of 1804 when the Cypriot peasants – which included Christians, Muslims and Linovamvaki⁴³ – rebelled against the authorities which included the Ottoman Governor, the Dragoman, the Archbishop and the Bishops (ibid). The peasants actually besieged the capital and, after entering it, attacked symbols of authority from both the Christian and the Muslim authorities. The significance of those uprisings is that the protests were multicultural involving participants from below of all three different religious groups (Attalides, 2003 [1979]; 1977; Kitromilides, 1977; Kyrris, 1984; Panayiotou, 2006b). Panayiotou sums up this period as follows:

⁴² Tanzimat means reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire and it was a period of reformation 1839-1876. The period was characterised by various attempts to modernise the Ottoman Empire (Shawn, 1976, Vol.2, pp.55-172).

⁴³ Linovamvaki was a lower class social group in Cyprus that practised both religions, i.e. Islam and Orthodox Christianity. The group disappeared in the twentieth century after the pressure of national polarisation of the Cypriots (Bryant, 2004, pp.64-66).

[t]he very existence of Linovamvaki, the general peaceful coexistence, and the common uprisings are enough testimony that by the eighteenth–nineteenth century religious identity did not essentially provoke conflict (2006b, p.79).

As the Ottoman Empire was declining and disintegrating there was a diffusion of new forms of politics emphasising popular participation and nationalism which were inspired by the French Revolution (1789-1799).

Part of these historical processes was the Greek war of independence (1821-1830). In Cyprus however, during the 19th century, there was not an uprising of that kind but the broader religious tensions of the period in the Ottoman Empire were reflected in the island. The most intense episode of that time, which is often referred to for nationalistic purposes, was the hanging of the Archbishop and other elite Christians by the local Ottoman authorities. Kyrris, in his discussion of the 1821 events, argues that this was an elite clearing out of differences, since it seems that the Muslim elite found the chance to take some power back from the powerful Christian Orthodox Church which had seen its power rise dramatically in the previous decades (1984, p.80). It is important to point out that the 1821 events did not lead to major religious conflicts on a popular level. Actually a few years later in 1833 there were again a series of uprising like in 1804 in which members of both religious communities cooperated. After 1833, when the lower classes⁴⁴ gained better economic conditions there was an extended period of tranquillity in Cyprus.

Furthermore, it is worth discussing the everyday coexistence of the two communities. During the time of peaceful coexistence and common struggles of the lower class Cypriots there is evidence of the development of a shared social and cultural identity. People participated in commercial and religious fairs – like the Christian fairs dedicated to a Saint's name day or the Muslim bayrams – independently of their religion. According to Kitromilides, a British consular report regarding the condition of Cyprus in 1862 stated: "the Moslems live in peace with their Christian neighbours in town and country" (Luke,

⁴⁴ According to Kyrris (1984) the traditional feudal social structure started being undermined in the 18th century with the rise of a new middle class of tax collectors who maybe seen as an early form of the local bourgeoisie. The peasant revolts were actually aimed primarily at the impact of these groups. Thus, the class structure of Cyprus during that period and in the 19th century in general can be seen as moving from a feudal one to a modern capitalist one (Katsiaounis, 1996) It does seem however that the lower classes managed to create a form of social compromise which encouraged small ownership (Panyiotou, 2006b).

1921 cited in Kitromilides, 1977, p.41). Attalides considers as an important factor for this traditional peaceful coexistence the “inextricably interdependent patterns of economic and ritual relations” that, according to the author, endured until 1974 (1977, p.75). The people of the two communities during that period depended on each other for their economic survival: merchants, intermediaries and peasants cooperated independently of their religion or ethnic group. The important elements regarding the ritual relations of the two communities in traditional society were the coffee-shops and weddings; these are two elements that even today signify belonging in Cypriot society.

The coffee-shops are another signifier of group identification since, as Attalides contends, in many villages there were – and still are in many cases – different coffee shops for the rightists and the leftists. The coffee-shop was in this case an indicator of belonging to a specific political group independently of religion or ethnicity (Panayiotou, 2006a, p. 270) since in several mixed villages – even in 1974 – TCs and GCs used to go to the same coffee-shops (Attalides, 1977, p.76).

Attalides cites oral reports, which describe that in traditional GC weddings there was a ritual way to invite a neighbouring Turkish village, i.e. by placing a large candle in the Mosques of the Turkish village, and this was considered as an open invitation for the villagers (1977, p.76). This of course was reciprocated by inviting GCs in TCs’ weddings. One of my GCs interviewees told me on that:

[W]hen they used to have a wedding we were invited and we attended their weddings [*My question: Did you go at the mosque?*] Not at the mosque, at their houses. I remember they used to make a platform for the bride to sit on and the decorated her, they used to put a crown on her head and a veil and men were not allowed to be there, only women. [...] And I remember a woman was playing the *tuperleki*⁴⁵ and a blind man was playing the violin, so he couldn’t see the bride. We were also invited when they would make the *kourampiedes*⁴⁶ for the wedding and I used to give them the recipe.

A similar indication of belonging can be considered the very recent invitation, on 25th July 2008, of Mr. Christofias – and other GC politicians – to the wedding of Mr. Talat’s

⁴⁵ *Tuperleki* is a traditional musical instrument like a drum.

⁴⁶ *Kourampiedes* are traditional sweets that are given in TC and GC weddings until today.

daughter.⁴⁷ The fact that the TC leader invited the GC leader in a period in which the two communities are separated, and the fact that the second accepted, is an indication of the same openness/belonging towards the other community. Even though Mr. Christofias accepted the invitation, the event was controversial as presented in the media since the wedding and reception was held at the Merit Crystal Cove Hotel in *Kyrenia* which was originally GC property. Mr. Christofias finally did not attend the wedding but visited Mr. Talat at his house two days after the wedding. Other GC politicians however of the Left, Right and Centre-wing parties did attend. It is almost a deliberate reminder one could say, for the older generation – but also for the younger people who may have heard similar wedding stories – of how the two communities have a history of similar ritual relations.

⁴⁷ Demetris Christofias is the current president of the Republic of Cyprus – leader of the GC community. Mehmet Ali Talat was the president of the de facto “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” until April 2010 – leader of the TC community. The current President is Derviş Eroğlu who won the presidential elections on April 18, 2010.

3.3. The British colonial period

In 1878, after the Ottomans were defeated by Russia, Cyprus' administration passed into British hands.⁴⁸ Geopolitically, Cyprus would serve as an important military base for the British since its location was valuable to their colonial routes. Famagusta, for example, a city on the east coast where a harbour was developed soon after the British began their administration in the island – would become a crucial strategic naval base due to the fact that it overlooks the Suez Canal, a key route to another important British colony – India. On the other hand, the Ottomans depended on the British to support them in the case of any future intrusions by the Russians (Nevzat, 2005, p.105). However, while the British administration of the island was agreed in 1878, its sovereignty was not; all Cypriots remained Ottoman subjects until the British annexation of Cyprus in 1919.

The period of the British rule in Cyprus can be divided into two periods, 1878-1931 and 1931-1959. In the first period the British tried to create a new political system in Cyprus with the British colonial constitution of 1882 that offered the chance to the two communities to be represented in the Legislative Council.⁴⁹

Cypriot adult men who paid tax had the right to vote for representatives in the council in the following pattern: non-Muslims had the right to elect 9 representatives, Muslims 3. In addition to these, 6 British members were appointed – not elected – participated in the 18-member Legislative Council. Christians, who made up 80% of the population were therefore represented by only half of the members of the council. Furthermore, the British Governor participated in the council with a “casting vote”, something that the colonial government took advantage of in order to pass important economic, educational or social legislation. In this way, the British authorities of the island, with an easy application of ‘divide and rule’, could block any democratic decision.

⁴⁸ The British Empire acted as an ally of the Ottoman Empire in an effort to limit Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean.

⁴⁹ My translation from Greek, of *Nomothetiko Simvulio* (Attalides, 1986, p.126).

At the same time the Orthodox church became an early sceptic about British rule, not simply because the British had legitimised several constitutional changes that decreased the Church's income and in effect its power, but also because it was challenged by the modernisation that the British brought to the island (Loizos, 1986, pp.103-104). As Loizos contends: "the relatively liberal British politics caused an important political, spiritual and ethical challenge" to the traditional ideas of the Church (1986, p.104).

The key change in the relations of the two communities occurred with the emergence of Greek nationalism. According to Attalides, the fears of the Muslims could not be expressed in a similar way to the Christians' anti-colonialism – which took the form of modern nationalism – since during that period, prior to 1919, Turkey was not a nation state and as a result Turkish nationalism was not developed either – or at least not yet fully developed (2003 [1979], p.40-41; 1977, p.77). Greek nationalism spread with the establishment of the Greek State in 1829 but it spread more rapidly to Cyprus during the period of British rule through the Church – to some extent as a reaction to the modernisation mentioned above – and in effect through the educational system (see next section). The fact that the Christian Cypriot volunteers of the Balkan Wars (wars which resulted in the increase of the Greek state's territory and population) returned home during the same period, had also influenced the rise of Greek nationalism amongst the Christians of Cyprus that was expressed through the idea of *enosis*.⁵⁰ It is important to note, though, that there was an initial hesitation with the use of *enosis* as a primary slogan especially in relation to Muslim Cypriots and the cooperation with them. This was the source of the split of the Christian bourgeoisie that culminated in the Church conflict of 1900-1910.

Thus, after the internal cultural conflict between the faction supporting the traditional ideas of *Romiosini*⁵¹ and of modern nationalistic ideas, the Orthodox Church adopted the

⁵⁰ *Enosis* is the Greek word for "union" and refers to the desire/movement of the GC community to integrate Cyprus into the Greek State.

⁵¹ *Romiosini* describes the identity of the Greek Christian Orthodox inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire. Even in the Ottoman Empire period, the Orthodox Christians have been addressed as *Romans* (Kitromilides 1989, p.158).

ideology of *ellinochristianismos*.⁵² Panayiotou defines *ellinochristianismos* as a “compromising ideological discourse”, since:

it was a framework mediating the differences between the ancient Greek past [modernists’ ideas of Hellenism] and the Byzantine middle ages [traditionalists’ ideas of Romiosini]. In the new transitional narrative, the two periods (antiquity, Byzantine Empire) were considered as continuous – part of the history and evolution of the Greek nation (2006b, pp.81-82).

3.3.1. The first colonial period 1878-1931: Education and the press as omens of division

A special focus on the appearance of the educational system and the press is necessary at this point in order to examine the impact of these two institutions as mechanisms for the spreading of nationalism in the island. Moreover, the press is the key institution of print culture – and a main aspect on which this research will focus in Chapter 6.

Nationalism has attracted considerable attention in recent decades. Before World War II nations and nationalism were in part seen as self-evident phenomena produced by some form of historical maturing or awakening. Even Marxists, who often found themselves in confrontation with nationalists, tended to accept the nation as a historical form produced by modern capitalism. World War II made extreme forms of nationalism – like Nazism and fascism – issues to be explored. On the other hand the proliferation of national-liberation movements in the Third World and of ethnic movements inside the West produced a new interest in the phenomenon of the nation, nation-building and on forms of identity within nations.

This new interest has shifted the academic focus away from nationalism’s claims to represent a ‘natural’ characteristic of people or a pre-ordained historically evolving phenomenon. The new focus centres on nationalism as a cultural-political force which engages in identity politics.

⁵² *Ellinochristianismos* means Greek-Christianity. This ideology underscores the direct link between ethnicity and religiosity in defining identity.

In the new analytic context identity – whether ethnic or national – is seen as a contested form. But by the 1980s a new perspective started developing which saw nations as modern homogenising constructs. The new perspective emphasised some of the negative characteristics of nations already clear from World War II, and raised also by ethnic movements opposed to assimilation. But the new perspectives emphasised also the impact of communication media, especially the print medium. A key work expressing this shift has been Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1999 [1983]). Its impact has been felt definitely in the academic circles of the area under study and we will refer subsequently to works that adopt to varying degrees Anderson's model (Kitromilides; Papadakis; Panayiotou; Bryant). Another influential figure in the reconceptualisation of nationalism as a historical construct, has been Ernst Gellner's (1983) work which sees an instrumentality also in the construction of nation states. His focus is not Marxist though. Nationalism – in this analytic tradition – is the ideology of the state and of certain status groups such as the intellectuals and the carriers of forms of high culture. Mavratsas' work (1998) to be discussed subsequently is clearly influenced by this perspective.

The relation of print culture and nationalism is at the centre of both Gellner's and Anderson's analyses. Gellner, specifies this relation as follows:

nationalism is, essentially, the imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality of the population. It means that generalised diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of a reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomised individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves (1983, p.57).

The Church was also a dominant force for the GC education system that was constructed around the ideology of *ellinochristianismos*. As early as the mid-eighteenth century the Church showed an interest in education (Kyrris, 1967 cited in Attalides, 2003 [1979], p.25), but the most important development in education occurred after the British came to Cyprus. According to Loizos, with the arrival of the British the number of Christian schools increased from nineteen in 1860 to eighty three in 1878 and twenty years later the number of schools doubled: something that became a pattern for the following years (1986, p.95).

The curricula of the schools were initially mainly based on religious themes – something that continued to be the case for the Muslim schools, with minor amendments – until 1920. In the case of the Christian schools the curriculum was the cause of another conflict between the traditionalists and when the nationalists came victorious in the Church conflict of the period until 1910. The nationalists emphasised the need for a curriculum beyond the religious themes that would follow the Greek educational system; the traditionalists adapted to that since on the one hand the educational system of mainland Greece was a key mechanism for exporting the “Megali Idea”⁵³ (Kitromilides, 1989, p.163) of Greek nationalism – the source of *ellinochristianismos* – and on the other hand it was also a way to control or “secure” people’s perception in the face of the modernising ideas of the British.

By 1901 the “Greek-Christian” schools had increased to 238 from 94 in 1881, and the Church was in charge of appointing the teachers. Attalides uses the example of a secondary school in Famagusta to illustrate the dependence on and influence of the Greek educational system. In 1908, the school board of that particular school, after realising that many parents did not educate their children, wrote to the Greek Ministry of Education asking them to send a teacher who would be a university graduate “of good character and holding to the pan-national ideal”, with the hope that this would improve the school. Eventually their desired “improvement” was achieved and by 1923 the school was recognised as an equivalent to Greece’s schools (Attalides, 2003 [1979], p.26).

Around the same period – in contrast to the GC education – the TC schools followed a more religious orientation until the 1920s at least. The Turkish state was created in the early 1920s as a reaction to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the potential occupation of what is contemporary Turkey by western powers – including Greece; thus before the 1920s there was not any major source of nationalistic influence to TC education. On the other hand, according to Bryant, as early as 1922, “every force [including education] in the GC community had been mobilised in the cause of union with Greece” (2004, p.130). However, the fact that nationalistic trends were present among the GCs, made the TCs

⁵³ “Megali Idea” is an irredentist concept of Greek nationalism that expressed the vision of establishing a Greek state that would incorporate all ethnic Greeks still living under the Ottoman rule beyond the Greek independence of 1832.

express their loyalty to the British by being more cooperative with the colonial authorities regarding the development of their education system.

The British authorities created a more modern version of schools for the TCs giving emphasis to the Turkish language and to sciences. Until the mid 1930s these schools were under the complete control of the British, who appointed both British headmasters and teachers. But subsequently – as in the GC community – these schools and the cultural dynamics of their education also helped in the introduction and construction of local TC nationalism. An example that illustrates the adoption of a modern, western way of life by the TCs, which eventually inspired nationalism among the TC community is the public reaction of Young Rifat – owner of the TC newspaper *Masun Millet*⁵⁴ – about the decision to reconstruct the *Big Holy-school*⁵⁵ in 1931 Rifat stated his opposition to that decision by saying:

The construction of holy-schools is synonymous with the murdering of the [TC] community. When other nations put an end to the business of paradise, these foxes and wolves are trying to empty these last bullets on us. If we let these traders be strong nowadays it is like we are cutting our own heads off (Rifat cited in Maviş, 2010, pp.13-14).

Furthermore, according to Bryant, within a few years of Ataturk's consolidation of power in Ankara in 1937, "Muslim Cypriots became Turks, taking upon themselves an identity forged in the crucible of nationalism" (2004, p.149). However, as she contends, education for TCs aimed to enlighten people in the sense of illuminating them with the knowledge necessary for leadership, "serving as the guides into Ataturk's future" whereas in the Greek Orthodox case, "education's task was a cultivation or evocation of a latent potential of the ethnic subject" (Bryant, 2004, p.155). Despite this differentiation in the educational aims of the two communities that Bryant suggests existed in this period prior to 1955, there had been enough nationalistic trends even within TC education to develop a consciousness of ethnicity. One example of these "young men of enlightened ideas" which TC education aimed to create is Rauf Denktash who is considered a leading TC nationalist of the latter half of the twentieth century and who went to school in Cyprus in the late 1920s-1940s.

⁵⁴ *Masun Millet* is translated in English as "Innocent Nation".

⁵⁵ My translation of the Greek *Megalo Ierodidaskalio* which was one of the catechistic/religious schools that had been created in Cyprus during the Ottoman period.

Denktash himself acknowledged the crucial role of his teachers in developing his national consciousness (Denktash, 1993, p.6 and p.15 cited in Nevzat, 2005, p.109).

Meanwhile, the spread of print technology also seems to have made an impact and helped in the rise of nationalism. According to Anderson,

the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation (1991 [1983], p. 46).

In the case of Cyprus, print technology has been a tool for creating an “imagined community” for the GCs since through school-books and newspapers the Greek language was established in their perception as a “tool of virtue” that could define one’s social class and connect one with Greece (Sciriha, 1995 cited in Moshonas, 2002, p.19). Bryant refers to an article which appeared in 1912 in the GC newspaper *Kypriakos Filax* to illustrate how the newspapers became tools of enhancement of the national virtue. The author asserted, “that the Ottoman Empire – Turkey as he called it – would have vanished from the face of the earth a long time before if it had not been buttressed by European powers with an interest in its survival” (Bryant, 2004, p.142) and concludes his article by saying that,

the Greek race, if it does not contain its national virtue in the peaceful antagonism towards other races, will find it possible to impose its spiritual nation-state on the thousands of inhabitants of these nations [the neighbouring nations] and to enlighten them with faith, and to restore the cross to the dome of Aghia Sophia [in Istanbul] and to return the [Byzantine] Two-Headed Eagle to the battlements of the Kingdom (*Kypriakos Filax*, 318, April 28, 1912, cited in Bryant, 2004, p.142).

In contrast, the oral culture, which was dominated by the Cypriot dialect, was excluded and in some cases even demonised in the print culture in order to create a desire of belongingness in the “imagined community” of the modern Greek state. Karyolemou’s doctoral research on the Cypriot press illustrates this since it identifies that even today authors of serials and letters in newspapers blame the Cypriot dialect for the “linguistic weakness” of the Cypriots and their inability to use the Greek language “properly” (Karyolemou, 1994 cited in Moshonas, 2002, p.20).

This thesis will study newspapers as another source of evidence of the nationalistic trends that appeared in the island (see Chapter 6 for more details). It is worth mentioning for now however, that as early as 1860 members of the GC middle class would meet at a teacher's house or at the coffee-shops to read – or listen to the teacher reading – the newspapers that the Greek consul would send to them from Greece (Bryant, 2004; Attalides, 2003 [1979]; Kitromilides, 1989). According to Attalides (2003 [1979], p.43) the arrival of the British in the island was again the reason for the “outburst of Greek publishing activity” in Cyprus. If we note the year that the first newspaper for each community appeared in Cyprus we can identify a ten-year gap that signifies the difference in the behaviour of the two communities: the GC newspaper appeared a few months after the arrival of the British and the first TC newspaper ten years later.

3.3.2. The second colonial period 1931-60: Modernisation and nationalism

3.3.2.1. The beginning of Turkish nationalism and the intensifying of Greek nationalism

Even though the 1931 uprising of the GCs had political causes – against the Governor who was overriding the vote of the colonial parliament – it became codified as a nationalist uprising because its key slogans had to do with *enosis*. The TCs did not participate in the uprising but they did not react against it either – they only expressed opposition to *enosis* through memoranda – something that indicates the absence of ethnic conflict during that period too. In Kitromilides' words:

[T]his was still a period characterised by the absence of ethnic conflict: significantly, the Greek rising in 1931 marking the height of *enosis* agitation did not provoke any interethnic incidents (1977, p.43).

However, there was a gap between the ideological stages of the two Cypriot communities. Attalides (2003 [1979], p.45) uses an example that illustrates these different ideological stages: on the one hand, the Greek consul of Cyprus became a symbol and active instigator for *enosis* for the GCs and had been recalled by Greece only after the British authorities' complaints, while on the other hand the leaders of the TC community themselves persuaded the British to expel the Turkish consul of Cyprus because he was a “supreme

Kemalist and nationalist” (An, 2002).⁵⁶ The Turkish national State improved its relations with the West after the Treaty of Montreaux in 1939 and with the progressive rise of nationalism as due to modernisation made the Muslims of Cyprus want to be called Turkish (Beckingham, 1957 cited in Attalides, 2003 [1979], p.45).

In the meantime, rumours of discrimination against the Turks of Rhodes and Kos, and the intellectuals that arrived in Cyprus after their studies at universities in Turkey, added to the creation of a national Turkish consciousness among the Muslim community of Cyprus too. An important point that signifies the solid development of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus are the names that the main TC political groups adopted: the first group was established in 1943 as the “Association of Turkish Minorities of the Island of Cyprus”⁵⁷ after two years a new group called “TC National Union Party” appeared which in 1955 was renamed as the “Cyprus is Turkish Party”.⁵⁸

One cannot say of course that the development of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was simply a product of nationalist development – and analogous imports – from Turkey. TC nationalism needs also to be explained on the one hand as a reaction to the gradually intensifying Greek nationalism that was spreading among the GC community, and on the other hand as a result of British efforts to protect their interests by using divide and rule. In the words of Dr Kuchuk, the creator of the “TC National Union Party”:

[A] community political structure was developed as a result not only of efforts of TC leaders to oppose *Enosis*, but also of encouragement from British and Turkish officials who were seeking to safeguard their countries’ strategic interests (Patrick, 1972 cited in Attalides, 2003 [1979], pp.46-47).

⁵⁶ This was part of a broader conflict in the TC community among traditionalists and nationalist/modernisers.

⁵⁷ In Turkish *KATAK*: Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıklar Kurumu.

⁵⁸ Public Information Office, 1963, cited in Attalides (2003 [1979], p.46).

In 1955 the GC Right and the Church organised the armed group *EOKA*⁵⁹ and launched an anti-colonial guerrilla war. Loizos explains that the Church's involvement with *EOKA* can be seen as a reaction to modernisation:

The fact that the Church felt oppressed by the modernism of the European university graduates and by the materialism of the Left, might explain to some extent the passion and the time the Church chose to engage with *EOKA* (1986, p.105).

Even though I will refer more extensively to this below, it is worth noting at this point that a mass anti-colonial movement emerged since the 1940s with the Cypriot Left as the key organiser in that decade.

According to Kitromilides (1977, p.48) in spite of the fact that initially *EOKA* was careful not to harm any TCs in its attacks, the British government – in another attempt to protect its strategic interest – set up an auxiliary body of TC policemen to counter *EOKA*'s activities. According to the same source, this resulted soon thereafter in the killing of a few TC policemen and, with the blessings of the 'motherlands', the outbreak of ethnic conflict started with killing, street rioting and arson (ibid). According to Panayiotou, the killing of a TC policeman in Paphos in 1956, was indeed an incident that led to the attacks of GC shops by young TCs in Nicosia and for the bicomunal conflict which followed in the vicinity of the *Olympiakos*⁶⁰ club. Later in the same year more conflict followed (2009a, p.4). However, as Panayiotou suggests it is probably less important whether such incidents were coincidental or planned; what is rather more important is that by that time, such conflicting episodes constituted "an established model, one murder led to one collective identification which led to an explosion of violence between people that were not involved into the initial episode [meaning the initial murder]" (ibid).

Nevertheless, this does not imply that *EOKA* was not provoked. It should be made clear that *EOKA* was an organisation which included extreme GC nationalists and anti-Turkish feelings; in 1958 the leader of *EOKA*, General Grivas, considered the TC as the third

⁵⁹ *EOKA* stands for *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* in English "National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters".

⁶⁰ *Olympiakos* is a GC football team of Nicosia, established in 1931 with right-wing ideology. Many of its members had become *EOKA* fighters during the period 1955-59.

enemy of the organisation, communists and the British being the other two (Attalides, 2003 [1979], p.48).

As a response to *EOKA*, TCs organised “The Turkish Resistance Organisation”, *TMT*. The fact that the British authorities considered *TMT* legal throughout the bicomunal conflicts in 1957-58 (Attalides, 2003 [1979], p.47) could be considered another strategic attempt of the British to protect their interests.

3.3.2.2. Bicomunal coexistence during British colonialism: Bicomunal political movements

It is important to note that people of the lower classes of both communities in Cyprus – who had previously in the 1920s participated in mass uprisings for economic equality – were represented by the communist party of Cyprus, *KKK*⁶¹ and then *AKEL*,⁶² which was founded in 1926. The ideology of this party came into conflict with the discourse of *ellinochristianismos* and was accused by the rhetoric of the establishment of lacking “national ideals” (Panayiotou, 2006b, p.85). *AKEL* was the first political party that did not divide the Cypriots into ethnic communities. For, when Servas and Adamantos got elected mayors of Limassol and Famagusta with the support of *AKEL*, they placed both the Greek and Turkish flags at their town halls (Attalides, 1986, p.146). Additionally, in 1958,⁶³ in comparison to the TC trade unions that had only 1137 members, *PEO*⁶⁴ - the leftist trade union in Cyprus – had members from both communities (ibid).

In the 1940s rightist trade unions appeared in Cyprus and were supported by the Church but according to Loizos this was another reaction to the powerful social modernisation that challenged the Church’s traditionalism. He characteristically states:

⁶¹ *KKK* stands for *Koummounistiko Komma Kyprou* in English “Communist Party of Cyprus” (CPC).

⁶² *AKEL* stands for *Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou* in English “Progressive Party of Working People”.

⁶³ 1958 was the last year of common organisations after the nationalist confrontations and massacres that Summer the division between the two communities started to spread both geographically and institutionally.

⁶⁴ *PEO* stands for *Pagkipria Ergatiki Omospondia* in English “Pancyprian Federation of Labour”.

If the Church included *fathers that knew better* [italics in the original text] then AKEL was full of *rebellious sons*⁶⁵ [italics in the original text] (Loizos, 1986, p.104).

As *AKEL's* political ideology – to expand the “rights of the people” and secure the “people’s movement” – came into conflict with the struggle “against imperialism” – “in 1948 the Left found itself under attack and fighting” as Panayiotou contends – with the Cypriot Right, the Church and the colonial authorities. According to the same source, this developed a leftist subculture that became more intense in the late 1950s when *EOKA* attacked the leftists of both communities (Panayiotou, 2006b, p.87).

The May Day parade of 1958, which was the last one commemorated bicommunally in the midst of growing sectarian/communal violence on the part of *EOKA* and *TMT*, illustrated this subculture of friendship and the alternative to the sectarian nationalisms of the working class people of both communities. After that May Day parade the leftist TC sports club in Nicosia was burnt down and a few days later a TC journalist and a trade unionist were shot; *TMT* took credit for those killings as a public warning to the leftist TCs to stop cooperation with ‘the Greeks’.

⁶⁵ My translation from Greek.

3.4. The first period of independence 1960-74: The escalation of ethnic conflict

In 1959 the Zurich-London agreement took place between Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, Archbishop Makarios and Dr Fazil Kuchuk, in order to settle the dispute in Cyprus. In the context of this agreement a constitution for Cyprus was prepared and signed by the participants, and in 1960 Cyprus was proclaimed as an independent state. Even though the agreement was also signed by the two leaders of the two Cypriot communities their extremist aims were not abandoned. According to Kitromilides, the GC elite continued to use the language of *enosis* while the TCs on the other hand, asked for the partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey (1977, p.49).

In general the agreement of 1960 brought to power the nationalists of the two communities, while the Church on the GC side came out of the conflict stronger since the Archbishop was the first president. The control of political power by these forces was not a good omen for coexistence and healing of the conflicts that emerged in the period 1955-59 – especially the massacres of 1958. The GC Left – which was the political force emphasising the need for coexistence – was excluded from power in the context of cold war politics, while the TC Left in particular suffered repression with the murder of some of its leaders by TC nationalists. In 1962, Gurkan and Hikmet – two TC advocates who were publishing the liberal-leftist newspaper *Cumhuriyet* – were assassinated and in 1965 a TC member of the central committee of *AKEL*, Kavazoglou,⁶⁶ was also murdered.

It should be noted that this was a transitional period: while the dominant culture emphasised the ideas of nationalism in both communities there was also a growing support for the lived experience of independence. After 1964 and especially after 1968 – when Archbishop Makarios was reelected as president of the island – this support for independence coalesced around the support for President Makarios in the GC community.

⁶⁶ The TC member of the central committee of *AKEL*, Kavazoglou was shot to death together with the GC member of the central committee of *AKEL*, Misiaoulis on the 11th of April 1965 when their car was ambushed on the Nicosia-Larnaca road. Since then they became a symbol of the bicomunal friendship that characterised the Cypriot Left.

In that context the staunch supporters of enosis were confined to the extreme right wing which mobilised eventually violently against the democratic institutions.

The bicomunal tensions however which were building up due to the rival nationalisms exploded in the period 1963-64. At the Christmas of 1963 there was a new outbreak of bicomunal violence which started the new cycle of bicomunal conflict. In August 1964, after further clashes and the attack of the GC military on TC positions in *Tylliria* – an area in the northwest of the island – Turkey – as a guarantor power⁶⁷ – sent their air force to bomb GC villages. The result of this new crisis was to separate the two communities even more through the creation of enclaves for TCs.⁶⁸ The TCs in general lost in the conflict and withdrew – or were forced to withdraw – from the positions in the central government that remained under the control of the GC exclusively – even though they claimed to still represent the bicomunal Republic.

In the meantime, Greece, Turkey and the USA tried to solve the “Cyprus problem” that was developing into a destabilising factor in the western alliance – and even more the West was concerned with the existence of a mass based communist party in Cyprus and the growing independence of its president, Archbishop Makarios, who sought alliances with the non-aligned movement. In this context, a series of “plans” for dividing up the island were suggested. One of them – the famous Acheson Plan – proposed a double union of Cyprus to Greece and Turkey – as a solution to the Cyprus problem. However, Makarios did not agree with such a solution. This created a new set of tensions between the GC and the Greek government. In effect, as Attalides notes, in this period a form of Cypriot consciousness started emerging which increasingly shifted towards support of independence among GCs (2003 [1979], pp.57-79). The return of General Grivas to Cyprus in 1964 gave hope to the Acheson Plan supporters, who in Cyprus were the diehard supporters of *enosis* among the Cypriot Right and extreme right wing, since he could identify the plan with *enosis* and would put more pressure on Makarios. According to Attalides,

⁶⁷ After the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960, Turkey and Greece had the right to intervene in Cyprus if its independence, territorial integrity, security or constitution was threatened (Attalides, 2003 [1979], p.53).

⁶⁸ Enclaves were the area controlled and set up by the TC administration in the period 1964-74 which has passed into the official memory of the TC community as the “years of repression”.

[b]y 1966 there were attacks on President Makarios in the right wing Athens press for his disobedience to the “National Centre” [and] his opposition to *enosis* (2003 [1979], p.72).

The dictatorship established in Greece in 1967 aggravated the tensions between Athens and Nicosia. Later that year, after an attack on a TC village by the GC military, Grivas and the mass of Greek troops that came to Cyprus in 1964, were forced to withdraw under international pressure. By 1968, Makarios proclaimed new presidential elections and put himself forward as the candidate of independence – the *efikton*/the realistic. His overwhelming support among the GCs created a situation where in the period 1970-74 the key dimension of the Cyprus issue was less the bicomunal conflict – even though that issue was still open and negotiations were underway – and more the conflict among the GC majority supporting Makarios and independence on the one hand, and, a campaign of violence by the extreme right wing which supported union with Greece on the other (supported by the Greek military government and, it is said, by the American secret services).

The crisis reached a climax in the summer of 1974. On 15th July 1974, the Greek junta – which controlled the GC military through its officers – organised a coup against the Cypriot government. Turkey’s response to that – which, it argued, was Greek military involvement – was to invade Cyprus on 20th July and extend the operation on 14th August and to occupy the northern part of the island. Makarios, who had to flee in July after the coup, returned by the end of the year to a ‘hero’s welcome’, but the island was now de facto divided. The GCs, though, managed through Makarios to maintain the control of the sovereignty of the state – thus the Republic of Cyprus is still controlled by them, as a bicomunal state expecting, the argument goes, the return of the TCs. The TC community on the other hand, moved to the north and by 1983 a “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” was proclaimed which failed to gain (international/formal) recognition. The new, more peaceful conditions of life however permitted the TC Left to emerge again after its repression in the late 1950s.

In the meantime, negotiations started again and by 1977 the two sides agreed to the framework of a bi-zonal federation as the blueprint for a future solution. However, efforts to reach the total solution have not been successful yet.

3.5. Historical narratives in the post-1974 period

These multiple conflicts that constituted the Cyprus problem for decades produced inevitably a multiplicity of perspectives as to what happened, what the causes were, and what were the possibilities for solving the problem. The outlining of the main perspectives is important in producing a framework for analysing the new dynamics which emerged in the relations of the two communities after the 90s and the renewed efforts of rapprochement and reconciliation.

Papadakis, in his paper “20 years after what?”⁶⁹ – written in 1995⁷⁰ – draws attention to the multiple interpretations of the 1974 conflict and the bicomunal relations prior to that. During the mid-1990s that Papadakis is referring to, there were convergences and identifications which show not only the historical dynamics outlined above, e.g. the convergence of leftist views in each community into a “Cypriotist”⁷¹ perspective, but also the power relations which emerged; a closeness of the official views with right-wing views especially in the TC community. These multiple meanings are interpreted by the different groups that experienced the 1974 conflict – or in some cases by some political parties that were formed in the aftermath: 1. The GC official side, 2. The TC official side, 3. (a) The right-wing GC party *DISY*⁷² and, (b) the left-wing GC party *AKEL*, 4. (a) The right-wing TC party *UBP*⁷³ and, (b) the left-wing TC party *CTP*.⁷⁴ According to Papadakis, the groups mentioned above do not support six different versions of history or simply produce different fictions that they all call the “history of Cyprus”. Rather he suggests that each one of the afore-mentioned groups has its own interpretation on which they base their own

⁶⁹ Translation of the original Greek title *20 hronia meta apo ti?*

⁷⁰ It is important to make clear that Papadakis’ paper was written in 1995 so he referred to the historical narratives that existed within that time framework.

⁷¹ The term implies an enhanced projection of the Cypriot identity rather than the ‘ethnic’ identity of one of the two communities. The term will be explained more thoroughly in the unfolding of the discussion.

⁷² *DISY* stands for *Dimokratikos Synagermos* in English “Democratic Rally” and it is the main GC right-wing party since 1976.

⁷³ *UBP* stands for *Ulusal Birlik Partisi* in English “National Unity Party” and it is the main TC right-wing party.

⁷⁴ *CTP* stands for *Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi* in English “Republican Turkish Party” and it is the main TC left-wing party.

different *mythistorical*⁷⁵ version (Papadakis, 1995, p.355). Thus, a *mythistory* is targeted to the specific audience – the social group that constructs it – and is not an objective story adopted universally (Papadakis, 1995, p.354). However, this does not mean that the people who support it or those who are exposed to it do not consider it as the universal objective truth (ibid). Papadakis’ argument seems to be based on an anthropological perspective that views narratives as forms of discourse that do not necessarily correspond to truth. On the other hand, one can claim that his analysis poses as a reading of biased partisan narratives and thus it represents some form of scientific – or at least not partisan – reading. In the context of this thesis in which the analytic framework is based on interdisciplinary academic works the analysis of rival and competing narratives can be seen as part of historical dynamics involving cultural and political conflict.

Peristianis (1995) – in a similar attempt to Papadakis – traces the multiple interpretations that existed in Cyprus after 1974⁷⁶ regarding the history of bicomunal relations; however his focal point is the shifts in the collective identifications of GCs. As Peristianis suggests, the collective identifications of GCs after 1974 are like a pendulum that swings between *Greek-centrism* and *Cypriot-centrism*, the identification which emphasises the common characteristics among the Cypriots independent of their ethnicity (1995, p.126).

Furthermore, Mavratsas, at about the same period, outlines the shifts of the “daily consciousness” – meaning the consciousness that does not have a political character and is rooted in the daily routine (1998, p.160). In this way he traces the multiple historical narratives that existed in Cyprus at least until 1998. Mavratsas use of the term *daily consciousness* like Peristianis’ simile of *pendulum* stresses the fluidity that characterised the identity of the GCs after 1974. As he suggests, one’s “identity always depends on the specific circumstances based on which it is constituted and this appears clearly in the GC case” (1998, p.165).

⁷⁵ Mythistorical version is explained by Papadakis as a version/story based on real, objective events that however are explained according to the specific group’s concerns, fears and experiences (1995, p.354).

⁷⁶ Peristianis’ work referenced here has been also written in 1995 so this period constitutes the scope of the referenced paper.

By now it is established that there are different narratives of the same historical events by each community's official side, but there are also different narratives within the communities themselves. Papadakis, for example, has pointed out that there is a convergence in the narratives of the leftists of the two communities thus creating new possible identity combinations or reassertions. His work, though, did not analyse the centrist rejectionist narratives. And as developments in the past decade have shown, there are also shifting forms of identification. As Panayiotou (2011) argues, identities are not stable. There is a fluidity as the work of most researchers confirms. And this fluidity has been amply expressed while this work has been completed: in the winter of 2011 the TC mobilised massively asserting a TC identity against Turkey while maintaining their autonomous collectivity vis à vis the GC.

3.6. From leftist bicomunal meetings to conflict resolution seminars: Post-1974 rapprochement activities

During the period 1974-2003 the two Cypriot communities were in the status of complete physical separation since there were restrictions of freedom of movement in the island. There are only a few cases of physical contact between people of the two communities in Cyprus: the case of the Maronite communities living in the village of *Kormakitis*, identifying as GCs under TC administration, and the case of some mostly elderly GCs who decided to stay in their properties in Karpasia village even though this meant they had to live in a TC controlled area; and the case of *Pyla*, a village located within the *Dekbelia* base⁷⁷ where physical contact and exchange of black market goods, messages and photographs takes place (Loizos, 2006, p.182). Additionally, a small number of people from the “Roma community”, i.e. Gypsies – who consider themselves TCs – crossed the checkpoints in 2000 to the GC controlled area in order to live in a place where they claimed there was less discrimination and more economic opportunities (Constantinou, 2007, p.263). Otherwise, contact between people of the two major communities of Cyprus was possible only outside Cyprus, for example in London where there are a lot of immigrants from both communities and in the context of European and American universities where there were/are both TC and GC students (Loizos, 2006; Broome, 2005).

However, in Cyprus during that period there were attempts to bring the two communities into contact through organised activities and those attempts will be the focus of this section. Broome, who worked as a facilitator for rapprochement programmes through the Cyprus Fulbright Commission in 1994-1996, organises the bicomunal activities that took place in Cyprus during that period under six categories: 1.Political Contacts, 2.Business and Professional Meetings/Projects, 3.Citizen Gatherings and Exchanges, 4.Conflict Resolution Activities, 5.Ongoing Bicomunal Groups and 6.Special Projects (Broome, 2005, p.15). The structure of this section will be based on Broome’s categorisation as an attempt to address a historical overview of the post-1974 rapprochement activities in Cyprus.

⁷⁷ *Dekbelia* is one of the two Sovereign Base areas in Cyprus – the other one is *Akrotiri* – controlled by the UK administration.

3.6.1. Dynamics of reunification among existing and established political forces

In the political context there have been bicommunal contacts other than the official negotiations of the political leaders of the two communities. The purpose of these contacts was not to negotiate for a settlement in Cyprus but rather to facilitate communication between the Cypriot communities.

The Cypriot Left characterised, as mentioned before, by a sort of openness towards the other community had a pioneering role in initiating bicommunal meetings on a regular basis, as early as the 1980s. Loizos traces the emergence of the term *rapprochement* in Cyprus in the 1980s particularly among the GC leftists who used it to suggest “a coming closer together again” (2006, p.181). These meetings were mainly organised by the youth wing of *AKEL*, named *EDON*,⁷⁸ and in some cases, when crossing the checkpoints was not possible, meetings took place either in the buffer zone⁷⁹ or abroad. Later, in 1996, the European Commission organised a series of bicommunal youth workshops in Brussels, again in the political context; most of the participant youth organisations kept contact for as much as a year after the end of the workshops. In 2000, a number of youth organisations initiated a “Festival of Mutual Understanding” which was eventually taken up by the major political parties, i.e. the GC parties: *AKEL*, *DISY*, *KISOS* and *United Democrats* and by the TC parties: the *Patriotic Unity Movement*, the *Republican Turkish Party* and the *Communal Liberation Party* (Broome, 2005, p.17). Though the festival was organised by political parties it was not thematically political. The programme of the festival included music, dance and poetry aiming to introduce or remind Cypriots of the intersections of the cultures of all communities.

Business and professional meetings aimed at bridging the differences in the economic and business context in order to create a stable common future for both communities.

⁷⁸ *EDON* stands for *Eniea Dimokratiki Organosi Neoleas* translated in English as “United Democratic Youth Organisation”.

⁷⁹ The buffer zone is the area controlled by the United Nations and is located between the southern and northern areas which are administrated by the GC and TC communities accordingly.

However, businesses from both sides were circumspect since any activity of cooperation between them might imply or contribute to the recognition of the other's political status.

Two leftists were again the pioneers of the bicommunal activities in this context too. In 1978, Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa Akinci – mayors of the divided Nicosia – assisted by the UNDP⁸⁰/World Bank, organised teams that would work on the completion of a joint sewage system of the city since its construction was interrupted in 1974. This resulted in the cooperation of people with different specialisations (e.g. economists, architects, sociologists) from both communities that lasted until the 1990s in order to develop a scheme for a united city. As Loizos contends, it was “a project kept out of the public eye” and though it is not exactly a “Well Kept Secret” it was not widely known or appreciated either (2006, p.184). It has not been widely appreciated in the sense that the public was not aware that within this project “functional interdependence was present” between the two communities, like for example the need for GCs to supply electricity in order for the TCs to be able to pump water from *Morfon*⁸¹ to the south.

Later, in 1997, two bicommunal meetings between trade unions of the two communities in Cyprus took place in each side. These meetings were sponsored by the European Union and aimed at a discussion of the economic aspects of Cyprus' entry into the European Union.

Two important attempts to bring business leaders into contact have been made. Firstly, in 1995 by the U.S. Ambassador and then in 1997 by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission. The first attempt brought senior businessmen together at the buffer zone, and the second one initiated meetings on a regular basis of young business leaders. In both activities the groups discussed opportunities for cooperation between businesses before and after a settlement in Cyprus (Broome, 2005, p.19). During the same period, 1994-1997, the Cyprus Fulbright Commission organised a series of management training courses for more than 250 GCs and TCs. The managers who participated in this programme expanded their meetings

⁸⁰ UNDP stands for United Nations Development Programme.

⁸¹ *Morfon* is a town in the northern part of Cyprus, controlled by the TC administration since 1974.

outside the context of the management course which resulted in the development of an “ongoing” bicommunal group.

Finally, professional groups like lawyers, journalists, accountants, medical professionals, educators and others from both communities met for workshops or training. Some of these bicommunal activities took place again outside Cyprus like in Boston or Washington DC and focused on areas of common interest; for example in the case of the educators’ meetings the focus was on the history books used in both communities’ schools and how they could eliminate the ‘enemy’ image in this historiography.

Furthermore, bicommunal activities in the context of citizen gatherings and exchanges aimed at bringing together ordinary people from all the sectors of Cypriot society. UNFICYP⁸² initiated such gatherings by organising an annual open house on the United Nations Day, 24 October. Embassies hold similar events on their countries’ national holidays and as a result attract a large number of individuals.

In 1997 an important gathering was organised by the United Nations. One Greek and one Turkish singer⁸³ were invited to perform at a pop music concert for people of both communities. The event attracted thousands of young GCs and TCs to watch the concert; however most of the media from both communities, even before the day of the concert, started criticising both the singers and the audience who intended to attend the concert and instead of covering the event that would take place they focused on other aspects in an attempt to delegitimise it. For example, *Fileleftheros* newspaper on 19th May, the day of the concert, published three articles about the concert on its front-page, including one that highlighted the decision of most of the GC political parties to reject the event by not attending without mentioning at all that *AKEL* would be represented at the concert.

None of the leaders of the Cypriot [it actually means GC here] political parties will attend at today’s concert of Rouva and Kut that will take place in the area of Ledra Palace. Some

⁸² UNFICYP stands for United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

⁸³ The Greek singer *Sakis Rouvas* and the Turkish singer *Burak Kut*, both very popular among the Cypriot youngsters.

political parties [DIKO and EDEK] prefer not to be represented by any members. [...] According to information, DISY will be represented at the concert but not by a high-ranking member (*Fileleftheros*, 19 May 1997).

In a similar attempt, both *Fileleftheros* (19 May 1997) and *Simerini* (19 May 1997) referred to the demonstrations that would take place against the concert, like the one organised by *Adouloti Kerynia Association*.⁸⁴ *Simerini* also included the announcement of the association which urged the GCs to participate in the demonstration that took place at *Platia Eleftherias*⁸⁵ in Nicosia at the time of the concert. The most extreme attempt of those discourses of delegitimisation however, was that both the newspapers referred to the technical equipment that would be used in the concert underlining the fact that it arrived in Cyprus from Turkey through the port of Famagusta.

With the exception of the leftists' efforts for bicommunal activities, the conflict resolution activities are considered the most crucial effort for rapprochement. These activities aimed at providing a 'safe space' in which reconciliation could develop and as Broome suggests "they resulted in many bicommunal friendships and working relationships that could not have existed otherwise" (2005, p.23). Loizos, sees the 1990s' conflict resolution activities in a broader context of significant changes that took place in the political and communication landscape of Cyprus during that decade. He specifically refers to "a continuing increase in educational attainments" (Loizos, 2006, p.185) as the first change of that period and he attributes the significance of this change on the fact that more people had the chance to come across with more ways of thinking about the world through their education in European and American Universities. Another important change for Loizos that took place in the same period in Cyprus is the "opening up of new media outlets – TV, radio, Internet" (2006, p.186). Even though more media options do not necessarily mean a greater variety of political views, it indeed provided at least a potential for plurality. Furthermore, Loizos points towards "the diversity of tasks undertaken by bicommunal conflict-resolution groups" (ibid) as the next change that makes the 1990s' bicommunal activities significant. I would add one more reason that makes the 1990s bicommunal activities important that is not directly referred to by Loizos (2006) or Broome (2005): the

⁸⁴ *Adouloti Kerynia* is an association created by the GC inhabitants – now refugees – of Kerynia that were forced to leave their properties in 1974.

⁸⁵ *Platia Eleftherias* is a historical square in the centre of Nicosia close to the Green Line which divides the city.

fact that the 1990s activities took place during a rather ‘difficult’ period in which the official discourses – in both communities – were characterised by nationalistic sentiments. In the case of the GC community, during the majority of the decade the official discourses were mainly shaped by the right-wing party *DISY* which was in government – with Glafkos Clerides as President from 1993 to 2003. Similarly, in the case of the TC community Denktash – as the President of the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during that decade and with the support of the right-wing party *UBP* – was controlling the official discourses within the community. Thus, what I want to suggest is that the 1990s bicomunal activities are also *significant* because they took place during a period of difficult conditions⁸⁶ in the island, i.e. that they went against the dominant nationalist discourses of that period.

The 1990s conflict resolution activities included workshops, skills training, interactive design processes, mediation training, seminars and study groups. Some of the highlights of those efforts were the series of workshops for students recipients of a grant from the Cyprus American Scholarship Programme to study in the United States, the funded youth camps again in the United States for young Cypriots – ages sixteen to eighteen – and the interactive design workshops during which GCs and TCs developed a strategy for their peace building efforts in Cyprus.

It is worth noting at this point that the conflict resolution activities often received criticism. Anastasiou, in his analysis of these bicomunal activities, refers to the “nationalist critics” who accused this kind of activities of being “artificial” (2002, p.593). Something that I have also observed when through personal communication in different occasions with two leftists – both members of *AKEL*’s central committee – these activities have been referred to with a similar critical essence saying that this type of conflict resolution “activities were based on American modernistic ideas that focused on psychology techniques rather than on solid political discussion”. Additionally, critiques have been made by media of both communities especially during the 1996 period when bicomunal activities have grown. That is when according to Broome:

⁸⁶ Examples of such difficulties are referred by Loizos, (2006, p.183) but have also been highlighted to me by the participants when I was interviewing them.

several prominent GC magazines published articles ridiculing many of those taking part in cross-community workshops, distorting the nature of the activities and painting an inaccurate and sinister picture of those involved (2005, p.44).

3.6.2. Dynamics of reunification which utilise and experiment with new forms of communication

In this category are bicommunal groups that developed mostly out of the conflict resolution skills training and interactive design workshops and they had a special focus e.g. education and women.

The bicommunal educators group developed in 1995 and worked on projects like the study of the educational systems in Cyprus and the negative perceptions they create for students about the other community. In 1996, a bicommunal women's group was also formed which worked on projects that examined the factors that according to Cypriot women create/d pain and suffering in Cyprus.

Broome considers the YEP (Youth Encounters for Peace) project as a special one since it facilitated communication between young people of the two communities in the period 1997-2002. The project included a series of events that covered many areas of young people's interests like festivals, dances, music concerts, tree-plantings and workshops.⁸⁷ The YEP project has been the inspiration for the development of another special bicommunal programme called "Youth Promoting Peace" (Y2P) which was formed in 2000 and focused on bridging the communication gap between the two communities. In the context of these efforts there were also workshops and conferences organised on the prospects of the Annan Plan.

Hade,⁸⁸ a bicommunal magazine is also considered a special project since it was on the one hand the only bicommunal magazine and on the other a medium through which

⁸⁷ For more details on YEP project refer to Chapter 7.

⁸⁸ *Hade* is a word used in the Cypriot dialect meaning "Let's go".

bicommunal events and stories could be published.⁸⁹ The first edition with articles in English succeeded in both communities and a second edition was published this time with articles in Greek and Turkish. However, this effort stopped according to Broome due to “internal conflict and difficulties related to working across the Green Line” (2005, p.35).

⁸⁹ A discussion will take place in the following chapters on the criticism the bicommunal activities – and in effect their participants – received by the media.

3.7. Concluding note

Placing the bicomunal relations in Cyprus in a socio-cultural historical framework one can observe that they have been relations of both coexistence and conflict. However, when one focuses on the dynamics of the bicomunal coexistence and conflict in Cyprus one is able to identify that in the largest part of history, bicomunal coexistence is characterised by cultural-religious dynamics and on the contrary bicomunal conflict is characterised by class or political-ideological dynamics. Political-ideological dynamics such as nationalism had been intensified by dominant institutions, including the media, and caused to some extent the bicomunal conflict and separation.

The two Cypriot communities, having experienced a traumatic series of violent events for about a decade, have lived separately since 1974. During the time of separation the cultural dynamics of bicomunal coexistence have been in a sense dominated by discourses of conflict and separation. The bicomunal and rapprochement activities of the 1990s together with the free movement measure in 2003 achieved to bring back – to some extent – the cultural dynamics of the period of peaceful coexistence or at least to soothe wounds caused by the political-ideological differences.

The following chapter (4), explains the research methods used in order to collect and analyse material that will allow me to tackle – in the following chapters – my research questions on bicomunal communication in the historical framework that has been discussed in this chapter.

Chapter Four

METHODS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to describe the methodological model that this research is using. The main characteristic of this model is that it does not consist of one method throughout, but it rather consists of multiple social science methods, put together. The reason for doing so, is that the research itself is multidisciplinary – bringing together media studies, anthropology, history, political science and regional studies – since it examines (a) the media's impact on communication and (b) the bicomunal communication in the context of the public sphere of Cyprus during the 20th and early years of 21st century. Furthermore, the research questions, demand the analysis of different kinds of data: newspaper, radio and television material, Internet conversation and face-to-face communication.

Section 2 will begin with a brief discussion on the use of discourse analysis as a method for analysing media material as well as interview and online conversation texts. Then it will explain (a) the reasons behind choosing interview as a method of collecting data regarding face-to-face bicomunal communication, (b) the procedure followed in choosing the participants, (c) the format of the interviews and (d) the way in which the data that derived from the interviews have been organised and analysed. Section 2.2 of this chapter, will explain exclusively for each medium, the reasons behind the choice of the material while giving details on the choice of particular media and the particular chronological periods. Finally, Section 3 will discuss the ethical considerations involved in the empirical studies of this thesis and the ways in which they have been addressed.

4.2. Discourse analysis

The main method of analysis used in the empirical studies of this thesis is that of discourse analysis. The largest empirical study of this thesis (Chapter 6) examines print and broadcast media material that consists mostly of textual material. When, the interviews in Chapter 5 and online conversations in Chapter 7 also generate a form of text for my analysis. That is why I had to choose a method of analysis that would allow me to identify those elements within the text that construct its discourse.

There is a variety of discourse analytic methods that a researcher can use, like: Narrative Analysis, Ethnography of Speaking, Conversational Analysis, Discursive Psychology, Generic Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis (Antaki, 2008, p.432). The discourse analysis used in this research stands somewhere between the two latter, i.e. the generic discourse analysis and the critical discourse analysis (CDA). Antaki defines generic discourse analysis as:

a work done without a strong commitment to the sorts of epistemologies and ontologies of the [rest] schools of analysis [...]: it is a sort of working procedure, inspired by the four basic principles of discourse analysis, and brought off in bespoke ways to make sense of one particular topic or domain of experience (Antaki, 2008, p.433).

Thus, on one hand, the discourse analytic method used in this research could be named generic since it is a procedure inspired by the four basic principles of discourse analysis – “(a) the talk or text is naturally found, (b) the words are to be understood in their co-text at least, (c) the analyst is to be sensitive to the words’ non-literal meaning or force, (d) the analyst is to reveal the social actions and consequences achieved by the words’ use” (Antaki, 2008, p.432) – and it is brought off to make sense of a particular domain of experience, that of bicommunal communication as facilitated by the different media in Cyprus. It also fits under the umbrella of generic discourse analysis since this research examines textual material and in particular, interview data with participants selected based on their experience, selected news media reports, radio play scripts and online conversation texts.

Antaki also underlines that when one is doing generic discourse analysis s/he does not see the author/writer of the text analysed as “a simple informant, reporting unvarnished facts”

but the author/writer is rather “seen as producing (or reproducing) themes or representations” (2008, p.433). This has been also followed in the discourse analytic method used in this research in the sense that I have attempted to extract those themes and/or representations produced or reproduced in the texts analysed in order to understand, (a) in the cases of the interview participants and the participants of online conversations the underlying dimensions along which they understand their experiences and (b) in the case of the media analysis, to uncover the elements of social practices which are embedded within the discourses of this material.

Then on the other hand, as I mentioned above, the method used in this research also stands close to the school of critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis differs from generic discourse analysis due to the fact that the analysts who use the first discourse analytic method state openly from the beginning of their analysis that the specific discourses that are to be analysed, produce or reproduce some sort of dominance. As Antaki (2008, p.434) puts it:

They [the critical discourse analysts] approach texts from a certain prior point of departure, often an avowedly political one. That is the critical in the term. 'The way we approach these questions', says van Dijk, one of the doyens of CDA, 'is by focusing on the role of discourse in the (re)producing and challenge of dominance' (van Dijk, 1993, p.249).

Thus from this perspective, the discourse analysis in my research is critical in the sense that my approach when analysing the texts, is that there is a dominance⁹⁰ in the historical context which I examine and my focus is on the role of the different discourses produced by the different ways of communication in (re)producing and/or challenge this dominance. I define dominance in discourses in a way similar to van Dijk (1993, pp.249-250), i.e. in the sense of the exercise of social power that results in social equality. However, instead of focusing so much on the elites, institutions and/or groups that exercise this power, my focus is on the way this power is exercised by certain media discourses on others – almost invisibly – and the way in which they manage to legitimise and naturalise social inequality.

⁹⁰ It should be noted here that the dominance to which I refer has been put towards one specific social group throughout the historical context of the research but towards different social groups depending on the historical period.

Van Leeuwen defines discourses as “social cognitions, socially specific ways of knowing social practices” (2008, p.6). Thus, in this thesis the discourses are analysed for the way they organise the text, in order to produce and legitimise specific ways of knowing social practices. This thesis takes the view that the legitimisation of specific ways of knowing social practices may result in social inequality for certain groups and through that attempts to address particular research questions such as: What is the impact of legitimising specific ways of knowing certain social practices around identity issues of *we* and the *other* on bicommunal relations in Cyprus?

4.2.1. Interviews

The main reason for choosing interview as the research method for collecting data about face-to-face bicommunal communication is because I wanted a method that would allow me to examine in depth how the participants experience bicommunal relations. In addition to this the interview, in comparison to other methods, allowed me to interact with the participants and to modify or add questions according to the participant’s narration, aiming to get my participants to describe their experiences in their own terms.

Fontana and Frey (2005, p.695) suggest that traditional interviewing is dead, meaning that interviewing is not an instrument of diagnosis – as it used to be commonly understood. Also, they suggest, the interview is a method that is “inextricably and unavoidably historically, politically, and contextually bound” (ibid). Thus, I should first acknowledge the fact that as a researcher, I am deeply bound up with my subject of study, not least because of my cultural identity and that I used interviews in this research not as an instrument of diagnosis but as a method of providing me a spherical idea on the participants’ face-to-face communication experience with the *other*.

Choice of Participants

The interview participants were identified to allow me to examine the experience of those who had and/or continue to have face-to-face communication with people of the other community in different historical periods and conditions. In such an attempt, I began with three historical periods: (1) the period of coexistence before 1974, (2) the period of rapprochement activities in the 1990s and (3) the post-2003 free movement across the Green Line period. The first and most obvious criterion I set in choosing a participant was

to be GC or TC. This included those with Cypriot nationality but did not necessarily mean that I would exclude those who did not have Cypriot nationality but had been born and lived their whole life in Cyprus. Cypriot nationality was not a criterion in principle, but in practice all my interviewees were Cypriot nationals. I was actually interested in including participants who were born in Cyprus after 1974 by Turkish migrant parents.⁹¹ At the same time, I did not want to exclude Cypriots who have been migrants themselves but who still had/have face-to-face bicomunal communication. I should make clear however, that my participants are not entirely random, but self-selecting to a degree. Thus, the research is by definition skewed towards those who do have contact with the other side, rather than those who do not.

Another category of participants is that of people who used to coexist and relate to members of the other community, that is living in the same village or neighbourhood, and who communicate either through their everyday activities or have some kind of deeper relationship/friendship. My interest in the experience of these participants had two dimensions. As a researcher, I was interested to see whether everyday 'ordinary' face-to-face communication between people of the two communities enhanced bicomunal relations and whether these everyday interpersonal relations were altered in periods of bicomunal turbulence. I should note that I have lived most of my life without having any face-to-face contact with the TC community, but having grown up with family stories of such communication.⁹²

The next category of participants that I wanted to include in this part of my research is that of people who were pioneers in the area of rapprochement activities during the period of separation, especially in the 1980s and 90s, particularly those who participated in activities that were either organised by local political parties or by foreign – especially American – institutions and organisations. The hope was to be able to capture the face-to-face bicomunal experience as facilitated by different techniques and in different contexts.

Lastly, I wanted to include participants that came into contact with the other community after 2003 with the introduction of free movement. This would allow me to include

⁹¹ For example, I made contact with Safiye [pseudonym] who was born and who has lived most of her life in Cyprus but her parents are Turkish migrants; unfortunately she did not reply to my request.

⁹² Family stories as the ones mentioned in the introductory chapter (1) of this thesis.

younger people and to examine their first face-to-face encounters with the other community in a less moderated context.

Thus the participants of the first empirical study (Chapter 5) are people of the two Cypriot communities who had in the past and/or have in the present interpersonal face-to-face communication with members of the opposite community. In order for my sample to be as representative as possible of the Cypriots' face-to-face bicomunal experience, I included participants from different age groups and of different ideological backgrounds whenever possible. The participants' age varied between 17 and 83.

The procedure followed in approaching my GC participants was as follows. People from my family, social and work environments had provided me with a list of names, email addresses and telephone numbers of people that fitted the profile of the required participants. I would then call possible participants and explain how I got their contact details and introduce myself and research activity and how their participation was useful for my project. If they agreed to participate in my research we would arrange a convenient time and place for the interview and in the meantime, I would send them an interview request letter which contained more information about my research and their participation.

The procedure followed in approaching my TC participants was similar, however, the TCs who I contacted tended to be more reserved in their decision to participate— something which I interpret as a reaction to my cultural identity – making it more difficult and time consuming to reach the number of interviews needed.

The most difficult part in that initial stage of planning my fieldwork was to contact people who had this second category of experience, i.e. that of having bicomunal face-to-face communication during separation. The difficulty lay on the fact that those bicomunal meetings had been held in the 1990s – almost 20 years ago – and although these meetings were included in literature on bicomunal relations in Cyprus (Broome, 2005) contact details of the participants – or even their names – were not mentioned. My first contact with a key GC who had participated in bicomunal activities during the time of separation, had been established completely coincidentally, through our common participation in Turkish language classes but her willingness to help me contact other bicomunal activists

from this period had been assured from the beginning of our contact. Contacting people from the other two categories, i.e. people that had face-to-face communication before separation and those who had/have face-to-face communication after 2003, was much easier – at least as far as the GC participants are concerned – through acquaintances and informal networks.

The total number of interviews conducted was twenty-four, twelve with GC and twelve with TC participants. According to Rubin and Rubin (1995, p.72) there are two principles that can be used in order to extend the interview data and that consequently determine the number of the interviews conducted: (1) completeness and (2) saturation point (Glaser & Strauss, 1967 cited in Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p.72). As they explain, the principle of completeness suggests that the researcher should keep conducting new interviews until s/he feels satisfied with her/his understanding of the complexity of the cultural arena of the research. The second principle, the saturation process, refers to the point at which the researcher stops adding new interviews because s/he realises that each new participant and interview adds little to the data already collected.

However, in the case of a political/cultural research as this one, this is only a pragmatic definition of completeness, at best. A definition of completeness in research of this sort implies a fluidity of the data in the sense that people's experiences change according to the cultural and political circumstances of the period in which they are recorded. In other words, completeness cannot be claimed in such a small-scale qualitative research, a larger scale anthropological research would be more successful in that sense. Thus the completeness, to which this empirical study rather aimed at, was to trace different experiences of bicomunal face-to-face communication in order to identify any common patterns or tendencies among them. That is why when I attempted to use the two aforementioned principles when conducting my interviews, I did so by trying to include participants that were linked to the subject of my research, i.e. who had experienced face-to-face bicomunal communication, while also trying to cover all different historical periods in which these contacts took place, the different conditions under which they communicated and the different reasons for and ways of initiating this kind of communication. More specifically, I included people that had participated in bicomunal face-to-face communication before the 1974 separation, people that have had this kind of

communication because of their position in political parties, people that participated in rapprochement activities in the 1990s, people who initiated face-to-face communication themselves by visiting the other side or by participating in discussions in online forums with members of the other community and people whose contact with the other community began out of a coincidental meeting while abroad. Completeness was achieved in a similar way with participants of both communities; however I observed a small differentiation in reaching the saturation point between the participants of the two communities. The saturation point was reached slightly sooner in the case of the TC participants – around the eighth to ninth interview – in the sense that the narratives repeated the same interpretations and themes in comparison to the GCs' case, where the saturation point was reached around interview eleven to twelve. This could be explained by the fact that the TC community is smaller than the GC community and consequently it is easier to locate similar interpretations. Another reason for this differentiation could be that the TC community, in comparison to the GC community, experienced a “postmodern uprising” as Panayiotou (2009b, p.237) calls the uprising of the TC community in the period 2002-04 that may have caused similarities in people's interpretation. The 2002-04 uprising was according to Demetriou and Vlachos (2007) the result of dynamics in the TC community which created a “working class”/“popular” front and challenged the status quo.

Format of the Interviews

All twenty-four interviews were conducted face-to-face except one that was conducted by email⁹³ due to the fact that that specific participant was living abroad but was very interested in participating in the research. I contacted⁹⁴ the candidate participants by phone, email or Facebook email and sent them interview request letters⁹⁵ through which I

⁹³ It should be noted here that the participant was willing to discuss via email any point of the answers that needed further clarification or was unclear to me.

⁹⁴ It is worth mentioning that I have contacted a lot more than 24 candidate participants but some did not reply to my emails and others even though responded positively to my initial contact/request they had been postponing or cancelling the realisation of the interview. This was more common with the TC candidate participants and could be explained as an insecurity to share their personal experience to an unknown person that belongs to the GC community.

⁹⁵ A copy of the interview request letter is available in Appendix D.

introduced myself and my research and also explained why their participation would be significant to my research. Twenty-two⁹⁶ of the twenty-four interviews were recorded using an mp3 sound recorder with the consent of the participants.

The face-to-face interviews were semi-structured, meaning that the questions⁹⁷ were open-ended and were conducted on a fairly informal level. There are several reasons for following a more informal model, for example, ensuring that the interviews would allow interviewees to add any details they would consider important even though not been asked. Additionally, it was crucial for me to ensure that the participants would feel comfortable to share with me experiences that in some cases were unpleasant or personal. For example Pembe, a female TC participant, described to me that her mother often mentions to her how the GC and especially the Greek soldiers took advantage of the body searches that they were conducted during the turbulence of the 1960s to sexually harass young girls, including herself. However the aspect of creating an informal and friendly atmosphere for the participants was not just a matter of tact in order to gain the trust of my participants, to share with me their personal experiences. In some cases this was demanding - especially in the cases of the TC participants who were asked to narrate their personal experiences, feelings, thoughts about the other community to me, a person who belongs to a community to which they sometimes referred unpleasantly; in other words keeping the interviews on an informal and friendly level was a matter of indicating my positive intentions and my willingness to hear criticism about my own – GC – identity.

In many cases I revealed my positive feelings towards the other community or about certain methods for building reconciliation in order to persuade my participants to feel as comfortable and to be as revealing as possible. In other words, I have adopted a more “empathetic approach” as Fontana and Frey (2005, p. 696) call it by taking “an ethical stance in favour of the participant being studied [...] hoping to be able to use the results to advocate social policies and ameliorate the conditions of the interviewee” (ibid). Thus,

⁹⁶ One of the face-to-face interviews was not recorded due to an unexpected failure of the mp3 sound recorder.

⁹⁷ A copy of the interview questions is available in Appendix E.

because of the open-ended questions and because of my interest in collecting the personal stories of the participants, most of my interviews took the form of narrative interviewing. Many times one story that the participant narrated led to the other with me – the interviewer – giving up control in order “to learn about experience in all its complexity [...] specific incidents, not general evaluations of experience” (Riessman, 2006, p.190). In some cases I even started the interview by inviting my participant to tell me her/his story about her/his relationship with the other community.

Finally, because of this semi-structured format the duration of the interviews varied depending on the experience and the narration of the participants. The shortest interview lasted fifteen minutes and the longest around three hours.⁹⁸

Procedure and course of analysis

In order to analyse the data derived from the interviews I first codified them in order to develop sets of broad categories. This codifying and organising process was made according to certain comments of the participants that related somehow with the categories that will be described below. More specifically, a comment like: “I saw a Turkish girl [for the first time] while studying in Italy in 1988 and I thought I would slaughter her”, was organised under the category *shifting images of the other community due to interpersonal contact* and was codified as *a negative/enemy image of the other* before face-to-face interpersonal communication. In a similar way a comment like: “I actually made a friend [from the other community] that I now consider my sister, she is more than a friend to me, she’s not even a best friend she’s like a sister and she calls [considers] me the same” was organised under the category *the way the participants relate to the other community after the first contact* and codified as *personal contact via face-to-face contact*. Organising data related to the first category – the reasons behind the participants’ first contact with the other – was in most of the times more straightforward since this sort of information was usually exposed by one’s identity, like having a mixed cultural background, born and lived for years in a mixed village or

⁹⁸ This interview was conducted over two days.

neighborhood, being a member of a political party (usually a left-wing party) or having a profession which presupposes bicommunal contact.

Thus, one of the questions that all participants answered either in a straightforward reply or answered through their stories was the reason/s for first contact with the other community. Therefore the first category that the data was organised under is the *form of contact with the other community: the cultural/ political background - the causes, reasons for first contact*.

Another category that was identified in most of the interviews is the shifting images for the people of the other community after due to a face-to-face contact. Thus the data collected was organised under the category of *shifting images of the other community due to interpersonal contact*.

The third category I was interested to examine further in the data is *the way the participants relate to the other community after the first contact*.

After organising the data into these categories the information confined developed categories based on which the information has been analysed.

- *First contact: cultural/political background- causes/reasons for first contact with the other community:*
 - Due to Personal/cultural background, e.g. living in mixed village-memories, being married to foreigners, etc – leading to being culturally more open to “others”, from other cultures and which prompted the person get engaged with the bicommunal movement.
 - Media images/discourses or generally mediated information events or discourses in the public sphere that prompted them (the participants) to shift to a more positive engaging attitude towards the other community.
 - Group influence/lifestyle/activism: It could have been friends or social/ political activism or even one’s job that led to developing attitudes and contacts with the other community. The focus here is on personal experiences/attitudes – e.g. due to university studies, perceiving oneself as being different from the majority. Belonging to a leftist subculture or liberal background.

- *Shifting images of other community due to interpersonal contact:*
 - Before face-to-face contact
 - After face-to-face contact.
- *Ways of relating to other community after the first contact:*
 - Personal contact: via face-to-face communication or mediated, like via letters, emails etc.
 - Media-mediated contact: images of the other community through selected mass media, public discourse.
 - Group/sub-culturally mediated contact: images/perceptions through group and cultural/political beliefs.

4.2.2. Choice of media material

In order to examine bicomunal representation in Cyprus through print and broadcast media, I analysed data from selected GC newspapers,⁹⁹ radio and television programmes across the historical context of the research. The reasons for limiting the research to GC print and broadcast media are twofold: my insufficient knowledge of Turkish, and the sheer volume of material to analyse even from the one community. Thus, I should first acknowledge that painting half of the picture of bicomunal communication through print and broadcast media presupposes specific limitations of the research conducted. Limitations like, for example, the lack of comparative study between the bicomunal representations through the mass media of the two communities or the failure to identify discourses that have been produced exclusively by the TC. Despite the limitations however, focusing only on the GC print and broadcast media is still justifiable since in Cyprus due to the fact that the languages – Greek and Turkish – used in the official public contexts and in the media were different to the ones used by the two communities in their everyday oral contexts – with the GC version of the Cypriot dialect being understood by the majority of the people of both communities – enforced the division of the Cypriot public sphere even before the physical separation of the two communities. Put less abstractly, the use of the ‘official’ languages by the media of each community automatically excluded those who did not have knowledge – especially reading – of the language of the other community. Thus,

⁹⁹ The newspaper material was accessed through the archive of the Press Information Office (PIO) of the Republic of Cyprus and the archive of the Archbishop Makarios III Foundation – Cultural Centre.

in this sense there is a de facto division of the Cypriot media which implies a different dynamic on bicomunal relations coming from the media of the two communities which means the focus of a research examining the Cypriot media as a whole would be centred in comparing this different dynamic.

Newspapers

The analysis of the newspapers will be useful in order to identify first the codes that dominated the GC public sphere, and second the different discourses that existed in the print domain. Language is definitely a critical element of the print media in any society, but as Panayiotou points out, language is particularly critical in Cypriot cultural politics since it not only separates GCs and TCs in two communities but it also causes internal status divisions (2006c, p.29). For example, many in the GC community consider the Cypriot dialect a subordinated branch of ‘correct’ Greek. The dominance of Greek in the public sphere of print – in contrast to the dominance of the Cypriot dialect that for oral communication between the two communities (see chapters 3 and 5) – had a significant function in the GC community. Indeed Panayiotou suggests it could be considered as the first structural form of censorship in the public sphere (2006c, p.29). I would argue this censorship operated on two levels. Not only were TC readers excluded but a second and different linguistic code – a “national print language” (Anderson, 1991 [1983], p.46) – was imposed on the GCs.

The selection of newspapers for analysis was based on two criteria: (a) the need to cover the entire historical period under review and (b) to examine bicomunal communication in historical periods significant for the relations of the two communities. I have also selected some newspaper material randomly in order to look at the newspapers’ discourse in days of ‘normalcy’ i.e., days that are not necessarily significant for any ethnic or bicomunal tension.

Now, because of the long period under review the newspapers from which the data would derive could not be always the same. Some papers that examined bicomunal communication in one historical period stopped in the next. However, I was consistent

with the choice of newspapers whenever possible and when not, the newspapers chosen were selected to represent the different ideologies. A brief description of the newspapers used in Chapter 6 is included in Appendix B. On the basis of these selection processes, the newspapers analysed are as follows:

Table 1. List of Selected Newspapers

Historical Period	Exact Date(s)	Reason for Selection	Newspapers
1908	22 March 1908, 4 April 1908, 18 April 1908	Election of a TC as mayor of Nicosia	1. <i>Kypriakos Fylax</i> , 2. <i>Foni tis Kyprou</i> , 3. <i>Eleftheria</i>
	1 & 7 November 1908	Random Dates	1. <i>Kypriakos Fylax</i> , 2. <i>Foni tis Kyprou</i>
1931	23 & 29 October 1931	October's disturbances	1. <i>Neos Kypriakos Fylax</i> , 2. <i>Alithia</i> , 3. <i>Foni tis Kyprou</i>
1940	30 & 31 October 1940	Demonstrations	1. <i>Neos Kypriakos Fylax</i> , 2. <i>Paratiritis</i> , 3. <i>Paphos</i>
1944	2 & 4 November	Random Dates	1. <i>Neos Kypriakos Fylax</i> , 2. <i>Anexartitos</i> , 3. <i>Paphos</i>
1956-58	21 December 1954, 13 June 1958, 23 May 1958	<i>EOKA</i> struggle for <i>enosis</i> and bicomunal conflict	1. <i>Eleftheria</i> , 2. <i>Harangi</i> , 3. <i>Ergatiko Vima</i>
	4 November 1958	Random Date	1. <i>Eleftheria</i>
1963-64	22 & 25 December 1963, 29 April 1964	Bicomunal conflict	1. <i>I Mabi</i> , 2. <i>Harangi</i>
1974	2 & 3 August 1974	Coup d'état and Turkish invasion	1. <i>I Mabi</i> , 2. <i>Harangi</i>
1981	4 November 1981	Random Date	1. <i>Harangi</i>
1996	12 & 17 August 1996	GC demonstrations	1. <i>Fileleftheros</i> , 2. <i>Simerini</i> , 3. <i>Harangi</i>
1999	4 November 1999	Random Date	1. <i>Fileleftheros</i> , 2. <i>Simerini</i>
2003	22, 23 & 24 April 2003	Regulation for free movement across the Green Line	1. <i>Fileleftheros</i> , 2. <i>Simerini</i> , 3. <i>Harangi</i>
2009	4 November 2009	Random Date	1. <i>Fileleftheros</i> , 2. <i>Simerini</i> , 3. <i>Harangi</i>

Radio

The mediation of bicomunal relations is conducted as much through entertainment as news media, and broadcasting was clearly a significant medium in this respect. Broadcasting through most of the period under review has been a very ephemeral medium, and the archiving of programmes is neither as comprehensive nor as accessible as newspapers.

For reasons that I will elaborate below, the examination of broadcasting's role in this thesis centres on some close textual analysis of one particular radio programme – the 'Cypriot radio sketch'¹⁰⁰ – that has been very popular among GCs¹⁰¹ since the appearance of radio in Cyprus in 1953. Broadcast every Sunday at noon by *CyBC*,¹⁰² these scripts were written by Elli Avraamidou, who was kind enough to give me access to her scripts in 2007. It was something very progressive during this period for a female author to have such public prominence, and I will consider the way in which gendered discourses also feed into the production and reception of these programmes.

The reason for selecting the radio sketch for this analysis is because of its immediacy due to the fact that it was written and broadcast in the Cypriot dialect – a rare thing on Cyprus radio indeed – it was the only programme on the mainstream media where Cypriots could listen to the sound that defined their identity.¹⁰³ More specifically, the use of dialect allows me to explore the notion of *communicative equality*. It is significant how this sound was

¹⁰⁰ "Cypriot sketch" is my translation in English of the Greek *Kipriotiko Sketch*.

¹⁰¹ There are no statistical or other information on the popularity of the Cypriot sketch. However there are sources referring to its high popularity (Moshonas, 1996, p.122; CyBC's website <http://www.cybc.com.cy/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=178&Itemid=227>, (accessed on 14 July 2010). I do not mean to exclude the TCs from the audience of this radio genre. Even though there is no evidence that the Cypriot sketch was also popular among the TC community, this could be the case since the language used in this radio genre was the Cypriot dialect (the GC version), which was understood by a large number of TCs.

¹⁰² It should be noted that the Cypriot Sketch it is written by a several writers and broadcast every Sunday noon until today. *CyBC* in Greek *RIK* stands for Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation and is the public broadcaster of the Republic of Cyprus.

¹⁰³ The broadcast of the Cypriot Sketch actually followed a programme called *I Ora tis Ipethrou* (translated in English as *Rural Times*) which also broadcast specimens of the Cypriot dialect since it included a few short interviews of peasants. However, the language used by the broadcaster of the programme was Greek. It should be noted that both programmes *I Ora tis Ipethrou* and *The Cypriot Sketch* are broadcast until today on the same weekly basis.

excluded from every form of the official public dialogue; it was excluded from any political and public speech, from the school, the church and the media (Leontiou, 1982). The exclusion was realised in the sense of Anderson’s notion of “print language” (1999) i.e., that the language-of-power created by print capitalism in the GC community was Greek and not the Cypriot dialect. Thus, the GCs were forced to maintain a form of bilingualism (*diglossia*) since they used the Cypriot dialect in their everyday life but they had to use the Greek language in any kind of official or status related communication (Moshonas, 2002). Therefore, this form of public authority/ power was cancelled – almost ritually one could say – every Sunday noon. Because of the Cypriot sketch, the Cypriots could listen to their *own sound* through the most advanced technology of that period, the radio.

The sketches were produced by *CyBC*, the corporation that aired Cyprus’ first radio programmes in 1953 and the first television programmes in 1957. The selection of individual sketches for analysis was based on their historical significance and on whether their title or the names of characters implied reference to bicomunal relations or the TC community in general. In the following table there is a list of the selected sketches and their significance.

Table 2. List of Selected Radio Sketches

Broadcast Date	Historical significance of the Broadcast Date/Period	Title
1 March 1964	Escalation of Bicomunal conflict.	<i>Kali Karkia</i> in English “Good Heart”
15 August 1965	One-year anniversary of the bombing of the village Tillirka ¹⁰⁴ by the Turkish air forces.	<i>Sti gi tis Tillirkas</i> in English “In Tillirkas’ land”

¹⁰⁴ *Tilliria* or *Tillirka* – as it is called in the Cypriot dialect – is a region in the northwest part of Cyprus that has been bombed by Turkish air forces in August 1964. Part of the region remains under the Turkish occupancy since 1974.

27 March 1966	Two days after the Greek National Day ¹⁰⁵ (25 of March) in the period of bicomunal conflict.	<i>Chorkon mou agapimeno</i> in English “My beloved village”
19 November 1978	A few years after 1974, the year of coup d’état and Turkish invasion.	<i>Me tin agapin</i> in English “With love”
11 March 1979 ¹⁰⁶		<i>I Kipros mas itan nan paradisos</i> in English “Our Cyprus would have been a paradise”

Television

In order to examine bicomunal communication as mediated by television in the post-separation era, I chose to analyse two different types of television material, the one-off media event and regular news reports. The first type is represented by President Tassos Papadopoulos’ declaration, broadcast on 7th April 2004, a broadcast which belongs to the television genre that Dayan and Katz (1992) call “media event”. Media events are those television programmes “that have the power of interrupting social life by cancelling all other programmes [...] they are *interruptions* of routine; they intervene in the normal flow of broadcasting and our lives” (Dayan and Katz, 1992, p.5).

The proclamation was made in the context of the Annan Plan referenda that took place in Cyprus – concurrently on both sides – on 24th April 2004. The two communities were asked to vote in these referenda on the Annan Plan¹⁰⁷ as a proposed solution for the

¹⁰⁵ The Greek National Day (25th March) is also a bank holiday in Cyprus and celebrated with street parades.

¹⁰⁶ Even though the Cypriot Sketch is still being broadcast, I have chose not to include any more recent episodes because Elli Avraamidou has stopped writing sketches in the early 1990s so the 1979 sketch is her latest story referring to bicomunal relations.

¹⁰⁷ The Annan Plan for Cyprus was a United Nations’ proposal to settle the Cyprus problem. The Plan was named in recognition to that period’s general secretary of United Nations Kofi Annan who developed it. It is worth noting that the referenda were held for voting the 5th revision of the Annan Plan and that the revisions were done after a series of negotiations and discussions since 2002 between the leaders of the two communities – between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash initially, and Tassos Papadopoulos and Rauf Denktash after 2003 – under the supervision of Kofi Annan.

Cyprus problem. The result was the GC community voted to reject the Plan by 75.83% to 24.17% while the TC community voted to approve it by 64.90% to 35.09% (Statement of the Commissioner of Referendum, 24 April 2004, PIO).

Tassos Papadopoulos' proclamation was intended to inform and advise the GCs on the proposed solution of the Plan, as he made clear in a public statement on 1st April on returning from the final negotiations at Bürgenstock, a statement that is worth quoting at some length. Saying that the GC negotiators had tried hard to achieve a solution that would allow all Cypriots to live together peacefully, he continued:

Unfortunately our [GC negotiators'] attempt did not succeed. Not just the intolerant positions of the TC side continued during the whole process but eleven new additional demands have been added by Turkey having as a main aim to facilitate Turkey's interests and objectives through Cyprus and which through the arbitration of United Nations' General Secretary had been either completely or partially satisfied.

This is not the time to analyse the basic providences of the Plan and to compare the positive and negative results of the negotiations in Switzerland. This will take place in the following days and my positions and opinions will be placed in front of the people.

As it is expected and necessary the political parties of Cyprus together with myself will cautiously and responsibly evaluate the total proposal and will position on this. I personally – and as I believe every political Party, Movement and Organised Group – will announce my decisions with a public proclamation in front of the people with clarity and honesty (Tassos Papadopoulos, Public Statement, 1 April 2004, PIO).

Thus the analysis of Tassos Papadopoulos' proclamation aims to understand the impact of a media event on people's social life and more specifically its impact on GCs' decision-making about such an important matter for bicomunal relations.

The second type of television material is the genre of news reports. I have chosen to analyse the news reports of the first five days after the easing of restrictions to free movement across the Green Line in 2003 – produced and broadcast by *CyBC*. The main reason behind this selection is that the free movement regulation is the most significant event in recent times in bicomunal relations and Chapter 6 examines its coverage on the main state broadcaster.

The overall analysis of the television material is used in the attempt to provide cases to test Couldry's argument (2003, p.45) that contemporary societies maintain the myth that the media have a privileged relationship with the so-called "centre" of society that they represent.

Internet

The material chosen for examining bicomunal communication through the Internet derives from two different Internet tools that have been used for bicomunal communication in two different time periods. The first type of material was produced through email group conversations between people of the two communities. More specifically, the data analysed in Chapter 7, derived from the Yahoo Email Group conversations held between teenagers from both communities in the first five days after they returned to Cyprus from their participation in a bicomunal workshop in Prague in 2001.

This material allows me to examine what sort of discourses existed, or were produced within a bicomunal group who had the chance to communicate with each other in a period of time when face-to-face interpersonal communication was not allowed, nor approved or generally facilitated between the two communities. At the same time, this would also allow me to examine the social uses that this medium has been put to – and the reasons behind these uses – by this specific group under those specific circumstances. The reason for selecting the first five days of the group's email conversation is that I wanted to also get some sense of the atmosphere of the workshop that took place in Prague and that had initiated the email conversation in the first place. My access to this material was kindly given by the facilitator both of the Prague workshop and the online conversations held in the Yahoo Email Group.¹⁰⁸

The second body of Internet material analysed in Chapter 7 relates to the bicomunal groups that exist in Facebook. The selection of the groups was based on whether a

¹⁰⁸ For a discussion on the ethical considerations of the use of this material refer to the following section.

Facebook Group had members from both communities – and/or its theme was bicomunal relations in Cyprus or more generally the Cyprus problem. Having done an initial keyword search, I narrowed down the selection according to the two criteria, and then the final stage was to divide the groups into those having (a) a positive approach towards bicomunal relations, (b) a negative one and (c) a neutral¹⁰⁹ one. The analysis, however, focuses only on the positive and neutral groups, since this project is focused on the discourses produced when members of the two communities communicate in this online medium. In the case of the negative groups direct bicomunal communication did not exist. However, apart from the discourse analysis of the conversations that took place in the selected groups, a more descriptive analysis of the range of groups that existed in Facebook at the time of the research is also presented in Chapter 7.

¹⁰⁹ These are groups that have both GCs and TCs members but their theme is unrelated to the bicomunal relations or the Cyprus Problem.

4.3. Ethical considerations on the empirical research

The main ethical consideration regarding the empirical part of this thesis was to anticipate and prevent harm of the participants. That is why, whenever the research demands the participation of human beings as research subjects, caution had to be exercised.

Participants have been involved in this thesis in two ways: 1. Directly: as interview subjects and 2. Indirectly: as authors/producers of material under study, in the cases of the analysis of email conversations, posts in Facebook Groups discussion walls, newspaper articles and broadcast media material.

In the case of the direct involvement of participants – through the conduct of interviews – an interview request letter was given, whenever possible, to the candidate participant that gave information about this research, the purpose of the interview and the ways in which his/her anonymity will be kept. In other words, this interview request letter constituted the “informed consent” since the candidate participant has been first informed about important issues regarding his/her interview and then decided whether s/he wanted to participate in the research. Furthermore, in order to safeguard the anonymity of the participants, pseudonyms have been used instead of real names and information that could reveal the identity of the participants¹¹⁰ has been handled with care throughout the research process.

In the case of the indirect involvement of participants – the ethical dilemmas are always more complicated. For example, how do you use material that is published in online public spaces such as Facebook Groups discussion walls? Do you consider them public text since their authors are aware that they publish their posts in an open access medium or do you ask the authors’ permission to use this kind of material since the material is considered a discussion product between human beings? There is an ongoing scholarly debate focusing on whether the Internet material is considered *textual* or *spatial* (Bassett & O’Riordan,

¹¹⁰ Even though a small number of the participants stated that they would not mind revealing their identity one or two others asked for the use of pseudonyms. Thus, I decided that it would be correct to be consistent and use pseudonyms for all my interview participants.

2002). However, complex matters of privacy and copyright issues emerge in both cases and as scholars (Ess, C. & the AoIR ethics working committee, 2002, p.3) suggest there are no “recipes” but rather general values and guidelines for the researcher to follow depending on the case of her/his research in order to defend the ethical dilemmas that might emerge. Bassett and O’Riordan propose that a balanced approach should be followed when conducting research on the Internet that takes into consideration both the *spatial* and *textual* implications of the Internet material. This thesis attempts to achieve this balance in its approach as the one proposed above. On one hand it considers public text the material that is being posted in open access online spaces and not in private online spaces like the case of the conversations that took place in the Facebook Groups’ discussion walls. In other words, since Facebook Groups, from which the data has been taken, are open access and public this data has been handled as text that is “in the public domain, and therefore, aside from considerations of copyright, [which] is available for reproduction” (Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002, p.239). The same position has been applied when analysing print and broadcast media data. Based on the same quotation, the ethics involved in the case of print and broadcast media material become much more straightforward since this kind of material is no doubt in the public domain. Furthermore, Bassett & O’Riordan suggest that

the Internet user is also entitled to a degree of representation and publication in the public domain. If an individual or group has chosen to use Internet media to publish their opinions then the researcher needs to consider their decision to the same degree that they would with a similar publication in traditional print media (2002, p.243).

I share this view and I would like to develop this a bit further to suggest that the individual/group that publish their opinion on the Internet might be doing so in order for their individual or group’s opinion to be heard. That is why when using material for analysing the discourses that exist in the conversations hosted in Facebook Groups the original names or pseudonyms that the users/authors use to write their posts are revealed.

Nevertheless, the ethical dilemmas are intensified when the data under analysis have been produced in a private domain space as in the case of the Yahoo group email list conversations. The Yahoo group email list constitutes a private online space in the sense that the access to the conversations hosted within it is not open to the public but it can be given only by its administrator. However, in the case of my research the email

conversations under study took place in 2001 and this specific Yahoo group email list does not exist today. Even though this raises the question of a ‘statute of limitations’ on ethical decisions, including a case study on the use of Internet during the time of separation was extremely important since this would allow me to identify not only the intended but also any “unintended uses and effects” (Williams, 1990 [1974]) of a medium – the Internet in this case – by a group of people who would otherwise be excluded from the official public sphere due to the bicommunality that characterised the group. Furthermore, Bassett and O’Riordan acknowledge themselves that

in some cases it is not possible to gain consent of a large number of participants who may have changed their email address or ceased posting to a web site on the material under research is located. This should not prevent research of textual material that they have chosen to output via the Internet anymore than it would for textual products in other print or broadcast media (Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002, pp.244-245).

In order to ensure that my decision on the use of this material was ethically correct I asked the permission for using these email conversations from the person who facilitated both the bicommunal workshop hosted in Prague and the conversation hosted within the Yahoo group email list. A consent form¹¹¹ was signed by the facilitator as a permission given for the use of the email conversations in this research. Moreover, I considered it necessary to use pseudonyms instead of the real names of the people who participated in the email conversations in order to prevent the revelation of their identities.

Apart from the ethical considerations in relation to the involvement of participants and participants’ textual material, this research imposed other ethical questions in relation to my own identity as a researcher. Questions like: how do I stand as a GC in the debate of bicommunal conflict in Cyprus? Should I be obligated to state my national, ethnic and political allegiances/biases both within the text and in relation to my subjects? These questions have been partially answered when describing the procedure followed in conducting the interviews at the beginning of this chapter. As stated there, the nature of this research often demanded revealing to some extent my personal biases in order to gain the trust of my participants, especially in the case of the TC interviews. Furthermore, and

¹¹¹ A copy of the signed consent form is available in Appendix F.

as also mentioned before, the discourse analytic method used in this research stands close to the method of critical discourse analysis in the sense that my approach when analysing the texts acknowledges that there is a sort of dominance – with different sources and targets throughout the historical context of my research – to which I am critical. Also, as van Dijk claims, a sort of bias is unavoidable in any approach and despite other approaches, “Critical Discourse Analysis does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own socio-political position. That is Critical Discourse Analysis is biased – and proud of it” (2006 [2001], p.96).

4.4. Concluding note

This chapter has discussed the methodological model used in this research. As already mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter, this thesis uses a mixed methodology in the sense that it combines together different methods of collecting and analysing data. The aim of this chapter was to explain both the reasons and the way in which different methods have been combined together to address the research questions of this multidisciplinary thesis.

Thus, the interview data of the first empirical study in the following chapter (5) will be analysed according to the codifying and organising that was made around the categories discussed in Section 2.3. This will identify how both the hard and soft variables of the participants influenced their experience of face-to-face communication with the *other*. The empirical studies of Chapters 6 and 7 will follow a discourse analytical model since the data that will be analysed will consist of (a) print and broadcast media material and (b) online bicomunal communication material. Discourse analysis will allow me on one hand, to identify the discourses that existed in these contexts and on the other, to analyse their impact on bicomunal relations.

Chapter Five

INTERPERSONAL (FACE-TO-FACE) BICOMMUNAL COMMUNICATION

5.1. Introduction

One of the axioms that characterises communication according to Waltzlawick, Beavin and Jackson is: “Every conversation, no matter how brief, involves two messages – a content message and a relationship message” (1967 cited in Littlejohn, 2002, pp.235-237).

Even though many types of relationships in all forms of communication were at play during the period of the development of the print and then the broadcast media in Cyprus, this thesis focuses on the relationship of the two Cypriot communities and suggests that their communication was characterised – for the majority of those who coexisted before the separation – by a conflicting relation between the content message and the relationship message; for the majority of those belonging to the younger generations the relationship message was determined by the content message. The following discussion is an attempt to explain this conflicting and determining relation between the two kinds of messages.

The first empirical study of this thesis, reflects on the ways the GC and TC communities experience their interpersonal, face-to-face communication – both in the past and in the present – with their *other* accordingly. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the two main Cypriot communities used to coexist for years in the island until their partial separation in 1963 and their complete segregation in 1974. Until 2003, the GCs and TCs had no means – except in the rare occasions mentioned in Chapter 3 – of interpersonal communication. Since 2003, when some of the physical barricades that had been put up to separate the two communities in 1974 had been removed, GCs and TCs have the option to have face-to-face communication again. It should be noted that the language used for conducting bicommunal face-to-face communication was either English or the Cypriot dialect.¹¹² The older participants¹¹³ – mainly TCs – who used to constitute the minority in the mixed villages and neighbourhoods where they used to live before the separation, mostly used the latter. English was used by all the participants who were born after the separation with the exception of one TC participant Volkan who, even though he is 28 years old, learned

¹¹² The Greek version of the Cypriot dialect was used by the TCs who used to live in mixed places before the separation. One GC participant Niki, stated that she used both versions of the Cypriot dialect, Greek and Turkish since she used to live in the mixed neighbourhood of Limassol where the majority of the residents were TCs.

¹¹³ For biographical details of the participants refer to Appendix A.

Greek after 2003. English was also the language in which rapprochement activities were conducted. Only one GC participant stated that the use of the English language made bicomunal face-to-face communication more difficult for him (see Section 4 of this Chapter).

The current chapter analyses data that derived from interviews with people of both communities on their face-to-face bicomunal communication in three historical periods, i.e. pre-1963 coexistence, post-1974 separation and the post-2003 free movement across the Green Line. The interviews were designed to find about the reasons for the first contact with the other community, whether due to personal background, media influence or the direct influence of particular social groups, and then similarly to explore how that initial communication changed perceptions of the other community, and how communication was sustained after the first contact.

After analysing the interview data I will attempt to demonstrate how, during the time when bicomunal relations was rejected by the official public sphere of Cyprus, people had to find alternative ways to participate in bicomunal relations, and how the rituals produced within this form of communication help to break the dominant nationalistic stereotypes of the *other*. As far as the latter is concerned, I will draw upon media theories which go against any functionalists' arguments that society needs the media as a centralised system of symbolic production and distribution in order to have a healthy operation (Couldry, 2003b, p.137).

5.2. Reasons for contacting the *other*

This section focuses on the analysis of the data derived from questions related to the reasons the participants had made their first face-to-face contact with members of the other community.

According to the data the reasons that seem to have inspired the participants to make their first contact with the other community were: *Group influence/lifestyle/activism* and *Personal/cultural background*. Group influence means that the influence occurred either as young adults, either during their university studies (friends, co-students, tutors, specific courses or even the chronological period of their studies, their political activism or lifestyle i.e., friends, job). *Personal/cultural background* means that the influence for these participants came either because they (a) have grown up in mixed villages or neighbourhoods or (c) have a mixed cultural background, i.e. children of mixed¹¹⁴ marriages.

Thus the picture drawn in the historical chapter (3) of the leftist subculture being more open to the other community becomes in a way confirmed with the interviews. Participants who grew up in a leftist subculture appear to be more receptive towards the other community in comparison to participants with a rightist background. Even so, the former point at their background for urging them to make the first link with the other community the latter do not mention it at all.

For example this is how Costas, a GC member of *AKEL*'s central committee, explained to me how he made his first contact with the other community after 1974:

After the separation, and after becoming a member of the political office [of *AKEL*] – and I'm talking about the 1990s now – I saw TCs again during some meetings that Demetris Christofias and I made, both in the occupied areas and here and we mainly had meetings with the Republican Turkish Cypriot Party [CTP], with Özker Özgür¹¹⁵. But the initiative for those meetings appeared much before I became a leading member of the party. If I'm not mistaken, the first ever meeting took place outside Cyprus in 1978 and then other meetings followed abroad especially in London where *AKEL* has an office and which always had – and continues to have – TC members.

Furthermore, leftist participants would usually clearly state their political background so it was easier to understand how this influenced their actions even when they did not make a direct connection between the two themselves. For example, this is how the link appears

¹¹⁴ Mixed marriages here means marriages of Cypriots (GCs or TCs) with non-Cypriots. One GC participant is a child of a Malaysian mother and GC father, another GC participant's mother was Indian when her father is GC and finally a TC participant is a child of a mixed marriage between an English woman and a TC man.

¹¹⁵ Özker Özgür is a TC politician who served as a leader of *CTP* between 1976-1996.

between the leftist background and the positive attitude that Enis, a TC participant, had towards the other community even though born after the separation:

I guess that my parents never distorted the story for me, they explained it in a balanced way I think, I don't know... maybe some people's parents might have blamed only the other side, or the history books or the teachers might have done this. My parents never did that. [...] My family promoted my participation in bicomunal activities even though there were rumours that the names of those participated were listed in Denktash's 'black book'. [...] I would say that I'm coming from a leftist background and even though I cannot say that I am politically active since I never really voted, because I was never here during elections, but you know my parents promote or support a certain political party that I agree with I guess.

What is more interesting however is that this openness of the Cypriot leftists towards the other community appeared even during an interview with a non-leftist participant. Lefteris, a GC participant, was describing his thoughts and feelings about bicomunal coexistence when he clearly stated that he feels positively about this issue, even though he is not a leftist. In his own words:

It is really important to learn to respect each other, to know about each other's religion, to respect each other's symbols, to hear each other's language without 'shivering'. *And I'm not a communist or anything* [he emphasised this in his tone], I just see things differently now than I used to see them before, from a more humanitarian point of view because I understand that we have to live together.

Nonetheless, the first thing worth noting is that the participants who invoked their *personal cultural background* as the reason for their first contact, without this being their leftist background, are the older participants. It was the younger ones who were influenced by certain groups or lifestyles. In other words, the older participants, who had lived together with members of the other community in mixed villages or neighbourhoods before the separation, attribute their experience of coexistence as a reason that led them to make their first contact with the other community. A common pattern appeared in those interviews: the participants would begin by describing how living in a mixed environment was something normal and that ethnic differences were not something that implied a different identity. Then they would explain how happy and emotional they felt when they were able to have face-to-face contact with members of the other community again and how the close bonds that they used to have, have been sustained all these years.

For example Ilhami, a 51 year old TC participant born and living in *Morfou* started by saying:

Before 1974, all our neighbours were Cypriots and the difference of *we are TC and you are GC didn't exist*. My mother's house was right here, on the left side there was a Cypriot [meaning a GC] living, on the right side a Cypriot [meaning a GC] again and there was no difference to separate us.

Petros, a GC participant 58 years old who also used to live in *Morfou* before the separation said to me:

There were not many TCs living in *Morfou*. *Morfou* was a town with a few thousand habitats, and the TCs were only about 250 but they were ‘absorbed’ in the community of *Morfou*. They [GCs and TCs] were friends with each other, *koumpari*¹¹⁶ – one would be the best man in the other’s wedding – they had really good relationships. I remember as a child, that we had a TC wedding in the neighbourhood and my uncle was one of the best men and my mother was one of the maids of honour. The same happened in my parents’ wedding, of course I wasn’t there to remember it, but if you read the ribbon that names of *koumpari* were written on you will see the names of the TC friends and neighbours.

Chara, another GC participant 47 years old, also emphasised the normalcy with which she experienced living together with TCs in another Cypriot town *Kerynia*. She said:

Well that [her first contact with TCs] was before 1974, when we used to live in *Kerynia* and where we had an everyday contact with them [TCs] but I’ve never thought of them as members of the other community, they were *Keryniotes*.¹¹⁷ You know, maybe it was important that *Kerynia* was a mixed community, ok maybe there were more TCs lived in *Pano Kerynia* than GCs but it wasn’t like other places, like in bigger cities where the TCs lived separated or isolated. Coexistence was part of my everyday life, for example I remember *thia*¹¹⁸ Fatme coming to our house very often to sew with my mother. I remember many occasions... for example our baker was a TC but that had no difference for us.

So when the participants that used to live in mixed communities before the separation referred to their first contact with members of the other community after the separation it was quite obvious that they would consider it a positive thing. Ilhami said on that:

[With the opening of the crossing points] I was happy because I went to find my co-villagers, many of my co-villagers that we used to play together when we were kids and now we’ve aged... we are all happy to see each other and we call each other very often.

Petros in his attempt to make me understand that the close bonds that existed between members of the two communities before the separation have been maintained all these years said to me:

Let me tell you a story. I once crossed with a GC friend and we went to a tavern with my TC friends from *Morfou*. While being there, my GC friend asked one of my TC friends: «Mustafa, tell me how do you feel as an original *Morfitis*¹¹⁹ now that you live in *Morfou* and all your neighbours are *xeni* [foreigners]»? And how do you think he replied to him? He said: «I might live in *Morfou* but I don’t consider myself a *Morfitis* today. I will become a *Morfitis* again when Petros, *thia* [aunt] Maria, Costis return back to *Morfou*. I don’t feel a *Morfitis* now, only then I will feel one». [...] Do you understand? It is like nothing changed between us. For example,

¹¹⁶ *Koumpari* (plural of *koumparos*) is a Greek word which literally means ‘best men’. It is a custom that in a GC wedding there are more than one *koumparos* (both male and female). In order for someone to become *koumparos* has to offer apart from his/her gift to the couple an amount of money as an additional gift and write down her/his name in a book (in the past the names used to be written on the ribbon that linked together the headbands of the couple) that is distributed in the church during the religious wedding ceremony.

¹¹⁷ People from *Kerynia* are called *Keryniotes*.

¹¹⁸ *Thia* is a Greek word which literally means «aunt» but it is often used by children to refer to non-relatives that have a very close relationship with the family as in this case.

¹¹⁹ *Morfitis* is called someone from *Morfou*.

they [TC friends] might cross to this side one day for shopping and they will call me to come to our house for a coffee. Do you understand? This happens spontaneously.

Thus this could be interpreted either that the experience of coexistence had sustained a positive attitude towards the other community and they acted to recapture their contact when it was made possible again, or that coexistence had been a better experience than their situation under separation. The younger participants on the other hand, who had not had any face-to-face contact before the separation, needed an external influence in order to develop the desire to make contact with members of the other community. Now if the older participants who had also passed through the bad experience of bicomunal conflicts and war – something that the younger ones did not do – managed to maintain the urge to revive communication with the other community, what is/are the reason/s that kept the younger participants away from the same desire for several years until the time of the group influence they described? The question might sound rhetorical but it is not. This tendency that can be observed for the younger participants cannot be overlooked and the reason/s causing it must be sought. If we pay attention to the sources of the group influence that the younger participants invoked, they concentrate mostly on the area of youth camps, university studies and jobs. In other words, the time period during which the younger participants were influenced positively towards the other community is either their late adolescence or their early adulthood, the time that a person can break through the socio-cultural framework into which they were born and developed as a child and create their own. This means that the reason/s for not developing this positive attitude earlier in their lives, is/are located in the socio-cultural framework of their childhood environment, which is constructed mainly by their family, their school environment and is also influenced to some extent by the information produced by the media.¹²⁰

All these memories mentioned above, are characterised by a set of practices that can be mobilised to create a common identity for the Cypriots of the two communities. My point here is not to praise face-to-face communication in a Durkheimian way as a social integrative but to suggest that the ‘rituals’ that characterised the everydayness of the Cypriots when this mode of communication was dominant during coexistence, (and also whenever it becomes dominant in the current situation), allowed a more balanced distribution of symbolic power.

¹²⁰ Media power/influence here is meant in a diffused way in the sense that family and teachers that influenced the participants’ beliefs when children have been exposed/influenced to/by media information.

The third category emerging from the data is that of *Media images/discourses* or generally mediated information or events in the public sphere that prompted the participants to shift to a more positive engaging attitude towards the other community. It is very interesting that only one out of the twenty-four participants appears to belong to this category. This one GC participant, Nina, mentioned that the negative way in which the majority of the GC media used to refer to the Cyprus problem – especially during the Annan Plan period – make her become involved in bicommunal activities in order to find out herself where does this negativity derived from. None of the rest claim to have been influenced by any mediated information in the public sphere and this is something that deserves further analysis. There are two potential explanations: 1. The mass media do not cover news/information that involves the relationship of the two communities 2. The media discourses related to the interaction of the two communities or which focus on the other community are represented in a way that does not positively influence the people.

There is not any official¹²¹ statistical research regarding people's consumption of media – at least in the GC community – however there are¹²² seven daily newspapers, more than twenty weekly newspapers, six free island-wide television stations, eight free local television stations, nine island-wide radio stations, more than forty local radio stations and they are all targeting the population of GCs (748 217).¹²³ The first interpretation can be eliminated since a quick look at the Reviews' section (monthly news reviews of the years 1999-2011) of the Cyprus News Agent website¹²⁴ demonstrate that bicommunal relations are a very popular news item for the GC mass media discourse.¹²⁵ Nor is there any official statistical research in relation to the second interpretation, however the results of the small sample in the context of the present research show that the mediated information that the GC audience receive does not create a positive attitude towards the TCs, although this does not

¹²¹ The Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus does not conduct research on media's consumption. Media organisations hire private companies for providing them with figures on their media's consumption. However because these are paid researchs the accuracy of the figures cannot be quaranteed and that is why I am not referring to them.

¹²² According to the Cyprus Press and Information Office website:

<http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/mass_media_en/mass_media_en?OpenDocument> accessed on the 3rd of January 2011.

¹²³ Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus website:

<http://www.pio.gov.cy/mof/cYSTat/STATISTICS.NSF/populationcondition_en/populationcondition_en?OpenDocument&sub=1&e> accessed on the 2nd of July 2008.

¹²⁴ Monthly news reviews are available at the Cyprus News Agent's website:

<http://www.cna.org.cy/website/freeService_05.shtm> accessed on the 3rd of January 2011.

¹²⁵ For an extensive discussion on the coverage of bicommunal relations by the print and broadcast media refer to Chapter 6.

necessarily mean that they create a negative one since they might simply create a neutral stance.

5.3. Defining the *other* after the collapse of “the myth of the mediated centre”:

Shifting perceptions of the *other* after the first contact

Quotations that have been presented in the previous section showed that participants who used to live in mixed areas had a positive attitude towards the members of the other community something which in many cases also triggered their first contact after the separation. Therefore, the first thing worth observing is that the shift in the perceptions of the participants who had contact before the separation was slight to none. The slight shifting was more expressed as relief; a relief that the positive/neutral image that they had for the people of the other community and maintained through the years of separation in their memories was first worth maintaining and second valid until that first contact after the separation. One of the GC participants, Demetris, who used to have TC classmates before 1974 when he was a student in a private school in Larnaka, mentions in his attempt to describe his first crossing to the other side to meet his TC ex-classmates after 20 years of separation:

As I was crossing across and nearing the TC checkpoint with all of this intensity I started hearing voices calling my name “Demetris, Demetris...” and I looked up and I started recognising faces: Ali, Adnan, Ibrahim, Aygen, Mehmet, they were there... seven out of the nine [total number of TC classmates] were there and the other two came later. It was an amazing experience... We embraced each other, they had photographs of our classmates and the school and they were asking me “how is he and is that and the other”. It was unbelievable what happened and it was as if we had only seen each other just the day before not 20 years and our friendship was like a treasure that somehow was buried and locked for 20 years and then it was just brought on the surface and you opened it and it was there intact as nothing has touched it, nothing had happened. And for me that was a defining moment in my history of bicomunal work in the sense that I came to some simple but at the same time profound conclusions: If I have had such an experience potentially so many thousands of others can and should have this experience, isn't it? What happened to me should not be extraordinary; it should be the normal and the ordinary experience.

However, the discussion in this section will focus on the data that resulted from the answers and comments of the participants who did not have any face-to-face contact with people of the other community before the separation. The quotations will refer to the shifting perceptions of the *other* that these participants experienced after their first face-to-face contact with members of the other community.

As a matter of fact, according to the interviews, the period of separation, after 1963 and then 1974, seems to be a space defined by visual dynamics that the mediators created; the participants – especially the GCs – characterised the separation period with bold visual images of painful moments *printed* in their perception: “the image of an armed soldier” or “images of the GC mothers and wives of the missing persons”. These are images that the

print culture at first (through leaflets, history school-books, newspapers) followed by the broadcast media later, spread in the two communities. A similar example could be the story of one of my TC participants. Latif's story centres on the boundary that was formed, when he was a teenager, between him and his until then GC friend when the latter suddenly announced to him proudly one day his intention to change his name from "Andrikos" – a Christian name – to "Andronikos" – a Greek name – due to his realisation of his Greek roots and identity. The fact that this realisation occurred in the 1955-59 period, when the nationalistic discourse was dominant in Cyprus both in the press and in the GC education system, could not be coincidental; the nationalistic discourse is what assigned new meaning to the identity of Andrikos. In his own words:

I think it was the 1st of April 1955 that the first *EOKA* bomb exploded. And it was about a week later that my friend Andrikos – I cannot forget it at all we were really good friends you know we used to go to the cinema together – when one day he told me *Latif let me tell you a very serious thing: From now on I'm not Andrikos I am "Andronikos"*. [...] He transformed from a Cypriot to a Greek in one day.

Another example is that of a younger GC participant, Nina, who described to me how ecstatic she felt when in 2003 she was finally able to see in reality the old port of Kerynia which until then she knew only as a place that 'she should not forget' since as a child she was constantly exposed at school to pictures of the old port old of *Kerynia* accompanied with the slogan ordering her: *Den xechno*, meaning, "I do not forget".

It becomes apparent through the interview data that when face-to-face rituals are not part of the Cypriots' everydayness myths and stereotypes about the other can be legitimised. The first observation is that most of these participants had a negative image for the other community before their first contact and that the shift in the perceptions was vast. What makes the shifting perception an extremely interesting parameter for this research is the fact that when we talk about the perceptions these interviewees had for the other community we do not mean simply an abstract thought or stereotype. According to the data collected, when most of the participants talked about their 'perception' of the people of the other community they had a specific image of a figure – and I say figure and not human being because sometimes their description referred to a non-humanised being – that could be physically described. In these cases, the negative figure would sometimes take the image of a 'bad' soldier with mythical dimensions and powers, others the image of a fairytale monster or a fictional 'baddie'. This was more common in the interviews of GC participants but this might have been only because the GCs felt more comfortable to talk to me about the perception of their *other* where the TC participants might not due to the

fact that I am a GC. For example, some GC participants in their attempt to describe their reaction when they first saw a TC most of them intensely expressed their shock when they realised that “they are like us [GCs]”.

Savvas, a male GC participant, in his description of this negative image he used to have for the other community and anything Turkish in general mentions:

When I arrived in Komotini¹²⁶ [he went there for his university studies] I didn’t know that I would meet Turks. I went to this area and I saw that the street names were like “Ismael X” or something. My surprise was so big that I went into a shop, I stood in front of the other guy – the seller – and asked him: “Are you a Turk?” I wanted to see how he [a Turk] looked like. Because the only image I had for a person of the other community was the image of the soldier with the boot and the gun and what I used to see in the news. I had never come in contact until the 1990s with what we call Turk with a citizen look and not a soldier look.

The quote is an illustration of how the majority of the younger GC participants used to have an idea about the other not looking human. Savvas’ surprise was that a person from the Turkish-speaking minority could have an ordinary “citizen look”. Furthermore, the quote indicates that in some GCs’ minds – at least until 2003 when the barricades have been partially opened – there was a confusion about the identity of the *other*, i.e. there was no boundary to differentiate the identity of a Turk from a TC, or someone from a Turkish-speaking minority; anyone or anything with a Turkish element had one negative identity.

These participants who experienced this shift of the perception about the members of the other community after their first contact, described this moment of the shift as a moment of abrupt – almost violent or even magical one could say – move from puberty to adulthood. The paradox here is that for most of the participants this ‘maturing’ moment was overdue since – with the exception of three participants – all of them, even though young in age, were already adults when they experienced this shift. This is how Simos – another GC participant – described his experience of this shift:

We [himself and a TC] sat on this boat in the old port of Kerynia to have dinner, we served ourselves ouzo and at a point ... when we already had drank a few [ouzos] we did this cheers and... [snapping his fingers] at that moment it was like everything had gone. We said: “*Ate re kardeşim*”¹²⁷ and right there everything [negative image/feelings] has ended... He managed to change a lot to me; I stopped seeing him as my enemy.

[My question: *Was that because you started identifying some similarities between the two of you?*]

[Simos] No, it wasn’t a matter of similarities it was a matter of him being just a human being.

¹²⁶ Komotini is a city in northerneastern Greece with a large Turkish-speaking minority.

¹²⁷ This phrase consists of the Cypriot expression “Ate re” which could be translated in English as “Come on” and the Turkish word “kardeşim” which means “my brother”.

The GC participants described that after the feeling of shock a mixture of embarrassment, betrayal and anger arrived. They felt embarrassed for their extreme thoughts and angry and betrayed that someone/something had built and maintained such stereotypes all these years. Interestingly enough when they were asked to blame the one responsible for those stereotypes they could not give an immediate response. The participants were angry but they could not exactly determine where to direct their anger. After a few seconds thinking the participants would usually blame the same thing expressed in different ways: “the school”, “the public education”, “the Greek ideals in schools”. There was a slight differentiation in what exactly within the school system each one of them blamed. It is important though that in the range of eight participants – some blamed more than one – all the institutions, bodies, and even spaces that constitute a school had been mentioned: “the teachers”, “the ministry of education”, “the history classes”, “the books and textbooks”, “the celebration activities for the national days”,¹²⁸ “the religious classes”, “the classmates”, “the flags in the school playground”. Similarly to what has been discussed in the previous chapter when tracing the social history of Cyprus regarding the influence of socio-cultural political-state institutions, here also the fact that all these different school components have been mentioned reveals the multiplicity and complexity of the manipulation that a single institution is possible to engineer. The youngest of the GC participants, Georgia, characteristically described:

[E]verything that was said about the TCs at school was bad. I remember all these stories about how the Turks slaughtered Athanasios Diakos¹²⁹ using an awl [...] I was terrified when my father told me that we would meet a TC!

Nina, another GC participant, mentioned while emphasising to me the need for changing the history textbooks in the GC community:

Nothing changed in our history textbooks. They speak about 1821 and there is nothing else than that. [...] The books should mention facts, for example *pethomazoma*¹³⁰ existed, it should be mentioned but no more than that. You can't put a 10 year old girl to read and make her create monsters in her mind which is something done in our community. Before the Annan Plan referendum I was at a friend's house and her daughter came home from school holding a paper given to her at school briefing about an essay she should write, about *pethomazoma*! She is 9 years old! This can't be done...

The above two quotations are characteristic not only because they show the school's role in building stereotypes but also because they demonstrate the GC participants' confusion

¹²⁸ GCs also celebrate Greek national days.

¹²⁹ Athanasios Diakos was a Greek priest who was killed during the 1821 Greek war for independence against the Turks.

¹³⁰ *Pethomazoma*, is a Greek word referring to the method of mass children kidnappings used in the Ottoman Empire as a practice known as the *devsirme* system to forcefully take Christian boys from their families in order to enroll them to the four imperial institutions.

about creating separate and identifiable images for TCs and for the Turks. One can argue that their confusion derives from constructing their own national identity too. How would they describe their nationality during that period: Greek, Cypriot or Greek-Cypriot? And how would they accordingly describe the nationality of their 'enemy'? Could their enemy's identity include the word Cypriot or could a proper GC 'patriot' reach the extreme and call the 'enemy' a Cypriot? Therefore, the argument can go beyond assigning to the school system the responsibility for creating a negative stereotype for the other community, and can be articulated in the context of the failure, the "lack" of the school system to construct positively a holistic national identity of the Cypriots.

For example, according to one of the GC participants, Lefteris, who is a headmaster in the only mixed school in the GC community of Limassol even in that school the history and religion lessons are taught separately for the GC and TC students, in different classrooms. Thus, there is not a holistic approach from the Ministry of Education and Culture to promote one Cypriot identity for the students through the lessons of history or religion. However, Lefteris highlights that it is with the teachers', parents' and his own initiatives that they are promoting this through the cooperation of the students in making a bilingual music CD, a book for Cypriot cuisine that included recipes from both communities or even by changing the school's Christmas show into a New Year's show in order to remove the religious element from this event. This is how he described to me this attempt:

[W]e [teachers, parents and himself] then achieved a mixed Christmas show. Even though at the beginning I was worried that our intention of having the TCs participating in the Christmas show could be considered as our attempt to proselytise the TC students, the TC parents reacted positively. [...] That was the first time we included in the school's Christmas show poems and songs in the Turkish language. [...] The first time that the TC students would present a Turkish poem [in the school's New Year's show] I was worrying about the GC parents would leave the show or would start cursing. [...] I remember that the first TC students to present their poem were four tall boys about 13 year old, they stood there and started moving uncomfortably, they felt anxious and what surprised me was that the people [he refers to the audience here but mainly to the GC parents] started clapping to encourage them to start their presentation. So that was it, they made their presentation their faces became brighter and the clapping of the TC parents became more intense, you could feel it. And since then, the TC parents attend such shows and we're trying to have shows with less intensive religious content.

Nina, also underlined that in her first meetings with TCs she made an important observation: that when the TCs were asked about their nationality they would say Cypriot and not Turkish in contrast to the GCs that would say Greek or GC. In her own words:

One thing that I realised, I can't remember if that was during the first workshop but it was quite intense, was that the TCs would say *I am a Cypriot and not a Turk* when the GCs would say *First of all we are Greeks and then Cypriots* and it's a realisation I made that maybe they [TCs]

have philosophised more the whole issue and they feel more Cypriots that we do. And I did it myself you know... When I was asked where I was from while studying in Italy ok I would say Cyprus but if it was a conversation that I didn't care much about I would reply straight away Greece.

Nina's observation brings me back to what I mentioned at the beginning of this section: that more GC than TC participants stated that they had a negative perception of the members of the other community before their first face-to-face contact with them. But before discussing the possible reasons behind this I should refer to the three out of twelve TC participants that admitted that their perception has been shifted from negative to positive after their first face-to-face meeting with GCs.

As with the GC participants, these TC participants were indeed the younger ones. Enis, a male participant for example, almost embarrassed, admitted to me:

I remember asking my mother before I left [for a bicomunal youth camp in the US in 1999] "how do they [the GCs] look?"

The education system came to the surface again very soon as something responsible for their initial negative perceptions. This is obvious in a similar comment about the perception she used to have before meeting a GC who came from Nurcan, a female participant:

I wasn't scared but I wasn't sure what to expect because the borders¹³¹ were closed and there was really high nationalistic education and propaganda and brainwashing going on, I mean there still is but at least the borders are now open and you can go and see for yourself [...] And you usually even though you might not own those thoughts you think of the other community through whatever information is given to you which was basically murderers, armies...

This second comment of Nurcan provides evidence that there was strongly nationalist education in the TC education too. Her comment: "you think of the other community through whatever information is given to you which was basically murderers, armies..." illustrates how the lack of face-to-face communication with the other imposes certain interpretations and meanings to concepts related to the other. As in the GC case, the TCs seemed that had been exposed to similar interpretations and meanings assigned by those who had undertaken the role of the mediator, i.e. the mass media, the education system and other related structures. Nurcan moved even beyond from just blaming those mediators in giving me an example of her previously mentioned comment, "thinking through whatever information is given to you".

I remember I was writing poems for the massacre that we and the TC history books defined as a mass murder you know the killings on the 21st of December 1963, that's the big

¹³¹ She uses of the word *borders* to refer to the barricades that are used across the Green Line to separate the southern and northern parts of Cyprus.

date in the history. So I remember writing poems saying: “They [GCs] came, the murderers, barbarians and killed us” you know you just ... I mean I was a kid in the middle school, how much feeling can I have about such a subjective issue? But they just make you write these things.

Thus, Nurcan’s comment gives a hint to draw the bigger picture; “the massacre that we and the TC history books defined as a mass murder you know the killings on the 21st of December 1963, that’s the big date in the history” she says something that brings us back to what Papadakis (1995) argued and has been discussed in Chapter 3, that each side made its own “mythistory” about bicomunal conflict in Cyprus. In other words, meaning is not something produced only by the history books and the education system, “we defined” Nurcan said, but by all those that the people consider as the ‘natural’ mediators of a society’s ‘centre’¹³² (Couldry, 2003b, p.45). It is when this myth of the natural mediators collapses, that anger arrives; an anger that is usually disoriented because the education system is not the only one responsible for assigning meaning to concepts. The following extract is indicative of this disoriented anger that the GCs felt after this kind of realisation. Simos describes the anger he felt not simply when he realised that the perception he used to have about the other community changed but generally every time he was confronted with an unknown truth about the history of Cyprus.

I found out about the existence of TC missing persons through a German book when I took a course on “Peace Education” at the University [in Germany]. [...] And it was mentioned in there [in the book] that they [the GC relatives of the missing persons] went and told them [the TC authorities] “Why don’t you give our missing persons back?” and the other guy [TC] tells them “Wait a minute, did you give our missing persons since 1963 back?” And I was reading this and I asking myself: “But did they [TC missing persons] exist?” and I became so angry on that day...

[My question: Angry with whom?]

[Simos:] With everybody, I felt that I went to school for so many years, I read everyday the newspaper – because I am politicised – and I thought there wasn’t one *karagiozis*¹³³ to tell me this thing?

Simos, apart from blaming the school also blames the newspapers for not informing him about this part of the history of Cyprus. According to his last statement he considers himself not just a casual newspaper reader but a politicised one – a word that uses to emphasise his commitment in this habit – thus he had the expectation as a politicised person to be correctly informed. In other words, Simos here experienced not just the

¹³² For an extensive discussion on the theory of “the myth the mediated centre” that Couldry coined, refer to Chapter 2.

¹³³ *Karagiozis* is a word coming from the Turkish *Karagöz*. *Karagöz* is the leading character of a shadow play popularised in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus since the Ottoman period. The characterisation “Karagiozis” is used nowadays in different contexts to refer to a lazy person that uses mischevious and crude ways to earn money.

revelation of unknown parts of the history of his country, but also the collapse of “the myth of the mediated centre” (Couldry, 2003b, p.45), i.e. the idea that the media have a privileged relationship with the centre of society that is why they represent the truth, collapsed at that moment for him.

When Nina was asked to blame something/someone for her previous observation that the GCs have a Greek consciousness more than a Cypriot one. She gave me an answer with responsibility being again diffused on different agents. She said:

We [GCs] grew up with Greek ideals.

[My question: Was that done at school or in the media?]

Everywhere, everywhere... I had a Greek flag at home [as a child] not a Cypriot one, which every 25th of March and 1st of April I used to put out in the balcony with great happiness! This is how I grew up.

[My question: Do you think then that maybe certain political parties or ideologies are also responsible for this?]

For sure. Coming from a family that support *DISI* and the right I think influenced me for sure. But now this is something that annoys me a lot.

[My question: So is your political ideology the same today?]

No, no I've changed. I think I've changed in general. Ok some people say to me that I'm more towards the left now but I don't know; I don't want to put a label on me and I was never registered at a political party.

Thus, the political background of the participants also seemed to have influenced their perception of the other community. According to the data collected, the participants that did not have a negative perception of the other community before their first contact have a leftist background. The distinction was more easily noticeable with the GC participants since there were not many TC participants coming from the right, however having most of the TC participants coming from the left might be another way to explain why fewer TCs experienced a shift in their perception of GCs after their first face-to-face encounter.

But let me begin with a quotation coming from a GC participant, which I think is important since it illustrates the contribution of one's leftist background in the prevention of a negative perception about the members of the other community. It is important to note that this participant, Pavlos, lost his father during the 1974 conflict, a month after his birth, but did not express any negative thoughts about the TCs. On the contrary, he asserted that the perception he used to have of the other community before his first contact with them was incomplete on the one hand, but positive on the other, due to the feeling of openness that his leftist mother and uncle transmitted towards the TCs. Additionally, Pavlos was the only participant who expressed a distinct image of the TCs

that was detached from his perception of the Turks. Such a detachment arrived earlier for the leftist participants, in comparison to the rightists, since by the time the first group were familiarised into the history of *AKEL* they were also familiarised with the common struggles of the leftist members of the two communities against nationalists/extremists (Papadakis, 1995, p.362-364). This could also be the explanation for the slight to non-existent shift of the image of the other community that the leftist participants had. This is how Pavlos described his experience:

I had a positive perception about the TCs, I can't say that this picture was completed/full but from stories of Morfou that I had heard others saying without necessarily narrating them to me, I created a positive perception. For example, I knew that there was a TC family living in our neighbourhood in Morfou of which the daughter was the maid of honour in my mother's wedding, the brother was a close friend of my uncle – like brothers – and I knew that this [TC] family helped one of my uncles that he got enclaved in Morfou when as a soldier coming from Kerynia to the already occupied by the Turks Morfou to get out and pass to the free [non-occupied by the Turkish troops] side and in fact to save his life. So, I had a positive image for the TCs as a matter of fact in Morfou we didn't have any significant problems with the TCs.

[My question: The fact that you lost your father during the war, didn't create any negative feelings or thoughts about the «enemy» in inverted commas].

Look, I think that myself as many others did something that we need to do, differentiated the Turkish invaders from the TCs. For example, I knew that my father was killed at the invasion by the Turkish invaders. Of course while growing up – especially within a leftist context – you learn that the people of a society are so multifaceted that you don't expect that they have killed him [his father] because they were Turks, he was killed by specific Turkish soldiers that were executing an ordered mission; There are progressive TCs, nationalist TCs, there are TCs of the left and TCs of *TMT* similarly there are different kinds of Turks, you cannot homogenise people. I think I never had such ideas, on the contrary I always believed that what happened was also due to our criminal mistakes of the past, made by the GC community, no actually I'm wrong I should have said the mistakes of the nationalists of the GC community, due to imperialist foreign interventions and I think from a quite young age I didn't have such syndromes as considering the TC community responsible for everything.

Now, if we go back to the majority of younger TC participants whose perception about the GCs was not negative even before meeting them and follow the interpretation that this is due to their leftist background we are led to the reflection why was that not also the case with the younger GC participants with a leftist subculture? A possible reason for this differentiation is that the leftist subculture was not the only factor that precluded the creation of a negative image by the younger TC participants. Another factor that could explain this trend that appears in the interviews is the fact which was mentioned by the majority of the TC participants during their interviews, which is that they were unhappy with the quality of life that they had in the so called 'TRNC' at least until the easing of restrictions in free movement in 2003, something that was not the case with the majority of the GCs. A consequence of this unhappiness was that in the environment that they grew

up in there had developed nostalgic discourses – memories that most of the times would get idealised – about the coexistence with the other community by their parents or other relatives which would help create more humanised images about the GC community. Azime for example, a young female participant, described to me how these nostalgic discourses were always in her life while growing up, she said:

I remember whenever we had power failures [in Trikomo the village in the north where her family moved after the separation] and we were sitting – you know how it is when there is no power there isn't TV to watch etc and you sit and talk – the conversations would always build around Larnaka, Larnaka was like this and that, was very beautiful, because you know all the TC refugees from Larnaka went to Trikomo which is not near the sea and you know they left from the sea [Larnaka] to go to Trikomo so they didn't like it. So my mother's generation and maybe older generations always felt nostalgic about the sea, because they grew up by the sea.

My immediate next question was of course if Larnaka was indeed as beautiful as it sounded in her mother's descriptions when she finally had the chance to visit it, in order to understand whether there was a degree of idealisation in those stories about Larnaka and there was a sense of hesitation in her answer, she said:

Well yes... Of course my mother says that she remembers it differently, it changed, today it's more developed...but at least it is still beautiful...

Her mother remembered it “differently” she said and Larnaka is indeed more developed today, but what is worth thinking about more deeply is whether that sweet nostalgia that Azime's mother felt was indeed caused by the beautiful landscape of Larnaka or by the childhood experiences she had there, her way of life while she was growing up in Larnaka that was much more happy than her current situation in the so called TRNC. Because as Azime said the landscape even more developed “at least is still beautiful” but those experiences were what she could not have when she re-visited Larnaka, she was all grown up now and she was only a visitor there, it was like her experiences were not hers anymore but they belonged to the new residents of Larnaka now.

Cemile, a TC refugee from *Kalavassos*, also described in a nostalgic way how she felt when she went back to her village after the easing of restrictions about free movement across the Green Line. She said:

Let me tell you, we've been to our village but how can I explain this it makes you think, after all these years you go there but without your mother, father and now I've lost my husband too (not in the war). I grew up in the village, I lived there, I got married there so I felt really bad when I went there for the first time... [My question: *Why? Did the place change?*] It's not better to tell you the truth, the people left, the trees withered, the carob trees, the olive trees. I've asked them [the current residents of *Kalavassos*]: *What have you done to the olive and carob trees?* And

they told me how people now go to Limassol to work that how they make their money, only a few come back but most of them leave the village to live in Limassol.

I do not of course mean that those nostalgic discourses developed only by the TCs. GC refugees also had and expressed those idealised memories about their hometowns or villages they were forced to abandon in 1974 or in 1963, for example as described by Dikomitis when she said about her GC father: “In every single sentence I hear his longing to return to Larnaka tis Lapithou” (2004, p.8). My own grandmother also used to share with the rest of the family some of her coexistence memories of living in the mixed neighbourhood of Limassol until 1958. However, I cannot say that the description of those stories seeded the desire inside me to live with the other community since I knew that even though my grandmother was forced to abandon her house and her life there in 1958, her quality of life was good despite her displacement. Perhaps, the memories of a GC refugee that used to be very wealthy and happy during coexistence and s/he did not have the same luck afterwards would have the same impact when narrated to her/his family.

In other words, what I suggest here is that there is a difference between the nostalgic discourses of the two communities that has to do with how pleased each community felt with their after-separation way of life. The GC refugees living in the more prosperous south, developed discourses that were on the one hand nostalgic and idealised but on the other they also concentrated on or at least included putting the blame on Turkey and the TC community – (mostly there was no distinction) – for losing their beautiful homeland. Thus, the GC dominant discourses demonised anything Turkish. The TCs’ nostalgic discourses contrarily, excluded painful or blame issues since their current life situation – especially before 2003 when they could not even cross or enjoy their benefits as Cypriot citizens – is less prosperous than it used to be. This is to what Papadakis (1995, p.363), refers to when he argues that the TC leftists express their dissatisfaction for the conditions they live after 1974 since in the society in the north where the rightists are the dominants and the Turkish emigrants are the cheap workers, the Turkish-Cypriot leftists are in economic misery.¹³⁴

However, one cannot ignore the possibility that the discourses that created negative perceptions about the other community were more intense in the GC south than in the north. The intensity of the GC discourses will become clearer in the next chapter when

¹³⁴ For more on Papadakis’ argument refer to Chapter 3.

examining the print and broadcast media which had been among the main producers and circulators of the discourses that dominated the GC public sphere.

5.4. Communicating beyond the myths: Ways of relating to the *other* after the first contact

This section concentrates on the analysis of the answers and comments of the participants about the ways of relating to the other community after their first face-to-face contact.

All the participants¹³⁵ – with the exception of one – after their first contact related to the people of the other community by having *Personal contacts* with them. The exception is a GC participant, Niki who is the oldest participant (she was 83 at the time of the interview) living in Limassol and who did not have any personal contact with the other community after the separation. Niki relies on *Mediated media information* about TCs since 1974 something to which I will refer later in this section.

Nonetheless, many participants of both communities – mostly the younger ones – have personal communication with the other community using email and other Internet¹³⁶ tools (forums, Facebook, Yahoo groups). The Internet tools are used by the majority of the participants to communicate with members of the other community in a completely personal context – meaning with their own initiative – in order to discuss political issues, to inform each other about bicommunal events or to discuss issues of common interest. The participants who have a political position use email in order to communicate/to keep in contact with people of the other community in a similar political position to them, e.g. when I interviewed the Nicosia Mayor she mentioned that the Internet is an important tool to communicate (via email) with the TC de facto Mayor of the northern part of Nicosia; similarly four of the participants who have a position in political parties also use the Internet in order to communicate with members of political parties in the other community.

However, a slight differentiation was observed between the participants of the two communities in relation to the way they make this *Personal Contact*. More TC participants than GCs prefer to have their personal contacts with GCs face-to-face and as a result fewer TC participants are using the Internet for this purpose. This has to do with something more than simply the participants' age and technical literacy. If we relate this to the observation that the GC participants experienced more intensively the shift of the image they used to have about the other community than the TCs, we could suggest that the latter

¹³⁵ Having personal communication with members of the other community was also one of the criteria for choosing the participants.

¹³⁶ Chapter 7 focuses on the use of the Internet for bicommunal communication in Cyprus.

feel/felt more comfortable with the idea of contacting face-to-face with the other community when the first as more insecure – even though only one of the GC participants admitted this straightforwardly – they chose/choose to do that through the Internet. In addition to that, at least in the post 2003 era when the crossing points have been partially opened, some sense of insecurity might have been caused for GC participants by what Demetriou (2007) describes in her paper as “the absence of state”. As she suggests, the GCs have been in a state of anarchy in 2003 since on the one hand there was this great enthusiasm about being able to cross to the other side and meet with the other community but on the other hand the GC government did not approve the ‘way’ this freedom was given. A characteristic comment from a GC while visiting the other side with Demetriou, illustrating that the insecurity overshadowed the excitement goes like this: “If only this government would come out and tell us what we are supposed to do and what not!” (Demetriou, 2007, p.1001). This insecurity that Demetriou describes, appeared in some of my interviews with GCs too. For example Petros, even though as a leftist and as someone that used to live together with TCs as a child, stated that was very positive in meeting with TCs, he revealed that he initially felt insecure about crossing to the other side. This is what he said to me:

At the beginning I had second thoughts about showing my passport in order to cross to the other side but thinking and philosophising it, I realised that maybe it is the only opportunity to cross and pass with your presence the message ‘you know we haven’t deleted those places from our memory, we are here’ [...] Of course I was influenced by all these words that they were heard [about the process of crossing] through the media. More or less every Cypriot that was crossing was characterised as a traitor in the way they were presenting it. It made you think about it... second thoughts were created for sure.

Also, Nina who appeared very confident about her activism in bicomunal communication and rapprochement during the whole interview and even though she stated that she was feeling “ecstatic and with nothing to hold her back” when she was about to cross to the other side for the first time, she made the following comment when I asked her how she feels about showing her passport or identification card in order to cross:

I had no reservation but if we see it logically yes, this is not right and I don’t want either to show my ID card in order to travel in my own country but I had a lot more to gain when showing my ID card; To see all these that I could not see for so many years. After my first crossing I didn’t cross again for a long time. But then I became involved in rapprochement activities so my crossings had a different meaning. For example, I will not cross to the other side for shopping or... I will go there to have a coffee, to see a friend, or to make an excursion; In a similar way that I would make an excursion to *Pafos*, this is how I see it. But of course there is a procedure [that one needs to follow when crossing], if the checkpoints weren’t there the reunification would come without us realising it. Now want it or not we say *I will go to the other side* and the only way for not saying this is to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, otherwise we’ll always say *I’ll go to this or to the other side*.

What the above quotations show is that due to the fact that the decision for the opening of the crossing points in 2003 had been taken exclusively by the TC leader – an unrecognised authority by the GC community – the GCs unlike the TCs, needed some sort of legitimisation from the GC authorities in order for their interpersonal face-to-face contacts with the other to be naturalised. Petros clearly stated that he was worried that crossing to the other side would be like being a traitor to his country. This is because the crossings were “moralised” as Demetriou (2007, p.997) asserts – for example it was moral for people to cross in order to see their houses but immoral to cross for shopping – thus these participants wanted something that would legitimise their crossings. This legitimisation is what Nina was asking for in order to cross to the other side again and she did not do it until she found it, she says: “But then I became involved in rapprochement activities so my crossings had a different meaning. For example, I will not cross to the other side for shopping or... I will go there to have a coffee, to see a friend, or to make an excursion”. Thus, what I suggest here is the slight reservation of some of some of the GC participants to cross in order to continue having face-to-face meetings is caused to some degree from the “immorality” that was assigned to the act of crossing.

Another interesting point that emerges from the data collected is that none of the participants – with the exception of two GC participants – stated that they use *Media mediated information*¹³⁷ as her/his only way to relate to the other community. The first GC participant that belongs to this category does not rely exclusively on *Media mediated information* for his relationship with TCs but also has personal contact via face-to-face and Internet tools. He specifies however, that he does this via the *Politis*¹³⁸ newspaper since he believes that it is trustworthy to some extent. The fact that the majority of the participants prefer ways to relate to the members of the other community other than through print and broadcast media indicates a sort of distrust towards the mediated information provided on bicomunal issues. This adds to the argument made while discussing the shift of the image of the other – since the distrust of the participants towards print and broadcast media might be explained as a result of the misleading image that the majority of the participants used to have about the other community when face-to-face communication was not possible in Cyprus and the media used to be ‘responsible’ for an almost daily representation of the *other*. It should be noted that the TC participants stated more clearly their distrust to

¹³⁷ The representation of the *other* in the (GC) print and broadcast media is examined in Chapter 6.

¹³⁸ *Politis* is a newspaper that generally supported the Annan Plan during the referendum and supports reunification since then. It was also the first GC newspaper that cooperated with Turkish-Cypriot editors.

the media than the GCs. “The newspapers always lie” two TC participants, Yurtsev and Ilhami said to me in Greek and in a tone that implied that this was something obvious of which everyone is aware and he should not have been asked. The reaction of the GC participants was less intense when they were asked the same question this needs further reflection. The reasons behind the observation have probably to do with the general distrust that these TC participants had for their authorities in the north. Yurtsev for example, grew up in an environment that was characterised by such distrust towards the TC authorities. At the age of 10 his family was forced to move from the mixed town that they used to live to a TC village because his father, as a leftist member of the political office of the GC party *AKEL*, had been threatened by the TC nationalist organisation *TMT*. He said to me:

People of *TMT* came from the nearby villages and threat my father because he used to be together, he used to cooperate with Christians. So my father got scared and he said that we should move to *Gazivera* in order for the TCs to see us that we relate with them too, not to think that we are always with the Christians.

Thus, TC participants who had similar experiences to Yurtsev have a general distrust towards any form of authority of the “state” in the north.

On the contrary, Niki, the GC participant who relies on *Media mediated information* as her only way to relate to the other community in the post separation era (even though she lived until 1958 with TCs and according to her descriptions they used to get on very well) said to me when I asked her how she feels about TCs today:

I believe that those TCs whom with we used to live together are good, those who came from outside, the settlers, are not good because they are ordered by Turkey and TCs are now influenced by Turkey and they can’t do anything about it. Didn’t you hear what *Erdogan* said when he recently came to Cyprus? That he will not give anything back, that they want the TCs to be equal here, to have their own president, I saw this on TV. Also didn’t they have a celebration recently in the occupied areas where they presented their guns and he [*Erdogan*] came again [*My question: Did you see this on TV again?*] No, our politicians also said that this shouldn’t happen since there are meetings going on between Talat and Christofias. It is them [Turks from Turkey] who poison the TCs and they don’t let them make an agreement for peace [*My question: Do you think that TCs want peace?*] Yes, some of them want, especially the older ones because we used to live together in the villages and everywhere: there was a wedding we were all together, there was a *paniyiris*¹³⁹ we were all together, if someone was ill we [GCs] would go to see him and they would do the same.

What comes out from the above quotation is that Niki’s feelings are divided and contradictory. On the one hand, she receives the media mediated information (and also

¹³⁹ *Paniyiris* is a Greek word used to describe a festival (which includes food and other product stalls) that is usually organised to celebrate a Saint. It takes place outside the church which is dedicated to the Saint that is being celebrated.

what is being said by the politicians) about the other community unquestionably but on the other hand she cannot abandon her feelings about the TC community that were produced from her own experience when living in a mixed neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the fact that Niki is 83 year old and uneducated should also be taken into consideration.

The last way the participants relate to the other community after their first contact is that of the *Group sub-culturally mediated contact*. Two of the GC participants belong to this category but again not exclusively. They belong at the same time in the category of *Personal contact* and the common thing between the two is that they both have a political position in a left-wing party. This might be interpreted as their need to relate with the other community within the safe and trustworthy environment of their political companions. An additional reason for this is as came up in the interview with one of the these participants is that he prefers to relate to TCs through groups of the political party he supports because it is a good way to overcome the difficulty that he admitted he has when communicating in English. This is what Costas told me:

Some of them [his TC friends] speak Greek very well, Nuretti [one of his TC friends] for example can also read newspapers and books in Greek, he has one room in his house that is a library with books in English, Greek and Turkish. With some others we speak in English and because my English is not so good there is a problem; Communication needs a language, a common one. Maybe that's why other leftist companions more easily [than himself] participate to this kind of communication and they expand their bicomunal relations on an interpersonal level, because they can communicate better [in English].

Thus, relating to the other community through a group also provided a more comfortable feeling to some of the participants even if the insecurity was caused by an unimportant element as their weak knowledge of the English language.

5.5. Bicommunal face-to-face communication: An alternative public sphere in Cyprus?

In the discussion developed about the public sphere in Chapter 2, some questions have emerged when applying the theory of the public sphere in Cyprus. This section will attempt to give possible responses to some of these questions based on the data that emerged from the interviews.

The first question is whether the public sphere that emerged within the rapprochement movement in the 1990s, could be considered as a different form of public sphere in comparison to the official ones that existed in the island during that period.

As described in Chapter 3 the 1990s was a period that has been characterised by nationalistic tensions on both sides mainly due to the fact that in the GC controlled south the largest right wing party was in power and in the TC controlled north Denktash's party was in power. Thus, the hegemonic discourses of that time, did not allow space in the official public spheres for bicommunal communication or cooperation to be developed. What I suggest then is that the bicommunal groups that were developed in the 1990s – and in which many of my interviewees participated – constitute an alternative and in many occasions a counter public sphere that existed parallel to the official ones, characterised by bicommunal public discussion and a kind of short-term coexistence something that was heavily rejected in the official public spheres in both sides. Furthermore, looking at the data, the interviewees who participated in bicommunal activities in that period – with the exception of two GC participants who define themselves as liberals – either consider themselves leftists or have some kind of leftist background. This of course has to do also with the fact that as described in Chapter 3, the left in Cyprus had been historically characterised by bicommunality and a sense of openness towards the other community even in periods of intense nationalism. This openness of the leftists appeared also in the interview extracts that I presented in Section 2 of the current chapter. As a result, during the period of separation the leftists of both sides had to find alternative ways to cooperate since anything bicommunal was not acceptable in the official public spheres that existed in that period. This is how *Enis*, the general secretary of the TC leftist party *YKP*, described his first experience of participating to a rapprochement event in the 1990s:

It was I guess 1991 or 1992 when the New Cyprus Association invited us [the New Cyprus Party] in an event that it organised in *Famagusta Gate* [in Nicosia's Republic of Cyprus controlled areas]. It was very strange for us to be there because very few people could cross in

those days mainly they would meet abroad, especially the people of *AKEL* and *CTP*. [...] It was interesting for us – these were strange days – because everybody reacted about these crossings. In the north our previous president’s – Alpay Durduran – car was bombed twice because of these issues, they attacked to us several times. When we crossed again, I’ll never forget it, we’ve been picked up from Ledra Palace and we went to *Famagusta Gate*, there were two rows [of people] there: one with huge Greek flags and the other one with red flags – our supporters, later I found out that these were the people from *Ergatiki Demokratia*¹⁴⁰ and some other friends who came to show their solidarity – and there were so many policemen and we were only 6 or 7 TCs. When we went in the Famagusta Gate room that was full and suddenly everybody stood up and started cheering and clapping. It was a strange feeling because I was 18 then, and I was crossing somewhere that was illegal and we were leftists, I was trying to understand these things.

Enis’ comment gives the reasons for considering those bicomunal meetings as more than oppositional politics. According to him, people who participated in such activities were often attacked physically and verbally but these meetings continued to take place despite these reactions and that is why I suggest that the bicomunal activities that took place in that period constitute not only an alternative public sphere but also one that ran counter to the official ones.

The criticism that the participants received is illustrated by another interviewee’s narration. Marina, a liberal GC member of the rightist party *DISI*, this time said to me:

The first bicomunal group went abroad to meet – because at the beginning we couldn’t meet in Cyprus – the group consisted of 20 people and met in Oxford. I participated in that group and Serdar Denktash¹⁴¹ also participated in the group so when this became known [in the GC community] even though we did not try to hide it or anything, but you know there is always this tendency to see conspiracy everywhere and because the meeting was organised by Americans, it have been considered as an attempt to solve the Cyprus problem behind the back of the government and you know there were many negative comments... *ANT1*¹⁴² TV made a big fuss about it. [...] We had been always either criticised or jeered for our participation in this kind of workshops that we are “America’s muppets” or that we are naïve for doing workshops with these activities that are like games.

Fraser (1990, pp.59-61) contends that alternative public spheres exist in recent historiography and that their emergence is a result of certain groups’ – political, class, ethnicity or gender-based groups – exclusion from the official public sphere. Thus, one could argue that similarly to the cases Fraser mentions, in Cyprus the leftists of both communities due to the marginalisation of their themes from the official public sphere they were led to form alternative public spheres through rapprochement activities in order to facilitate bicomunal public discussion in their desirable context. This bicomunal public

¹⁴⁰ *Ergatiki Demokratia* is a leftist organisation which is supported by both GC and TC political parties.

¹⁴¹ Serdar Denktash is the son of that time’s TC leader, Rauf Denktash.

¹⁴² *ANT1* is a GC private television channel.

discourse took place in a completely different context, out of both the dominant GC and TC public spheres; a new alternative bicomunal public sphere was formed.

However, even though the leftists had been pioneers in bicomunal communication those efforts for rapprochement were not organised always by leftists. As mentioned in Chapter 3, American, UN and European organisations initiated many of these rapprochement activities and it should be noted at this point that some of the GC leftist participants appeared reserved towards any rapprochement activities that are organised by external – foreign, especially American – organisations and institutions. They explain their reservation of the fact that these organisations tend to have their workshops/activities based on “psychology tricks” and not on the conflict problem as such. The most intense of them was Pavlos who stated:

Let me tell you something, when we [the leftists] talk about rapprochement we give specific content/definition. Why does the left have a history in rapprochement? Because this thing is not something that comes out because it's 'fashionable' or that comes out of the current conditions. It's something based in the class and ideological position of the left and that is why in even the 40s the first announcement of the Cypriot communist party was about the common struggle of the Greek and Turkish people of Cyprus; It's because it [AKEL] has a specific/clear ideological basis. So when we talk about rapprochement we mean real contact between the two communities that aims to a better understanding of the other but also that at the end of the day will have a political basis, of course with 'political basis' I don't mean to meet in order to discuss about federation, but to have a specific political target. I think the rapprochement movement have been seriously damaged and a great feeling of suspicion have been created about the rapprochement movement from the time that the Americans came with an approach that is solidly psychological claiming that they will facilitate [...] and I have to tell you that at the beginning we [the leftists] participated in these seminars but what happened there was so unacceptable, with the use of 'psychological mood', or 'the tricky words' exercises for example we weren't allowed to mention the word 'invasion' because it's a 'bad word'. An approach that actually none of us accepts since more or less it's suggesting that we have psychological traumas that when we manage to overcome will be able to reach a solution! I think this is kind of naive. On the other hand, it's understandable why the Americans are doing this. What do you expect the Americans to say? That the Cyprus problem has been created by the foreign interventions and the American/NATO's 1970 plans in the wider area or that has resulted from the expansionist policy of Turkey?

Furthermore, a very few bicomunal activities took place in the 1990s and early 2000 in which alternative public discussion was facilitated. The YEP (Youth Encounters for Peace) project was one of these activities that were organised by individuals with their own initiatives. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Broome called such initiatives Special Projects and he stated that YEP was “one of the more inspiring projects” (2005, p.32). Two of the participants who were involved in YEP's activities, one as a facilitator and the other as a young participant, described the project as a group of different activities like workshops, conferences, parties, festivals and field trips all targeting to bring the two communities

together. The participants had interpersonal communication in the context of those activities however, as the facilitator mentioned, face-to-face contact was not always permitted because of the tense relationship of the officials of the two communities. For this reason, many times “we had to develop a Plan B” as the facilitator characteristically explained. The first “Plan B” that the facilitators came up with in 1996-1997, followed the violent incidents at *Derynia* (see Chapter 6 for details) after which parents were too scared to allow their children to meet physically. The plan was to apply the method of “match making”. The facilitators would decide on the “match friend” of each young participant and would bring them in contact via letter exchanging. This resulted in facilitating a close communication between the participants that would not be possible in other ways. Moreover, the group’s actions have been criticised by a GC magazine, *Selides*, simultaneously with an equivalent TC magazine. This is how Demetris, the interviewee who was the one facilitators of this activity commented on the criticism they received:

Can you imagine? I wonder if they [the magazines] talk to each other!” Demetris told me. [Selides] came up with a major article about these GCs who cooperate with American psychologists to brainwash our little children and supposedly they want to have communication and exchange letters [with TCs].

However, the communication via letters was not immediate therefore a discussion could not be easily initiated and despite the negative criticisms though, the group did not stop organising bicommunal activities. Even when the meetings in *Ledra Palace* were banned the facilitators managed to organise a bicommunal youth trip for a week to Prague where they could do their workshops.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ For more information on the *Prague Workshop* refer to Chapter 7.

5.6. Concluding note

This chapter analysed data that derived from interviews with TCs and GCs in order to examine the impact of face-to-face communication on their relationship.

In Section 2, I identified whether – and in what ways – variables like personal, cultural and political background or like exposure to media or group discourses urged the participants to make their first face-to-face contact with the other community. The participants of both communities appear to have been influenced mostly by their personal and political background and in some degree by group discourses but almost not at all by the media discourses. The openness of the leftists towards the people of the other community, which was described in Chapter 3, came up in the interviews with leftist participants as a reason that influenced them in making their first bicomunal face-to-face contact. Furthermore, participants who used to coexist in mixed neighbourhoods or villages before 1963 or 1974 also seemed to have face-to-face contact with people of the other community more easily even after years of separation.

Perhaps the most interesting dimension was the experience of shifting images that the participants had after their face-to-face contact with the *other*. The participants, during the time of separation – the time of mediated communication – have constructed myths around their identity and the concept of the *other* that have been collapsed with their first face-to-face communication experience. This was more common in the case of GC participants and as a result their experience when their initial image of the *other* shifted, was described as particularly intense. This differentiation between the experiences of participants of the two communities could be caused by several reasons that were discussed in Section 3. The most interesting possibility however is that of the discourses dominating the official GC public sphere during the time of separation, to have produced or enhanced through a constant circulation process those myths around both the identity of the *other* and of themselves - a possibility that will be examined extensively in the following chapter through the analysis of print and broadcast media discourses. However, the interview data suggested that whenever bicomunal face-to-face communication is possible the relationship of the two communities is formed on the basis of alternative meanings and interpretations of events and concepts that the ones that dominated the official public spheres.

Section 4, discussed the ways the participants of the two communities chose to communicate with the other community after their first face-to-face contact. The most popular way among the participants of both communities seems to be that of *Personal contact* and a slight differentiation appeared between the participants of the two communities: all of the TC participants prefer to relate to GCs through face-to-face personal contacts where some of the GC participants stated that personal contact through the Internet or *Group mediated communication* are two other ways they choose to communicate with TCs. As suggested in the discussion unfolded in that section, the reasons some GCs choose these ways to relate to people of the other community have to do with their uncertainty. This uncertainty is multidimensional: first, it has to do with the ‘danger’ of recognisability of the ‘state’ in the North; second – and this appeared mostly in the interviews with the leftist GCs – with a feeling of distrustfulness about bicomunal activities organised by foreign (especially Americans and British) organisations; another dimension has to do with the lack of confidence in communicating in a foreign language (English).

Finally in Section 5 it is suggested that bicomunal face-to-face contacts that took place prior to 2003, constitute an alternative public sphere since bicomunal relations were not accepted in the context of the official Cypriot public sphere(s). Most importantly, what places them beyond simply the category of oppositional politics within a democratic public sphere as evidence in the interviews showed, the official public spheres of the island rejected such activities in the sense that people have been very often restricted from participating in such activities and had to travel abroad in order to overcome some restrictions or in some cases participants have been even threatened for meeting with people of the other community. As the interview data suggest the alternative public sphere that had been formed was functioning *counter* to the official public sphere(s) of the island in the sense that it confronted not only the political powers that were against it – especially during the 1990s – but also as it will be shown in the following chapter, the hegemonic media discourses which were also not in favour of face-to-face bicomunal meetings or cooperation.

The overall discussion in this chapter suggests that whenever there was lack of face-to-face communication between the two communities, those who had undertaken the role of the mediator managed to impose certain meanings and interpretations in peoples’ perceptions about the *other*; in other words to present certain subjectivities as the reality.

Chapter Six

BICOMMUNAL REPRESENTATION IN THE GREEK-CYPRIOT PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA

6.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to outline the different discourses and rituals¹⁴⁴ developed in the context of GC print and broadcast media regarding bicommunal relations in Cyprus. After examining the intersection of oral culture – face-to-face communication – with bicommunal relations in the previous chapter, I will now try to explore the rise of the media of ‘mass’ communication – print and broadcast – in the 20th century in Cyprus.

This exploration will investigate the “media rituals” (Couldry, 2003b) developed in the context of print and broadcast media in Cyprus, aiming to understand how these rituals entangled with the politics of the island in order to legitimise certain interpretations for the concepts of *we* and the *other*. In Durkheim’s sense, ritual is a form of organising collective experience through a set of practices in the context of a cultural framework (Greenwald, 1973, p.166). My attempt is to explain how the concept of ritual relates to media, so I should first briefly return to how Couldry defines “media rituals” since this concept will be the central axis of this chapter.

Media rituals are any actions organised around key-media related categories and boundaries, whose performance reinforces, indeed helps legitimate, the underlying ‘value’ expressed in the idea that the media is our access point to our social centre (Couldry, 2003b, p.2).

As already explained in Chapter 2, the engagement of the audience with a medium is usually seen in relation to information diffusion or acquisition, i.e. through the transmission model of communication. When seeing the relation of the audience to the medium as a ritual however, it suggests that the focus should be on how the medium is perceived and how the position of the medium in the cultural context implies a certain

¹⁴⁴ The word ‘rituals’ is used here to refer to Couldry’s (2003b) term “media rituals”.

structure of power. In this context rituals reproduce certain hegemonic structures as “truth regimes”.¹⁴⁵

Thus this chapter will be organised around historical periods that can be related to the ones discussed in Chapter 2. The first section will be exploring the discourses that the press conveyed in the period which Cyprus was moving towards a new regime, that of colonialism. The focus of the second section will be on the historical period that, as seen in Chapter 2, has been characterised by nationalism and bicommunal conflict. So the attempt here will be to examine the media rituals that have been enacted when GC media covered significant events for the relations of the two communities or that have been used to simply refer to the TC community in ‘days of normalcy’.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, apart from the newspapers extracts I will be analysing data of another media genre – that of the Cypriot radio sketch – which as I already explained in Chapter 5, was very popular among the Cypriots during that period and had so many different/alternative elements¹⁴⁷ in comparison to the press. Finally, the third section will focus exclusively on Couldry’s concept/theory of the “myth of the mediated centre” and try to examine it in relation to two different television events that have been significant for the relationship of the two communities.

¹⁴⁵ As defined by Foucault (1980, p.131): “Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics of truth’: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”.

¹⁴⁶ With ‘days of normalcy’ here I mean the randomly chosen dates that have not necessarily characterised by any events of bicommunal conflict.

¹⁴⁷ For a more exclusive reference on the alternative characteristics of the Cypriot radio sketch refer to Chapter 4.

6.2. Hegemonic discourses and media rituals: the territorialisation process in the GC public sphere

6.2.1. Transition to modernity: Moving from the discourse of coexistence to discourse of enosis

As already discussed in Chapter 2, the period of transition to modernity was a phase when the GC community was experiencing for the first time an inner struggle between those who supported the modern ideas they brought from their travels and studies abroad and those who wanted to resist this new regime and maintain the traditional ideas of the church and *ellinochristianismos*.¹⁴⁸

The analysis which follows will attempt to illustrate how, on the one hand, tensions had been building up in the Cypriot society and how this has been reflected in the discourses of the GC press, and on the other hand, how the same discourses conveyed that the two communities coexisted peacefully and cooperated even during the period of tensions in the GC community.

6.2.1.1. Discourses of coexistence and tension during the transition to modernity 1878-1920

The first set of newspaper reports¹⁴⁹ to be analysed centre on Shefket Bey's election as mayor of Nicosia in 1908. The election of a TC as Mayor of Nicosia instead of a GC despite the numerical majority of the GC municipal council electoral members, was highlighted in the newspapers of Nicosia *Kypriakos Fylax*, *Foni tis Kyprou* and *Eleftheria*. The first reference to the municipal elections appears in the newspapers between one and two months before the elections. *Foni tis Kyprou* refers to the elections on 14th March 1908, on the third page, just giving information about the procedure of the election without further commenting on it. In *Kypriakos Fylax* the story appears for the first time on 9th February

¹⁴⁸ *Ellinochristianismos* means Greek-Christianity.

¹⁴⁹ For information about the selection process of the newspaper reports analysed in this chapter refer to Chapter 4. Also for more details about the character of the various titles refer to Appendix B.

1908, with the title “Most important Greek Mayors” and occupies half of the first and second pages. The text highlights the importance of the election of Greek mayors in order to protect and promote Greek ideals while at the same time the two paragraphs attempt to explain the newspaper’s position to the Muslim community and support for peaceful cooperation and coexistence. However, the desire/expectation of the Christians/GCs to obtain more positions of power due to their numerical advantage cannot be overlooked. I paraphrase these two paragraphs below:

We do not mean to wrong our Muslim cohabitants and compatriots since under the power of the Greek mayors we believe that everyone will be able to enjoy the prosperity of the improvements that will follow such an election [...] Greeks and Muslims of Cyprus, according to our ethnic community’s numerical percentage, we should peacefully cooperate and coexist in order to achieve common goods (*Kypriakos Fylax*, 9 February 1908).

The last reference of *Foni tis Kyprou* on the same matter appears on 18th April 1908 again in the third page, when *Kypriakos Fylax* makes its own last reference on the matter on 29th March 1908 in a much more indifferent tone than the one mentioned in the above quote. Both texts are very brief and refer to the result of the third and final meeting of the council committee, i.e. the election of Shefket Bey due to the disagreement of the Christian members, without making any further comments on this.

Nevertheless, even though all three newspapers of Nicosia presented the actual election result as a negative fact, I want to highlight here that the negativity was not built around the election of a Muslim as mayor of Nicosia but around the failure of the GC council members to decide which of the two GC candidates they would support. While this sense of negativity exists in the articles it should be made clear that the first two newspapers referred to the TC mayor and council members in a protective tone that opposed any racist feelings towards the TC community while the third one criticises the GC electoral members for their inability to agree on their actions.

Kypriakos Fylax for example creates this tone through the following statement that appears on the third page (out of a total of four pages of the newspaper):

For us the Nicosians, there are no feelings of coldness or dislike towards our Muslim fellow-citizens who naturally took advantage of the chance (22 March 1908).

Foni tis Kyprou starts the coverage of the election with a similar statement:

Without doubting the abilities of the elected Muslim person [the new mayor] and of the other honourable Muslim members [of the municipal council], who of course had every right, given the divisions among the majority, to ask for the position of the mayor for themselves, and they are indeed capable, and no one can complain about this, yet the event constitutes a shame for the Greek population of the capital and indicates the blindness of the mind and the hardening of hearts which party politics has brought to us (4 April 1908).

Eleftheria's article is entitled “The president’s election at Nicosia Municipality – [He is] Ottoman once again” and the article highlights:

The 6 Greek municipal counsellors have been given the chance to collaborate and elect Greek president and vice-president. But unfortunately for the third time the stubbornness and the [personal] ambitions have not been held back for the sake of national dignity [...] (18 April 1908).

Thus, the event appears to be interpreted as a negative result of the disagreement of the GC council members who did not protect their right to rule due to their numerical majority. In other words, the GC council members become the bad example of cooperation and authority management that the GC readers should not imitate in analogous cases while on the contrary the actions of the Muslim [TC] council members constitute the right cooperation model. The tension in the GC/Christian community that the newspaper discourses convey in their coverage of Shefket-Bey’s election is indicative of the tensions that appeared among the GCs/Christians during that period. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, during that period tensions had started building up between those who supported the traditional ideas of *Romiosini* and *Ellinochristianismos* and those who supported the modern ideas of Greek nationalism that created two parties in the Christian community, known as the *diallaktikous*¹⁵⁰ and the *adiallaktous* accordingly. The coverage of this particular event indicates that the transition to modernity initiated tensions in the Cypriot society which however did not cause – at least at its early stages – tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities. Nevertheless, the fact that the newspapers’ discourses imply that the Christians/GCs should be dominant in the sense that they should have authoritative roles because the opposite would not be beneficial for the political situation of the island cannot be overlooked.

¹⁵⁰ Refer to Chapter 3 for more on these tensions.

As Lymbourides (1980, p.91) contends, on the one hand there was indeed the expectation from the Christians/GCs for some kind of superiority/dominance of their community and the election of a TC as mayor of the capital of Cyprus triggered the initial dislike among the GCs but on the other hand, during Shefket Bey's three-year mayoral service there was no complaint by GCs.

In the meantime, the front-page editorials of the first two newspapers on two randomly selected dates – 1 and 7 November 1908 – appear to be neutral about the coexistence of the two communities. In the case of *Kypriakos Eylax* (1st November, 1908) there is only one reference to the other community when in its editorial entitled “Against Clericalist” in which it describes how the Church of Cyprus gained “freedom and spiritual power” after the Ottomans conquered the island without, though, blaming the Muslim community about anything specifically. In the case of *Foni tis Kyprou* (7th November, 1908) there is no direct reference to the Muslim/TC community even though the front-page includes an editorial about the disagreement/criticism of the European and English press on “the solution of *enosis*”. Thus, the absence of referring to bicommunal coexistence or the other community in general in these randomly selected dates could justify the interpretation that bicommunal coexistence was not a big – and certainly not a problematic – issue in the everydayness of the Cypriot society during that period and that the focus of the newspaper discourses was built around the issues of internal tensions within the GC community.

6.2.1.2. Competing discourses of enosis and bicommunal cooperation in the media rituals 1920-1960

The disturbances of 1931 began after a TC representative – even though Kemalist – voted against the British Governor's decision regarding raising rates in taxation, as the GC representatives did, and as a result the decision of the British Governor was prevented. The British Governor however – despite the votes of the representatives – imposed his decision and this triggered the riot. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 1931 uprising is significant for bicommunal relations even though it was an uprising against British rule by GCs only. The significance lies in the fact that firstly the uprising highlighted slogans in favour of *enosis* and second, and most importantly, that even though it clearly supported *enosis*, it did not stimulate any bicommunal conflict.

The disturbances are covered by the newspapers focusing mainly on the riot against the British rule outside the Governor's house¹⁵¹ and on the use of Greek ethnic symbols like flags, the national anthem which as described in the newspapers' coverage, they represented the people's wish for *enosis*. For example *Neos Kypriakos Fylax* includes in its front-page:

Police powers on horses try to prevent the entrance to the Governor's house, but the crowd insists and after the horses' bolt due to the noise, they [the crowd] manage to enter and as a result a Greek flag is placed [in the Governor's house], while the [Greek] national anthem is being sang (29 October 1931).

However, one out of the three newspapers chosen (*Neos Kypriakos Fylax*, *Alithia*, *Foni tis Kyprou*) in addition to the above includes a reference to the TC community that is worth analysing:

We the Greeks, inhabitants of the Greek island for three thousand years comprising 5/6 of its population and wishing that our Muslim co-inhabitants, with whom we harmonically live together, insightfully thinking they will definitely prefer the egalitarianism and prosperity of the liberal Greek constitution rather than today's unfortunate situation, we declare *enosis* of Cyprus with motherland Greece (*Alithia*, 23 October 1931).

The above sample illustrates the two dimensions of the rhetorical code used by the GC newspapers until the 1950s. One, they opposed British rule by all means by creating for example a Greek ethnic consciousness and promoting *enosis* as the way of releasing themselves from the British and second, they created a protective membrane around the TCs by emphasising concurrently their peaceful coexistence and common struggles from whom they are asking at least their understanding of their actions. *Alithia's* coverage of this event, is representative of the discourse that existed at the very early stages of the emergence of the idea of *enosis*, i.e. that *enosis* was firstly seen as a way out of the British rule and a step into prosperity that the belonging in the imagined community of the Greek nation would offer them. At the same time however, what is even more significant, as it appears in the last lines of the above extract, is that the imagined community that the idea of *enosis* initially represented was inclusive towards the TC community even though it seems paradoxical since it is defined solely as Greek.

¹⁵¹ The building used as the Governor's house during the period 1878–1960 is today's Presidential Palace.

This trend of coexistence and cooperation appears even bolder in the discourse used to describe the 1940s demonstrations that were held to support Greece and the allies' struggle after Italy's invasion of Greece. In this case all three newspapers (*Neos Kypriakos Fylax*, *Paratiritis*, *Paphos*) refer to the overwhelming participation of the TC community in the demonstrations. *Neos Kypriakos Fylax* writes:

The demonstration moved towards Saint George's Monastery towards the reception of the Archbishop's assistant [*voithos episkopou*], when a team of Turkish protesters holding a big Turkish flag joined the demonstration. [...] The crowds were continually bursting out in huge acclamations in favour of Greece, Turkey and the protector Great Britain (30 October 1940).

Paratiritis highlights TCs' participation with the following comment:

Having once again the students lead the way, thousands of people participated in vast protests in the streets of cities holding tens [meaning dozens] of large and small British, Greek and Turkish flags, banners and crosses. Among the protesting crowd there were very many Ottoman fellow citizens who unified sang the national anthems. Moving speeches against Italy were pronounced by Greek and Ottoman speakers at Saint Trinity church and in other places in the town (31 October 1940).

Paphos' discourse is of a similar mode:

[...] The Turkish [Cypriots] did not stay uninvolved in our [the GCs'] emotion and the events proved how deep and complete is the unity of emotion and ideas of the two elements [communities] (31 October 1940).

The significance of the above comments is that even after the use of *enosis* as a slogan by the GC community and even though in this case the protest was to support 'motherland' Greece, the press does not appear to promote – at least directly as it did in 1931 – the idea of *enosis* during this period. The detailed descriptions of the TCs' actions in the demonstrations maintain the motive of the closeness and cooperation of the two communities in the Cypriot public sphere; a motive which seems to describe the atmosphere of their everydayness.

One of the highlights of the cooperation of the Greek and Turkish communities is the period of the workers' strikes in 1944-48. This period needs to be emphasised since it is

referred to in the press as the struggle of the workers against authority without making any ethnic identification between the Cypriots. On the contrary, the only identification presented in the newspapers of that time is that of class. All newspapers selected, *Neos Kypriakos Fylax*, *Anexartitos* and *Paphos* referred to the two opposed bodies as “workers” or “working people” – a common expression used until today by *AKEL* – and “government”. In comparison to the cases described previously, this time the people’s movement was so big and focused that the newspapers simply described the events without appearing to have the need to indirectly ‘instigate’ people’s ethnic consciousness or justify anyone’s extreme actions. This is a good illustration of the fact that at least until that period there was not any conflict in the Cypriot society that was solidly ethnic.

When looking at the front-pages from some randomly selected dates – 4 and 2 November 1944 – of *Neos Kypriakos Fylax*, *Anexartitos* and *Paphos* the most significant observation is again the absence of any direct reference to the other community or on the relations of the two communities. *Neos Kypriakos Fylax* and *Anexartitos* (4th November 1944) include no reference to the Muslim/TC community other than mentioning a few Muslim names in the list of people that participated in the “National Whip Round”. Even though such reference looks like a minor detail, it could still be considered as a significant insight since it illustrates that people of the two communities participated in money raising for the common good and most importantly, since the newspaper characterises this whip round as “national” then the participation of the people from both communities indicates that during that period there was a desire/attempt for some sort of common national future. *Paphos* (2nd November 1944) also publishes a name list of those participated in the “National Whip Round” which includes some Muslim names too but it also includes a short editorial which refers to the celebration of the 22nd anniversary of the Turkish Republic by the TC community. More specifically, the editorial mentions – in a very informative tone without any hint of being critical about it – that the Turkish neighbourhoods of Paphos have been decorated with Turkish flags. This reference indicates that even though ethnic/national consciousness had been developing during that period this kind of national festivities by either of the two communities had been seen as something natural; meaning identifying with an ethnic consciousness other than the Cypriot one was seen as part of the everyday life of the Cypriots.

In 1954 the GCs' appeal for self-determination was rejected by the United Nations – something that led to demonstrations in which bicomunal conflict arises. The press reports these incidents of conflict while there is still a newspaper using a 'mild' coded discourse when referred to the bicomunal conflict and the TCs:

The need for a constitution of a united patriotic front is urgent. [...] Without any doubt provocative elements created tension to the relations of Greeks and Turks [...] Such thoughts about economic war must be condemned and on the contrary [we] should develop friendly relations with our Turkish compatriots (*Neos Demokratias*, 21 December 1954).

In the late 1950s however, something appears to change in the scenery. The image of cooperation and peaceful coexistence does not appear in any of the GC newspapers. On the contrary, this trend of coexistence seems to be replaced by the trend of bicomunal conflict and nationalism. One central question of this thesis is however, whether this change is something produced by the media discourses circulating in the public sphere or if it is simply reflected by them. What I am trying to suggest here, is that this change is both produced and reflected by the media discourses of that time. The two are hardly separated when examining the discourses circulating in Cyprus and juxtaposing it with the accounts of the island's history that have been reviewed in Chapter 3. This is due to the fact that on one hand these new ideas for the establishment of a Greek ethnic identity were introduced to the island from people who were educated in Greece, or were generally influenced by ideas of nationalism to which they were exposed during their travelling abroad and, on the other hand, have been reflected – but at the same time enhanced – by the institutions that were producing the discourses of that time, including the print and then the broadcast media. It would be misleading to suggest either that the media discourses could cause such a big change from scratch or that they simply reflected the change that was taking place in the Cypriot society. What I am rather trying to suggest is that both were happening concurrently and most importantly that certain media discourses produced rituals that contributed to the enhancement of this change. This enhancement was achieved by the two interconnected dimensions of the media discourses: 1. the fact that through “the myth of the mediated centre” (Couldry, 2003b) these kinds of media discourses were considered beyond doubt and 2. by the fact that having the media discourses reflecting certain nationalistic ideas that were already circulating in the public sphere was a way of confirming/validating them. This validation was even stronger in periods of violent events like those of 1956-1958 that I will refer to next.

Panayiotou (2006c) contends that the violent events of 1956-1958 were covered by the press using a different coded-discourse which constitutes a “new form of censorship”. He defines this new form of censorship as an invisible force of “journalistic thought police” which limited the openness of the public sphere (2006c, p.30). One observes that during that period the main GC newspapers instead of reporting the news they selectively present stories that, as Billig (1995) would say, are ‘flagging’ and consequently confirming the Greekness of their readers. Samples of such selectivity and flagging are articles in *Eleftheria* and *Harangi* that describe the bicomunal conflict at Kioneli in 1958.

Eleftheria’s article is entitled “Bloodthirsty Turks slaughtered or seriously injured Greek workers who were abandoned by British soldiers outside Kioneli village” and it continues:

Armed Turks attacked like tigers their unarmed victims. At Varosia, unsuspected Greeks experienced the unethical attack of the Turks and many of them were injured from whom fifteen were seriously injured. [...] The indignation and anger of the GC people was uncontrollable for this atrocious and gangsterish crime, after the official broadcast announcement of the government attempted to distort the real events, by giving responsibilities to a group of 300 Greeks who supposedly were moving towards the Turkish village Kioneli (*Eleftheria*, 13 June 1958).

Harangi describes the bicomunal conflict in a similar tone:

With the main and evident responsibility lying with the members of the security forces – Group slaughtering of Greeks by Turks outside Kioneli – shameful distorting of the events by the Cypriot radio station. [...] The inhabitants of Kontemenou were transformed into these [referring to the photographs accompanying the article] shapeless masses after they were mangled by the Turkish vandals (*Harangi*, 13 June 1958).

The first significant observation is that both newspapers even though having different ideology – rightist in the case of *Eleftheria* and leftist in the case of *Harangi* – use a very similar language and tone to cover the Kioneli event. This is not surprising however since radical reaction is expected after such an extreme conflict situation.

The flagging is obvious in both examples: *Eleftheria* defines the Turks – meaning the TCs – as the culprits since it makes it clear that they were the armed ones who “attacked like tigers”; while it uses the phrase “unarmed victims” to describe the GCs. It is interesting

that in this first sentence of the article, the attackers are ethnically labelled in contrast to the victims that are not. There is no doubt however, that in the minds of the GC readers the good character of the story will always represent themselves. What characterises the narration in this sample is the “form of imagining” that Anderson argues the newspaper constitutes (1991, p.26). In other words, some concepts are embedded in the minds of the reader and there is no need to define them. In this case however, what is even more interesting is that, in this example, the concept of victim or ‘goodie’ is the one embedded in the minds of the GC readers on the contrary to the one of the ‘baddie’ which seems not to be embedded and which needs to be prompted. This constant reminder is an illustration of the media rituals I suggest were enacted by the newspapers during that period in the attempt to territorialise GCs’ reality. For this reason, the concept of the ‘baddie’ is defined by an ethnic identity which might lead one to the argument that until that time, the imagination of the GCs could not ‘ethnically’ define the ‘baddie’ in the story as a TC. Such an argument could be justified by the fact that during these difficult periods for bicomunal relations, in the subterranean GC community – meaning in the everydayness consciousness of ordinary and especially lower class people – there was still in some degree the idea that TCs could also become victims of chauvinism. This is evident by the existence of *Ergatiko Vima*, the newspaper of the PEO,¹⁵² which constitutes one of the limited alternative voices of that time. One example of this alternative voice of *Ergatiko Vima* is the reporting of the attempted assassination on 22nd May 1958 in Omorfita of the TC Ahmet Shati – the person in charge of the PEO’s TC office – around the time of the events of Kioneli mentioned above. The next day’s paper carried an article entitled “Chauvinist elements shot Ahmet Shati and his wife yesterday”:

The attacks against the Old Trade Union are continuing having this time as targets the Turks [TCs] of PEO. Chauvinist elements that are not looking positively towards brotherly coexistence and cooperation between the Turkish and Greeks labours, which developed during the last years due to the right labour politics of PEO, shot and injured yesterday morning Ahmet Shati, the person in charge of PEO’s Turkish Office and his wife (*Ergatiko Vima*, 23 May 1958).

In this article the coded discourse is different: the victims are ethnically defined as TCs and the attackers are not given an ethnic identity but the general label of “chauvinists”. If one interprets this discourse according to Anderson’s “form of imagining” (1991, p.26) in this

¹⁵² PEO stands for “Pagkypria Ergatiki Organosi” which means Pancyprrian Federation of Labour.

case *Ergatiko Vima*, as an alternative voice, defines the victims ethnically instead of the attackers as an attempt to ‘overwrite’ the embedded idea of themselves – the GCs – as the only victims in the minds of its GC readers. It is worth drawing attention to this discourse since the outcome interpretation that is derived from this report is that the conflict is not as a bicomunal one per se but certain attacks from chauvinist members of both communities against those who coexisted and cooperated peacefully.

However, in order to understand the kind of flagging that Billig (1995) refers to it is necessary to examine whether this flagging and this kind of media ritual that aim at territorialising people’s reality exists not only in extreme situations like the Kioneli event, but on a daily basis during periods of ‘normalcy’ – if the period after 1950s in Cyprus could be characterised as a period of normalcy.

When looking at the front-page of *Eleftheria* on a randomly selected date of that period (4 November 1958) the discourse of nationalism is still quite obvious. These how the two main lead articles are introduced in *Eleftheria*’s front-page:

[Lead article 1:] The Surridge¹⁵³ committee submits to the government a report about different Turkish Municipal Councils. [...] What sort of topographic map is the committee using in order to draw themselves the geographical borders of the Turkish municipalities. Will the bigger part of the inner-walled city of Nicosia [old part of the city] go under the control of the Turkish municipality? It is said that the movable and immovable [real estate] property of the municipalities will be divided (4 November 1958).

[Lead article 2:] There has been a conflict between EOKA and pedestrian security patrol in a forest around Prodromos – Kakopetria.¹⁵⁴ [...] According to the official announcement, during the conflict in which the men of EOKA threw grenades, one soldier has been deadly injured. British citizen murdered in Nicosia. Mine and bombs explosions in Kaimakli¹⁵⁵ and Nicosia (4 November 1958).

The discourse of the first lead article is flagging the national consciousness of the GC readers by creating a feeling of danger and insecurity. The feeling of insecurity is built

¹⁵³ Surridge was the chairman of a committee set up in 1958 by Lennox Boyd to make recommendations about separate municipalities in Cyprus.

¹⁵⁴ *Prodromos* and *Kakopetria* are villages near *Troodos*’ mountain in Cyprus. Due to the wildness and roughness of the landscape in that area, the villages have been used as hiding places for the *EOKA* fighters during 1955-59.

¹⁵⁵ *Kaimakli* is the northeastern suburb of Nicosia.

around the idea that first of all the British will apply their own plan in Cyprus and second that this plan will give authoritative power to TCs which also means GCs losing authoritative power. The discourse of *Eleftheria* claims that it knows about the map that the Surridge committee is discussing and it ‘promises’ to reveal it to its readers. In other words, *Eleftheria* is using rhetoric in this headline which implies that the newspaper has a privileged relationship with the centre of society: that is why it represents the truth – it will reveal the topographic map that the committee is discussing. Furthermore, the feeling of danger is enhanced with the use of questions like “Will the bigger part of the walled city of Nicosia [old part of the city] go under the control of the Turkish municipality?” and with statements like “It is said that the movable and immovable [real estate] property of the municipalities will be divided” since (a) the walled city of Nicosia is a symbol of historical and cultural heritage for the GCs and (b) dividing property implies that the GCs will become less privileged.

In the case of the second headline, the national consciousness is being flagged again but by creating the feeling of national pride this time since the headline focuses on the attacking actions of the “men of *EOKA*” like throwing grenades – which is also connected with the bombings in Nicosia – and on the injuries that those actions caused to the opponents. At the same time there is no reference to any losses or injuries among the *EOKA* fighters.

6.2.2. The escalation of nationalism and conflict: The dominance of the discourse of conflict

The historical significance of the post 1960 period as already mentioned in Chapter 2, lies in the fact that on one hand Cyprus gained its self-determination as an independent state but on the other ethnic nationalism and bicomunal conflict escalated. Hence, what becomes interesting when examining the media of that period is to understand how the media have presented these two paradoxically co-existing issues to the GC readers: 1. of Cyprus’ independence of the establishment of a Cypriot national identity and ethnic nationalism and 2. the desire of belonging to the Greek nation. In such an attempt, the

focus of this section will be on the rituals that the GC media – press and radio – produced when covering or referring¹⁵⁶ to significant events which characterised that period.

6.2.2.1. Media rituals of bicomunal conflict 1960-1974

The first noticeable thing when looking into how the newspapers covered the bicomunal conflict that burst out in 1963 is the different discourses conveyed by the two main newspapers that represented the GC Right and Left, *I Mahi* and *Harangi* respectively.

An illustration of this notable difference in the press discourses of that time, is observed when comparing the headlines of these two newspapers on 22nd December 1963. *I Mahi* has as a headline “Blood and Challenge after the Illegal Armed Resistance of the Turks” while *Harangi*’s headline is “Avoid Every Challenge is the Common Call of the President and Vice- President”. It is interesting how both headlines contain the word ‘challenge’ while they convey different messages. On the one hand, the challenge in *I Mahi*’s headline is accompanied by blood and caused by the Turks leaving undefined as to whom the challenge is directed to; in *Harangi*’s headline, on the other hand, the challenge is something that should be commonly avoided. In the first case blood, challenge, illegal armed resistance are ethnically defined as Turkish and even though the receiver of all these is a blank space in the headline, the GC readers can easily fill this space in their perception with a representation of themselves. In *Harangi*’s case there are not any ethnic labels even though it is reference to the president and vice-president.¹⁵⁷ On the contrary, these two characters are defined by their common call for avoidance of every challenge.

This difference is also notable when comparing the front pages of these newspapers on 25th December 1963. *I Mahi* has as a headline “Big Counter Attack Against the Turks. The mutineers have succumbed in all fronts. They are pushing themselves into enclaves.¹⁵⁸ Omorfita is occupied” and the rest of the front-page titles are of a similar tone: “The big

¹⁵⁶ Referring – often indirectly – to significant events in the case of the Cypriot radio sketch.

¹⁵⁷ During that period president was the GC Makarios and vice-president the TC Kuchuk.

¹⁵⁸ After the 1963 bicomunal conflict the TCs either by their own volition or by force moved into scattered enclaves all over Cyprus for security reasons.

attack”, “Four Turks dead in Larnaka”, “Several incidents in Famagusta”, “Mr. Yorkadjis¹⁵⁹ congratulates the people of Larnaka” (*I Mahi*, 25 December 1963).

Harangi has as a lead article which includes the following:

Despite the repeated calls for termination of bloodshed the battles continued yesterday in the capital. Only during the night the shootings were reduced. Late yesterday night there was reliable information that serious attempts have been made to end the tragedy. The general desire is to stop the conflict (*Harangi*, 25 December 1963).

The rest of *Harangi*'s front page's titles are: “After the call of Dr Vasilopoulou PEO and EDON organise blood donation corps”, “To stop immediately”, “Yesterday's announcement for termination of conflict after the President - Vice-President meeting”, “[After a] common meeting in Larnaka decisions have been taken for re-establishment of order” (*Harangi*, 25 December 1963).

I Mahi's headline and titles create almost a war atmosphere in which the enemy is the same in all the stories described in the front-page that is why it is constantly ethnically defined as the Turk who the imagined 'hero' is trying to confront in those several fronts. The message conveyed from these titles is that the 'hero' should proudly continue his fight against the enemy.

On the contrary, *Harangi*'s lead article and titles do not attempt to create the imaginative characters of enemy and hero. Without mentioning the protagonists of the conflict – and without defining them ethnically – it is almost like the conflict takes place somewhere else and the readers of this newspaper are simply watching it from a distance while they are sharing at the same time the collective efforts for its termination.

When the bicomunal conflict intensified in 1964 though, the press that represented the GC Left changed its discourse too since it had to address exclusively its GC audience after

¹⁵⁹ Polykarpos Yorkadjis was the Minister of Interior during that period.

the physical separation of the two communities.¹⁶⁰ If we look at a sample front-page of *Haravgi* in 1964 we observe a turn towards a discourse very similar to the one used until then by *I Mahi*. For example, on 29th April 1964 on the front-page of *I Mahi* we find the headline “Turks in a desperate position inside the Ayios Ilarionas fortress” accompanied with other headings like “Our heroic soldiers hit the raiders” and in the front-page of *Haravgi* we see the headline “The fortress has been surrounded” with a heading above saying “The big battle of the homeland at Ayios Ilarionas” and another heading below the main headline saying “Our brave soldiers isolated and hit non-stop the mutineers”. As we observe in a year’s time the previously different discourses come closer since both newspapers create the imagined character of the hero that as flagged also by both newspapers is ‘our’ soldier. They are using, in other words, what Burke (1969 cited in Billig 1995, p.98) called the ‘rhetoric of identification’ in order to define the national identity of ‘we’. In the case of the GC press of 1964, that excludes the TCs. Billig argues that the newspapers’ journalists

[i]n addressing the imagined national audience, they dress it in rhetorical finery and, then, these speakers-as-outfitter hold a mirror so the nation can admire itself (1995, p.98).

And it seems that all headlines and headings included in *I Mahi* and *Haravgi* front-pages (29 April 1964) constitute an illustration of this argument. One crucial anomaly is that in the case of Cyprus the nation that admires itself in the mirror at that historical moment, is not the Cypriot nation, as one would expect when one thinks of the abstract idea of nationalism, but the imagined Greek nation of Cyprus which as Bryant (2004) argued may be seen as a form of “imaging the modern”.

However, in the context of another medium – that of radio – and of a different genre –the Radio Sketch – an alternative discourse was expressed even in the difficult period of 1964.¹⁶¹ In one of Avraamidou’s sketches, entitled *Kali Karkia* (*Good Heart*) that was broadcast¹⁶² by CyBC on 1st March 1964, the coexistence of GCs and TCs in a village is

¹⁶⁰ During this tension the TCs had to enclose themselves in enclaves (see Chapter 3 for more details on this event).

¹⁶¹ As mentioned before 1964 was a period of bicomunal conflict and violence which led the TCs into the enclaves.

¹⁶² For more about the broadcasting context refer to the review of the media theories included in Chapter 2.

emphasised. The plot is built around the relationship between co-villagers of the two communities that coexist peacefully in their village sharing cultural things like patronising together the village's coffeeshop or helping each other in important matters like contributing to each other's dowry and supporting each other in cases of sickness. Their harmonious life is interrupted when the TC villagers are forcefully taken – as one of the sketch protagonists characteristically describes: *Epian tous me to zori* (*They took them by force*) – from their houses and moved them into the TC enclaves. The author then places the GC protagonists in the position of the heroic characters that risk their lives to protect their co-villagers' herd and properties in cases of natural disasters like flood – until the day the TCs would be able to return to the village. The story ends happily with the return of the TC protagonists – after a successful escape from the enclave – to the village and with the wedding of the two young GC protagonists in which the best man and the maid of honour are their TC friends who returned home.

The significance of this frame of reference lies in several aspects that mostly have to do with certain characteristics of this genre – the Cypriot sketch – that have been already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. It is important however to re-emphasise that the radio sketch had been broadcast by the only radio station of that time, which was also the public broadcaster of the Republic of Cyprus and that had been very popular with the GC audience. Thus, this discourse has the anomaly that could be considered both official and alternative since the station, as the semi-government owned organisation, was expressing the official discourse¹⁶³ and alternative at the same time since it provided an alternative view of the 'conflict story'. On the one hand, the Cypriot Radio Service was considered by the GCs as a means of promoting the English propaganda against their desire for enosis (Sofokleous, 2008, p.54) and on the other, the broadcasting of the Cypriot radio sketch written in the Cypriot dialect – their most familiar linguistic code – with plots that referred to the rural way of life – a characteristic of the Cypriot society of that time was something with which the Cypriots could identify (Photiou, 2010, pp.3-4).

¹⁶³ The term official discourse coincides with hegemonic discourse here. According to Panayiotou after 1958, a kind of censorship had been enacted in the public discourse against the leftists who were critical about EOKA, an action that functioned as a warning to those who wish to be critical against the new power of the independent state (Loizos, 1974 cited in Panayiotou, 2011, p.121). Thus, if one wished to be expressed publicly during that period s/he had to do it through the official discourse (Panayiotou, 2011).

The alternativeness of the discourse communicated through the sketch lies in the fact that the TCs are clearly defined both as victims and as friends – (almost like family) the GC characters several times in the story refer to their relationship with TCs *opos t'aderkia* which means *like siblings*. Hence, in contrast to the story communicated by the rightist newspapers of that time, the TCs have been both mentioned and clearly defined, and the image of the enemy stays undefined since it is not labelled with the Turkish ethnic identity. When the GC character refers to those who took their TC co-villagers away she says: *“Irtan t'aftokinita tzi'epiran oullous tous chorkanous mas tous Tourkous”* meaning “The cars came and took all of our Turkish co-villagers”; in this discourse, it is like the bad character of the story is not a clearly defined person but takes the form of an object like ‘a car’. It is a character that the author does not want the audience to imagine having a human image with any specific characteristics or ethnicity. This is a tactic reminiscent of the one used by the Tom and Jerry cartoon writers who never reveal the whole image/face of Tom’s (the cat) female owner to the audience in order to avoid the creation of a specific human image of the character that often punishes Tom when he is naughty. In the context of the sketch, this strategy is used not to reproduce the sense of bewilderment experienced by ‘ordinary’ people, on the contrary the people were aware to whom the sketch was referring to due to the fact that the majority of them witnessed such events. This strategy was rather aiming at not becoming clearly political in the sense of giving hints about who to blame for this, an event for which even until today there are different deviating accounts.¹⁶⁴

At the same time, as though, the sketch uses a framework of reference that presents the TCs as victims it does not give any implication that the GCs could be also responsible for their victimisation. For example, the reason for taking the TC villagers to the enclaves is left unexplained and in order to emphasise that, the author even presents the TC characters to wonder why ‘the cars’ are taking them away. In addition to that, the story implies that the only cause of the TCs’ suffering is the forceful removal from their houses/village and the conditions in which they had to live in the enclaves, thus leaving any actions of extremist GCs taking place in that time out of the story. As a result the GC characters and

¹⁶⁴ Even today, there are disagreements on whether the TCs willingly left due to the oppression they experienced during coexistence or they were forced to do so by the Turkish administration. Even though Patrick (1976, p.78) suggests that the latter is only supported by the GC side he mentions: “The overwhelming majority of TC refugees moved only after TCs had been killed, abducted or harassed by GCs within their villages, quarters, or in their local vicinity [...] it was only in a few instances, after January 1964, that the TC leadership took the initiative in recommending that certain villages should be evacuated. However it is known that that such advice wasn't always followed”.

audience are left out from bearing any responsibility. For example Emine, the TC female protagonist, mentions when she is being asked how the rest of the co-villagers live in the enclaves:

They remember their village, their houses, their gardens; they remember what a good time they had with you [the GCs] and they are crying day and night. Why? Neighbour, why are our people [the Greek phrase *i diki mas* is used here meaning probably the Turks] doing all these to us? We [meaning the TCs] want the Christians, we love them, they never did anything bad to us... will [they] force us to hate them [the Christians]?

This last phrase/question of Emine “will they force us to hate them” reminds me of what Latif, a 72 year old male TC interviewee, told me when we faced the huge flags of Turkey of the so called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the newly built minarets in a joined visit to north Nicosia and Kyrenia. Below I paraphrase what he said, noting that he fluently used the GC version of the Cypriot dialect:

They [meaning Turkey and the government of the so called TRNC] decided to make us Turks. They believe that we do not know who we are, that we are not Turks enough and they are trying to convince us that this is who we are. They say that we are faithless/seculars so they are building huge minarets and mosques in every village to make us faithful but you’ll never see a TC in there. So if a solution doesn’t come in the next year it will be more difficult for us.

My intention with the use of the quote above is not to give an absolute validation of Emine’s words in the sketch but to provide a possible interpretation of the discourse of ‘enforcement’ that is produced by the sketch. Latif’s comments do support in a sense that at least nowadays, TCs are ‘forced’ by Turkey and certain TC elements in Cyprus to adopt nationalistic ideas that oppose their feeling of belonging in Cyprus – instead of Turkey – and that of having an identity other than the ‘solid’ Turkish. Thus, the sketch’s discourse of ‘enforcement’ seems truthful at least to the extent that this feeling of belonging could be the case in the sub-cultural level of the Cypriot society of that time but as mentioned in my analysis before however, this does not justify the fact that the sketch emphasises this in order to exempt GCs from every responsibility of the TCs’ suffering.

In another of Avraamidou’s sketches, broadcast about a year later, on 15th August 1965, Assumption Day – a very important date for GC Christians – the discourse changes. The broadcast date is significant also because it is a year after the bombing of *Tillirka* that is

why the sketch is also entitled *Sti gi tis Tillirkas* meaning “In ‘Tillirkas’ land”. The story has to do with the visit of a GC soldier to his home village Tillirka – which is now destroyed – a year after it had been bombed. This seems to be the first visit of the GC protagonist, Thanos, to *Tyllirka* after the bombing and the plot is built around this relating his memories to his fellow soldiers who joined him in his visit. Thus, what is emphasised in this discourse is the invaluable moments one has in her/his home and her/his attachment with the place, in this case the village, as an element of belonging which is crucial to one’s identity and consequently the great loss caused when it is destroyed or when s/he is forced to leave/abandon it.

In contrast to the 1964 sketch, this sketch does not include any TC characters or any reference to them. The memories that the GC protagonist narrates to the rest of the soldiers have to do with his love relationship with a poor co-villager; a relationship to which his father is opposed since he wants a wealthier bride for his son. In other words, Thanos seems to have an ordinary life in the village with the usual family clashes of the modern times in Cyprus. This ordinary life is interrupted when the news arrives that bicommunal conflict had begun in Nicosia. The villagers gather to listen to Thanos reading the newspaper – indicating once again the gap between the uneducated parents and the educated children and as a result the move from the traditional period to modernity. The author then includes a small paragraph that represents the news that is being read by Thanos, something that needs to be analysed. He reads from the newspaper:

“Bloody incidents in Nicosia”

Two people have been murdered in a number of shootings. A Greek policeman has been injured. The whole city of Nicosia was awoken today, at 2.30 in the morning by continual shootings that could be heard from the area of Ermou Street and after a while it was realised that two people have been murdered: one young male Turk and one female Turk, and one Greek police officer has been injured. Right after the incident the whole Police body of Nicosia and the suburbs have been alerted, [policemen] have been called from their homes and went to the police stations to be on duty... a while after the incident at Ermou Street three persons that have been chased abandoned a “Volkswagen” car that has been shot and they left with a “Citroen” car through Chrysohoon Street.

It is worth mentioning that before Thanos started reading the news his uncle says to the co-villagers: “Come to read the news of Nicosia... The Turks have begun...” implying that

the incidents have been initiated by the Turks or/and the TCs.¹⁶⁵ Another GC villager makes a similar comment after Thanos reads the story, he says: “You see? It’s the Turks and they began it” again accusing the Turks for initiating the incident. What is striking, though, is that according to the news story the victims of the incident were TCs and not GCs – there was only a GC police officer injured – so the idea that the Turks initiated the incident does not seem to suit the story. Additionally, the protagonists do not make any comment on the “murdering” of the young Turks; on the contrary a dialogue between Thanos and his mother takes place regarding his decision to go to Nicosia with other volunteers to help. When Thanos’ mother says to him, “For God’s sake my son where are you going to go in the ‘fire?’” he characteristically replies:

I’m going there where the duty of homeland is calling me mother. If we, the young people, don’t defend our place who is going to save us from the enemy’s hands?

When Thanos is referring to the enemy immediately after comments of the villagers such as “the Turks have begun” he defines the enemy ethnically as the Turks. In addition to that, Thanos’ words make the audience imagine that every GC man is doing the same thing as Thanos, i.e. is fighting the enemy to defend his homeland. The GC audience in other words is imagining its community acting similarly and homogeneously when listening to the story, as Anderson contends about fiction “is creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of every modern nation” (1991, p.31).

The sketch ends with Thanos describing his thoughts after the bombing of *Tyllirka*. The following part is worth further analysis:

I then [after the bombing] felt dominated by rabies¹⁶⁶ against those people that came to kill innocent people, infants, elders that did not harm anyone. [...]

With this crime they show what plans those cannibals¹⁶⁷ are prepared to use to impose their intentions. But they [their plans] will not pass because the Cypriot people will stand as a firm rock in front of them.

¹⁶⁵ It is not clear here whether the author refers to the TCs or indeed to Turks since as we notice also in the 1964 sketch when her characters refer to the TC protagonists they call them Turks instead of TCS.

¹⁶⁶ “Rabies” is often used metaphorically to describe the rage with which the enemy fought against the GCs.

¹⁶⁷ The characterisation “cannibals” is again used metaphorically to express the rage of the enemy as explained in the previous footnote.

The first part of Thanos' thoughts are characterised by intense feelings of aggressiveness against those who harmed his co-villagers. Even though it was clear that the bombings had been committed by the Turkish air forces the author does not mention the word "Turks" at all in the sketch's epilogue. Instead of that, her protagonist is using negative adjectives as intense as "cannibals" in order to express this outrage that the GCs felt after the bombings. In the second part of the epilogue though, Thanos is referring to the "Cypriot people" and not to the GCs as one would expect in a situation of bicomunal conflict and intense ethnic nationalism. Hence, the sketch here is using rituals that in a sense move beyond the ones that reproduce ethnic consciousness, like in the case of the majority of newspapers of that time, since the rituals enacted here reproduce both the negative feelings that the GC community might have had after the bombing and *recreate* – or *maintain*– the consciousness of a Cypriot identity when referring to the "Cypriot people"¹⁶⁸ instead of the Greeks of Cyprus – or simply Greeks – as some of the newspapers did.

In another of Avraamidou's sketches however, broadcast seven months later, on 27th March 1966, the discourse appears to be closer to the one produced by the newspapers of that time. The sketch is entitled *Chorkom mou agapimenon* meaning "My beloved village" and it is exemplary of the gradually changing discourse of the GC community that took place in the years up to 1974. The plot is again built around the ordinary rural life of a GC family and emphasis is given to the relationship created between the protagonists and their village and to an extent the attachment with their homeland. The story reaches its climax when Fytis, one of the family's sons, informs his parents and his older brother of his intention to migrate to Athens in order to avoid his military service. A family discussion is initiated in an attempt to prevent his decision having as a central point the crucial importance of one's devotion to her/his village/homeland. Here are some indicative parts of the discussion:

¹⁶⁸ "Cypriot people" – the Greek *Kypriake lae* – is an expression used firstly by the Cypriot left – and it is still used by them – to refer to the Cypriots of both communities. In periods characterised by nationalism, like in 1955-1974 this expression was transformed to *Ellinike Kypriake lae*, "Greek Cypriot people" or "Greeks of Cyprus"; the first was used extensively by Makarios in his public speeches. The expression was transformed back to *Kypriake lae* "Cypriot people" and used in the official GC discourses after the Turkish invasion in 1974, in an attempt of the GCs to convince the international community that the Republic of Cyprus represents both communities. Furthermore, in the 1990s when the right-wing party was in power in the south, the expression was shifted to "GCs" to be changed again in 2008 when the left-wing party came to power.

Kakoullou (mother): You were saying that you love the land, the sun, every tree, every flower, every green leaf and you were anxiously waiting to finish school in order to settle in your village forever? You used to sit with us and you were dreaming of making your village's land a paradise? [...] Every tree, every plant that you used to say that you love like humans of the earth, because they similar to us, they are thirsty for life, they are trying hard to grow up and reach high. "Look mum" you used to say to me "Look at their roots how firmly they are rooted in the soil and how they torture it to expand as deep as they can and to suck life from its gut".

Panais (father): [...] Are you scared? You deny defending your land my son?

Fytis: I even give my life for my land father as you know but I don't [want to] get a gun in my hands.

Fytis' mother is using some very intense words to describe this attachment with the village. She is using metaphors to describe this relationship with the physical environment of their village in order to emphasise the strong feeling of belonging that traditionally existed in the Cypriot village communities. Even though, this kind of land metaphor is used in a number of nationalistic/propagandistic discourses in the world, what becomes significant here is the anomaly that these land metaphors exist even though nationalism during that period as appeared in other GC media discourses was promoting not a Cypriot nation but a Greek nation. As Panayiotou (2007, p.12) argues during that period:

the imagery of the land of Cyprus was demoted from a mother [as it used to appear in the popular poetry/songs in the Ottoman rule period] to a 'daughter' of other lands (Greece or Turkey) [...] In the imagery of GC nationalism the goal was *enosis* – i.e. annexation of the island to the Greek state [...] Thus, in the imaginary, Cyprus was a land with no self-identifying locals/Cypriots.

Furthermore, the idea of the village/homeland as something very precious like a paradise is also produced in this discourse. This idea of a village as paradise – found or lost – is very common for Cypriots even today. For example, Dikomitis in her paper, "A moving field: GC refugees returning home" describes how her GC father being himself both a refugee from Larnaka of Lapithos – a village in the occupied part of Cyprus – and a migrant in Belgium always refers to his village as his lost paradise. She writes about this relationship between her father and his village:

In every single sentence I hear his longing to return to his village Larnakas tis Lapithou. Whenever we travelled and saw something overwhelmingly beautiful my Larnatsjiotis¹⁶⁹-father

¹⁶⁹ Larnatsjiotis is called someone from Larnaka.

compared it to Larnakas: 'It is breath-takingly beautiful. Just like my village.' He compares a Nepalese rural village, a British field and a French mountain with Larnakas. When it is beautiful, it is 'like Larnakas'. *Mia fora kai ena kairo* (once upon a time)... The traditional start of a Greek fairy-tale. This is how I thought about Larnakas tis Lapithou, as a place from a fairy-tale. I imagined this village as a celestial place as such only exists in fairy-tales. (Dikomitis, 2004, p.8).

Later in her paper Dikomitis includes a similar kind of comment from another Larnatsjioti that illustrates this paradise idea of one's village:

I would like to climb the Pendadakylos again, which overlooks Vassilia, Kyrenia, Lapithos... I remember that on my right I could see Vassilia, Lapithos... All those beautiful places (*tous oraious topous*). I have never seen such scenery anywhere else. From the other side we could see as far as Lefkosia. Imagine watching all those villages as far as Lefkosia. You know, this is the first thing I want to go to (*ma kseris en to proton praman pou thelo na pao*). I want to go up the mountain and enjoy the view again. I have never seen this anywhere else in Cyprus (*Poupote allou stin kipro en ida opou epia*) (Dikomitis, 2004, p.9).

In both those cases described by Dikomitis the paradise is lost, thus the nostalgic feeling that characterises the description in these two comments could explain this degree of idealisation of their village. In the case of the sketch though, the idealisation of the protagonist's village could be interpreted as a way to emphasise to the audience what could be lost in the case of a serious bicomunal conflict. The sketch ends with the disaster of the family's trees and fields by the 'Turks of the nearby village, as a villager explains *Irtan i Tourdji pou to diplano chorkon* meaning "The 'Turks came from the nearby village". That's when Fytis decides not to leave his village and attend his military service in order to protect his homeland. In his own words:

And I wanted to leave... to abandon my place, my village, our fields, our fortune, our land. Am I such a coward? Such a coward? My beloved village I swear on my life that I will stay with you to defend you even if I have to give and the last drop of my blood.

Thus, this 1966 sketch on the one hand uses a discourse similar to the one produced by the print media of that time since the TC community is represented as the homogeneously bad character of the story that destroys the tranquillity of the GC community but on the other hand, through its prophetic plot about the loss of people's properties and villages and the idealisation of the Cypriot natural environment it draws attention to the need to protect this quality of Cypriot life instead of creating the need of belonging in another 'idealisation' that of the imagined Greek nation. In other words what I want to suggest here is that in the case of this sketch, Avraamidou is using the physical environment of Cyprus to create an imagination that opposes rather than promotes those of the imported nationalism i.e., the imagination of a Greek nation. This looks similar to what Billig writes about the Prime

Minister John Major's reference to the beauty of British suburbs – specifically his reference to Britain as “the country of long shadows on country grounds, warm beer, invisible green suburbs, dog lovers and pool fillers” (1995, p.107); Billig uses this to argue that the physical environment is used as metonymic stereotype to create an imagination that conveys the representation of the nation, so what I suggest is that the discourse produced by this 1966 sketch uses a similar kind of a metonymic stereotype that attempts to introduce a different kind of nationalism to the one produced by the print media of that period – a more Cypriot-centric one. The discourse produced by the sketch is not less nationalistic than the one produced by the print media, but the nationalism that defines this specific sketch's discourse is more similar to the model of nationalism that Smith (1991, p.12) describes as “civic-territorial”. According to Smith, this model of nationalism differs from the “ethnic-genealogical” model of nationalism in the sense that the civic-territorial nationalism is first anti-colonial and second it seeks “to bring together and integrate into a new political community often disparate ethnic populations and create a new integration nationalism” (1991, p.82). Even though in the narrative of this specific sketch the desire of integration of the disparate ethnic populations of Cyprus does not appear – at least not directly – the intense reference to the significance of one's homeland – and the fact that in this case the significance of the homeland is being also put against the protagonist's desire to move to Greece (which could be viewed as the ultimate goal of an ethnic-genealogical model of nationalism) – makes one's homeland unique. Highlighting the uniqueness of one's homeland according to Smith is something which characterises this civic-territorial model of nationalism:

The homeland becomes a repository of history memories and associations, the place where ‘our’ sages, saints and heroes lived, worked, prayed and fought. All this makes the homeland unique. Its rivers, coasts, lakes, mountains and cities become ‘sacred’ – places of veneration and exaltation whose inner meanings can be fathomed only by the initiated, that is, the self-aware members of the nation (Smith, 1991, p.9).

Thus, the discourse of the radio sketch indeed experienced a gradual change in the late 1960s but did not adopt the discourse of the imported ethnic nationalism that existed in the newspapers during the same time. On the contrary, the elements of nationalism identified in the radio sketch of that decade is more similar to what Mavratsas (1998) calls *Cypriotism* – meaning the development of a more Cypriot-centric consciousness and identity – and this 1966 sketch is indicative of conveying this non-ethnic nationalism.

6.2.3. Representing bicomunal relations in the post-separation era

What becomes the point of interest in the post-1974 period is that the relationship of the two communities had become totally mediated due to their complete separation. So the aim of the analysis here is to understand how media rituals have been enacted to represent the other in the two different media genres which are examined: the press news coverage and the Cypriot radio sketch.

6.2.3.1. Using media rituals to territorialise the ‘new reality’ of separation 1974-1980s

Mavratsas (1998) argues that the milestone in the history of Cyprus after which the public discourses gradually changed the consciousness they produced – from that of ethnic nationalism to *Cypriotism* – is 1974, the year of the *coup d'état* and Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, according to Mavratsas, the GC political leaders, after 1974, in their attempt to convince not only the TCs but also the international community that they were honest in their wish for a solution of federation, began attempts of rapprochement with the TC community, making clear at the same time that the enemy is Turkish expansionism and that the two Cypriot communities could live together again as they used to do in the past (Mavratsas, 1998, p.83). However, as the above analysis of the 1966 sketch illustrates, and which we will see again in the analysis of samples from the press and radio which follows, *Cypriotism* consciousness was not produced homogeneously by all media discourses after 1974. The rituals enacted by the press produced a different discourse than the one produced by the radio sketch in the same period.

The newspapers *Harangi* and *I Mahi* have been chosen to examine the way the 1974 events – a period referred to by most GCs as the most tragic events in Cyprus' modern history – have been presented by the press. The sample newspapers are taken a few days after the 15th and 20th July, the dates of the coup and invasion accordingly.

On 2nd August 1974 the main article of *Harangi's* front-page has as a headline:

The Turks are violating the truce even after the Geneva agreement. The elected president Makarios denounced the Turkish provocation.

While on 3rd August 1974 *I Mahi* includes in its front-page an article with the headline:

The government is reforming. The President of the Republic Mr. Clerides highly recommended the avoidance of dispute between the people.

What is striking is that the two GC newspapers refer to two different persons as the President of Cyprus. *I Mahi*, the rightist newspaper, refers to Clerides as the President after the elected President Makarios had been forcefully taken away from the government by the military junta. On the contrary, *Harangi* refers to Makarios as the President, highlighting the fact that he is the one legally elected by the people. This demonstrates the greater gap that had developed between the GC Left and Right after the coup.

This gap is also present in other articles of the same newspapers of that era. When one compares the narration used in their articles one is able to trace their dissimilar rhetoric. For example two articles in the back page of *I Mahi* are entitled:

Eight thousand GCs in Kyrenia. Completely unprotected in the hands of the Turks. United Nations left after the demand of the Turkish invaders (2 August 1974).

The hostages from martyr Trimithiou are free. Return from hell. Beastly rapes of married women and young girls, barbarian amputations and murders of fathers in front of the terrified eyes of his young children (3 August 1974).

And the titles of two articles from *Harangi* are:

No More Blood. Cyprus cannot take it. No conflict and retaliation. Concord, unity, oblivion, brotherhood, cooperation and communication between both the GCs and the Greek and TCs (3 August 1974).

The invasion affected the Turks [meaning the TCs] too (3 August 1974).

In the case of *I Mahi*, the titles of the articles draw attention to the GCs' suffering. It is worth noticing that the title of the second article cites a list of the terrible things the GC hostages suffered from and the choice of wording is important since a great use of adjectives is observed before almost every subject used to refer to both the characters of victim and offender. The offender is characterised as "beastly" and "barbarian" while the victim is a "terrified" "married woman", "young girl" and "young child" definitions that

automatically make the offender look even more “beastly” and “barbarian”. An additional observation is that despite the fact that the invaders are ethnically defined as Turkish, the TCs are not mentioned at all in the titles and it could be argued that this absence – especially in the case of the title of the second article – is similar to the form of imagining that Anderson argues that exists in newspapers (1991, pp.24-25). A series of events are about to be described in the second article of *I Mahi* having in the role of victims the GCs and of the offenders the Turks. As far as the TCs are concerned, the readers obviously know of their existence but the absence of any reference to them make them improvise regarding their actions. Thus, the TCs become the characters who act “meanwhile” of the protagonists’ actions and the readers are asked to imagine their actions in this “homogenous, empty time” (Anderson, 1991, p.25). Do they act as “beastly” as the Turks or do they simply watch the “barbarian” actions without doing anything to prevent them becoming this way “beastly” spectators? In other words, this absence embeds a convergent character of the ‘baddie’ in the imagination of the GC readers that includes both the Turks invaders and the TCs. This discourse however is part of a broader rhetorical framework that Panayiotou (2009a, pp.10-11) refers to as “interpretation of strategy”. In the context of this interpretation, the conflict was the result of a series of events that led to an out-of-control situation but it had been instigated by someone(s) and in the case of the GC official interpretation the instigator was Turkey. Thus, *Mahi*’s discourse with the absence of reference to the TC community enacts rituals in an attempt to make this “interpretation of strategy” hegemonic.

On the other hand, the emphasis in the titles of *Harangi*’s articles is on the need for peace and cooperation on every level clearly outlining the characters for whom their relationship needs to be re-established: (a) between GC leftists and rightists and (b) between GCs and TCs. The rhetoric of *Harangi* becomes even more inclusive regarding the TCs when the second title refers to the effects of the Turkish invasion on the TCs. This could lead to the suggestion that this reference attempts to embed a different – or at least an additional – victim character in the imagination/perception of the GC readers, one that includes both the GC and TC community separating at the same time the TCs from the (mainland) Turkish offenders.

As far as the sketch is concerned, there are not any sketches of Avraamidou that have been broadcast just after the 1974 coup d’état and Turkish invasion, and which refer to

bicommunal issues in general or specifically to these events, as in the case of the newspapers, until the late 1970s. It is important to start by pointing out that whenever bicommunal relations are part of the narrative – meaning when they are directly referenced – they are presented in a positive way even when bicommunal conflict is mentioned in the story.

For example in a sketch broadcast on 19th November 1978 entitled *Me tin Agapin* meaning “With Love” the story is built around the close relationship developed between two Cypriot families – one of each community – that live peacefully next to each other. Avraamidou emphasises this closeness in the first part of the sketch through the description of several joint activities of the two families like knitting, cooking traditional Cypriot dishes, fishing, food and coffee gatherings and organising their children’s weddings. These activities have become elements of Cypriot consciousness as residues of the Cypriot traditional way of living that used to exist until 1974. In this way, in the first part the author creates a nostalgic feeling in the audience for this ideal life that they used to have in the paradise of the peaceful coexistence. In the second part, Avraamidou refers to a very painful issue of the 1974 conflict for the GC audience, that of the “missing persons” but again in a positive way which exonerates the TCs from any responsibility on that issue. She places Nazim, the TC male protagonist in the position of the ‘saviour’ who escapes from the Turkish controlled area to go to his homeland in the South, in order to inform his GC neighbour that he saw her missing son alive and that he helped him when the latter was in need. The ‘missing persons issue’ is of crucial significance for the GC discourse which developed after 1974 since it became one of the most painful issues. As Panayiotou asserts in his article “The Management of Pain” in the GC community:

[...] the pain was transformed by the hegemonic discourse, into a symbol of the tragedy that was codified as [the slogan] ‘I do not forget’. Outside Cyprus this pain was used to demonstrate the barbarity of the [Turkish] invasion. [...] For the GCs the missing persons were hostages that were alive until the proof of the opposite. [...] For the GC relatives of the missing persons that meant that they had to carry the weight of being a symbol of the collective memory (2009a, pp.9-10).

In the case of the sketch’s discourse however, the pain of the GC mother who is missing her son is ‘managed’ in a slightly different way. On the one hand, it becomes the symbol of ‘I do not forget’ that Panayiotou describes since the author places the missing son to be seen alive, in other words he is presented as a living hostage who will one day return home, but on the other hand, it becomes a symbol of bicommunal coexistence and integration since the missing GC son had been saved by a TC friend. In this way, the discourse of the sketch excludes the TC community from the representation of the barbarity that caused the

pain to the GC community.

As far as the imagined paradise that is created by this 1978 sketch is concerned, the components that are used to create the lost paradise this time are not elements of the Cypriot physical landscape as used in the 1966 sketch but elements of the Cypriot way of living. In this case, such elements are more important than a description of a physical environment, that could be identified with any Mediterranean landscape, since they create an identity which is solidly Cypriot and could not be ethnically identified as 'Turkish or Greek. That is why I suggest that Avraamidou is using a discourse in her sketches that promotes an alternative 'imagination' for the GCs, that of *Cypriotism*. The components that Avraamidou emphasises in her sketch are the cultural elements that Mavrastas calls "*sui generis* characteristics – of *Cypriotism* – that differentiate the GCs and TCs from the Greeks and the 'Turks and create a common ground between the two communities of the island" (1998, p.86). They are the integration elements that Smith suggests that the civic-territorial model of nationalism puts forward in order to develop a new political community (1991, p.82).

A sketch broadcast on 11th March 1979 could be considered as the author's suggestion for the ideal model of reunification of the two communities. The author is using the story of the two young men, a GC and a TC soldier – who lives in the house of the first – to communicate to the audience the need to re-enhance the trust and reliance on the other community that existed before the separation. The protagonists of this story appear to see the separation as a temporary situation that is unpleasant, to some extent, but at the same time at least for the GC protagonist the fact that his house is inhabited by TCs offers him a feeling of relief since he considers that his property is in safe hands. Avraamidou places her protagonists in the position of depending on each other's help and to be willing to offer their help in order to minimise each other's life's difficulties. Therefore, the title of the sketch, *Our Cyprus would have been a paradise* refers again to the lost paradise of the common past. The author almost directs in this way the audience to think and behave similarly to the protagonists in order to rediscover the lost paradise of Cyprus.

The rituals enacted by Avraamidou's 1970s sketches represent/reproduce both the 'missing persons' and the loss of the properties issues overlooking their traumatic aspect and focusing on the mutual aid and friendship that existed between the two communities even in such complicated circumstances. For example, in the 1978 sketch the TC protagonist describes to the GC missing person's mother and wife how he and other TCs helped the

GC protagonist to survive during the conflict. Similarly, in the 1979 sketch, when the TC soldier finds the jewellery box in the house of the GC soldier and returns it to him. In the 1978 sketch, the author draws attention to the similarities of the two protagonists, the GC and the TC mothers aiming to transmit to the audience the feeling of one *common* Cypriot identity. In order to stress this common Cypriot identity, Avraamidou, compares the quality of life in the two communities before and after 1974, before and after the separation. She idealises the common past in order to create in the present the feeling of nostalgia for the lost paradise. As a recent review of the Cypriot radio sketch mentions, in the 1970s and 1980s – the period of peak popularity for the sketches – this nostalgic element for the pre-1974 life has been more intense possibly due to the fact that people had been “violently urbanised” after they were forced to abandon their villages to live in the cities after the invasion (Photiou, 2010, p.6). Thus this idealisation of the common past that exists in this sketch, emphasises and gives different meaning to the definitions of *we* and *other*. The *love* that is mentioned in the title refers to the love that existed and needs to be re-enhanced between the TCs and the GCs; thus, *we* is clearly defined as the Cypriots, including both communities, whose peaceful coexistence was interfered with by the *other* that is referred to in the sketch as *i kseni*, meaning the foreigners. It is not clearly defined who these foreigners are, leaving the audience to make their own assumptions of the *other*. If we place the sketch in its historical context, November 1978, we realise that in the audience’s minds the *other* is referred to as all the external powers that spread nationalism in the island both in the past and present.

In 2003, with the easing of restrictions of free movement across the Green Line, many GCs who visited their houses found their personal belongings – kept and protected by the present residents of the house – in the state they left them in 1974 (Demetriou, 2007). It is remarkable that this idea, that the TC residents of the house would protect the personal belongings of the GC owners of the house as they felt that this situation was temporary; it existed in 1979 and it has been somehow been validated in 2003.

However, this less ethnically defined nationalistic discourse that Mavratsas suggests existed in the GC public sphere after 1974 was not something solid and stable as far as the media are concerned. When looking at the front-page of a randomly selected issue of *Harangi* (4 November 1981) for example, the discourse does not seem to be less conflicting. The leading article refers to Denktash’s statements about the demographics of the TC population. The headline goes like this:

81.12% and 18.88% The demographic proportion of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Inaccurate statements from Denktash (*Haravi*, 4 November 1981).

The article continues then by saying that the GC Government's Spokesman rejected the day before Denktash's arguments, that the TCs constitute 24% – excluding the settlers – of the population of Cyprus. So, the attention in this discourse is again drawn to the gap that existed between the ideas of the two communities. Even though *Haravi* as a leftist newspaper appeared often to adopt a more reproaching discourse, it seems that during that period – at least – this was not something stable.

6.2.3.2. Media rituals in moments of nationalistic tensions 1990s

In the 1990s the discourse used by the GC Right had become dominant in the GC public sphere due to the fact that during that decade the right wing party, *DISY*, held the Presidency. What I want to suggest is that during this period the discourse became ideological, meaning on the one hand that *DISY*'s discourse which was often nationalistic became dominant and on the other that *AKEL*'s reapproaching discourse became more stable. In order to analyse this further I will focus on sample press descriptions of the 1996 conflict events where two GCs were killed. Samples from three newspapers will be taken this time in order to include *Fileleftheros*¹⁷⁰ – in addition to the ones expressing the GC Right *Simerini* and Left *Haravi* – a newspaper generally considered to express a neutral voice.

The first incident of conflict, where Tasos Isaak was killed, took place in the context of a demonstration against Turkish occupation organised by GC motorbikers on 12th August 1996 in Derhynia.¹⁷¹ The second incident occurred again in Derhynia on 17th August 1996 – the day of Isaak's funeral – when his cousin Solomos Solomou was shot after attempting to put down the Turkish flag at Derhynia crossing point.

¹⁷⁰ *Fileleftheros* is considered to express a neutral voice in the sense that it is not a partisan/party newspaper. It has been created, as an attempt to provide a voice that did not express neither the right nor the left-wing party. It expressed the voice of Makarios in its early years. For more information about *Fileleftheros* see Appendix B.

¹⁷¹ *Derhynia* is a village at the east side of Cyprus, 2km south of the ghost city of *Famagusta*.

Simerini has the following titles in its front-page on 12th August: “Humiliated... disgraced once again”, “Like this they finished off Tasos”, “TCs were hitting him with rocks and wooden bars for 15 minutes”. On 17th August its front-page titles are: “Worthy!... Immortal!...”, “Greece leaned on Solakis¹⁷² coffin”, “Cypriots burned the Turkish flag yesterday”, “The Turks are alert in Ahna”.

Simerini’s leading articles on those two dates mention:

The motor cyclers were humiliated, the Republic was disgraced and the Turkish barbarity struck once again. A 24-year old young man from Paralimni, was lynched and finished off in the most barbarian way by an ordered TC herd, amplified with settlers, TC “policemen” and Attila¹⁷³ (12 August 1996).

Worthy, immortal. The soil of Paralimni received yesterday its second stout-hearted man, Solomos Spyrou Solomou, that the barbarian invaders unmanly shot, when trying to climb on the flagpole in order to put down the Turkish flag, the symbol of occupation (17 August 1996).

Haravi had as a front-page headline on 12th August: “Tragic ending- [of] tragic handlings. A 24 year was murdered in the dead zone”. The main article of that day included:

The dead zone at Derhynia was dyed in blood, writing this way the sad ending for yesterday’s motor cyclists’ demonstration against occupation. A demonstration that was marked by faulty handlings, sketchiness and irresponsibility, from those who until yesterday morning they were either in silence or they were prompting people to invade in the occupied areas and reach Kerynia. 24-year Tasos Isaak passed away, beaten to death from Turkish soldiers and settlers brought by Denktash. The unlucky young man that reached the barbed wire was lynched with profound violence by the occupation forces (*Haravi*, 12 August 1996).

Fileleftheros on the other hand includes this headline in its front-page on 12th August: “The demonstration was cancelled – the carnage happened and the Barbarians are unpunished murderers”. Then the leading article continues like this:

¹⁷² Nickname for Solomos.

¹⁷³ “Attila” has been metaphorically used in the GC discourse to express the cruelty and the rapacity in which the other side – without separating Turkish Cypriots and Turks most of the times – acted against the GC side. This meaning derives from the historical reference of Attila, the emperor of the Hun, known in Western Europe for his cruelty and rapacity in which he marched to stretch his empire.

24-year old Tasos Isaak was yesterday the victim of a profound atrocity but also of a demonstration against the occupation that was on one hand cancelled, but on the other hand could not be prevented and developed into the bloodiest conflict with Attila after 1974. In front of the passive eyes of UN forces men and with the total support of the Turkish occupation army (which also used guns) and with pseudo-policemen's help, thousands of Turks excellently organised, armed with clubs, hunting guns and rocks were invading the dead zone in groups, where they proceeded in heavy insults. At one moment after isolating three GC demonstrators, with profound violence they literally smashed one's head (*Fileleftheros*, 12 August 1996).

These events were no doubt tragic and the consequences of the demonstration were of course unfortunate especially for the GC community; thus a tragic tempo is expected in all the above articles. Despite this however, an initial observation when comparing the language used in the articles is that *Simerini* and *Fileleftheros* use two common characterisations for those who were opposed to the GC demonstrators, “barbarians” and “Attilas”, characterisations that is important to state are absent in *Harangi*'s article. There is a slight difference though between the uses of those words by the two newspapers. In *Simerini*'s case these words are used to define the TCs since they are used to either characterise or to replace – the only clearly mentioned opposite to the GCs – the subject “TCs”. In the case of *Fileleftheros*, the characterisations are not clearly referred to the TCs rather than to the undefined “Turks”. *Harangi* on the other hand, not only avoids the reference to such characterisations but also avoids giving any ethnic definition to the referred subjects. The only ethnic characterisation made by *Harangi* is when referred to the army and one could suggest that this is an additional attempt to embed in the minds of its GC readers a clear and distinctive delineation of the “baddie” that excludes the TCs. Furthermore, both *Simerini* and *Fileleftheros* in their front-page titles and articles give detailed information about the 12th August killing which draws attention to the ‘outrageous crime’ committed towards the GCs in contrast to *Harangi*'s article which focuses on the responsibilities of those who could prevent this conflict, meaning mainly the GC government. Despite the fact that *Harangi*'s focus could be purposed in order to express *AKEL*'s oppositional politics, the fact that at the same time it functioned as an alternative discourse that even in times of conflict did not intensify the gap between the two Cypriot communities could not be ignored. Additionally, even though during that period *Fileleftheros*, which is considered to express a neutral voice, seems to adopt a similar discourse to the one expressed by *Simerini*; it does not include as much ‘flagging’ as *Simerini*. One could suggest that *Fileleftheros* is flagging when it connotatively creates the image of the GC hero by describing in detail his suffering by the enemy in order to make the hero greater and the enemy beastlier. But *Simerini* makes even a step further; its ‘flagging’ is

direct and very intense in titles such as “Greece leaned on Solakis’s coffin” (*Simerini*, 17 August 1996).

But was this flagging in the two newspapers – *Simerini* and *Fileleftheros* – similar and stable in their discourses on a daily basis during the 1990s? A way to find out is by examining once again the front-pages of these newspapers on a randomly chosen date (4 November 1999). *Simerini*’s leading article is entitled “New Ordeal” and refers to the problems confronted in the procedure of “missing persons” identification. According to the article the fact that the body of the missing person Zinonas Zinonos had been identified the day before but was not expected to be in the mass graves that had been recently opened causes shock but also “places the procedure in danger and most importantly this could be used in advantage of Turkey”.

Fileleftheros’ leading article refers to the U.N. initiatives for solution of the Cyprus problem through the headlines “Dialogue with artificial respiration. The General Secretary of UN prepares his invitations and report”. “Weston’s tour for Turkish candidature. Denktash was cruel in his meeting with Bandler”.

The story of the previous day’s identification of Zinonos’ body is also included in its leading articles but what draws the attention is the different focus in *Fileleftheros*’ discourse. *Fileleftheros* covers the story by focusing exclusively on its dramatic aspect and not mentioning at all the complications of the procedure followed for the identification. On the contrary, *Fileleftheros* highlights the suffering of the mother of Zinonas in an attempt, as I want to suggest, to intensify the national consciousness. The headline and the caption of the picture which accompanies the article are indicative of this attempt. The headline is: “A mother’s Golgotha. 25 years of agony for the missing son. It doesn’t matter, I am proud of him, the country is worth it”. And the picture’s caption:

Eleni Zinonos [the mother] bended in front of the sight of her son’s body, the mother who for more than 25 years did not know what happened to her child. In her pain though she stated: “It doesn’t matter, I am proud of him, the country is worth it”. She added that at that difficult moment in the Institute of Neurology and Genetics she did not see a dead body but her son, as she last saw him wearing his military clothes. (*Fileleftheros*, 4 November 1999).

Thus when comparing the discourses of these two newspapers in this randomly selected date the observation is quite different to the previous one; *Fileleftheros* seems to adopt a more nationalistic discourse than *Simerini* even though one would expect the opposite since the latter is a newspaper which expresses the rightist ideology.

6.2.4. Representing bicomunal relations in the ‘free movement measures’ era

In 2003, after 29 years of complete physical separation, the Cypriots of the two major communities had the chance to have face-to-face meetings again. This of course was a fact that undoubtedly created a new reality with which on the one hand, the media had to represent and on the other, the people had to interpret. What becomes more interesting though, in terms of the way this new reality had to be represented by the GC media, is that because of the greatness of the event the majority of people have been active participants in this new reality. People of the two communities crossed the other side and/or had face-to-face communication/encounters with the other community, which made the media’s, until now, established role of mediating their in-between relationship and representing ‘society’s centre’, ambivalent.

6.2.4.1. Media Rituals of the ‘free movement measures’: The breakdown of the “myth of the mediated centre” 2003

As expected, the partial opening of the crossing points on 23rd April 2003 was extensively covered by the GC press. For purposes of continuity the same three newspapers, i.e. *Simerini*, *Haravgi* and *Fileleftheros*, will be examined on the day of the opening and one day before and after the opening.

On 22nd April both *Simerini* and *Haravgi* seem to present the decision of the TC leader, Denktash, in a similar way: as a new ‘trick’ of the Turkish politics. *Simerini* has as a title in its front-page: “New artifices of Denktash: He announces unilateral measures of GC’s and TC’s movement between occupied and free areas” (*Simerini*, 22 April 2003). *Haravgi*’s title on the same date is “Denktash’s craftiness. National Council: The decision of the occupation regime is illegal” (*Haravgi*, 22 April 2003). Both newspapers’ titles express a

feeling of disbelief for the actual application of such decision, a fear for what Demetriou calls as “the leap into the existence of a new subjectivity” (2007, p.994). Even though *Fileleftheros* also highlights that the event is a decision of Denktash, implying this way some degree of disbelief, that day’s title is more explicit saying: “Denktash opens the ‘borders’. From tomorrow Wednesday said Serdar”¹⁷⁴ (*Fileleftheros*, 22 April 2003).

The next day’s front-page titles illustrate even better this panic status which entered the GC public sphere during that time. On the actual day of the opening *Simerini* has as a title in its front-page: “Extortion for recognition. Denktash: The measures of movement target the good proximity between the ‘two states’” (*Simerini*, 23 April 2003). More titles of *Simerini*’s inside pages are: “Open danger of chaos. Denktash plays games with the confidence building measures” and “Tourists at our homes” (*Simerini*, 23 April 2003). *Haravi*’s titles on 23rd April are: “The TC press is referring to a new manoeuvre of Denktash. The occupation regime decided to raise the prohibitions of movement from and to the occupied areas”, “Denktash: ‘The states have the right to take decisions regarding their neighbours’”, “Y. Omirou:¹⁷⁵ ‘Move of impression from the occupation regime’” and “The European Union makes no comment for Denktash’s announcements” (*Haravi*, 23 April 2003). Finally *Fileleftheros* comes with the following headlines on its front-page: “Fears for provocation. Government: The TCs are free to come but with security measures” (*Fileleftheros*, 23 April 2003). On that day all three newspapers seem to adopt the discourse of the danger of recognition which might be the result of the free movement. In order to make this danger look greater *Simerini* and *Haravi* even use Denktash’s statement for a measure that will create a better proximity between the ‘two states’.

What I am trying to suggest again with the analysis of these headlines is that in most of the historical moments in Cyprus, which are discussed in this chapter, the hegemonic discourse – meaning the one which was dominant in each period examined – expressed by the newspapers is an ideological one. In other words, in specific historical moments in Cyprus the newspapers’ discourse is not simply a discourse of sensationalism in order to produce news and encourage sales but a discourse which tries to territorialise GCs’ reality. In this

¹⁷⁴ Serdar Dentkash is the son of that period’s TC leader, Rauf Denktash.

¹⁷⁵ Yiannakis Omirou is the president of *EDEK*, a centre-left social-democratic GC political party.

specific historical context – the period of the opening of the crossing points – the ideological discourse is even more obvious. As it appears in the headlines above, all three newspapers despite their different political stance at this particular moment, adopt the same discourse about the actions of the political leaders of the other community. Thus, their discourse even though characterised by a sensationalism aiming to increase the sales over competitors at the same time it also moves beyond the discourse of competitive journalism to an ideological discourse. This can be explained by the fact that until that point the newspapers in the GC public sphere have been producing rituals that maintained the idea of intolerance of the TC side and so they attempted to do so in this case. Demetriou (2007, p.989) argues that the opening of the crossing point event produced a different kind of temporality beyond the historical one, which changed the political subjectivity in Cyprus. This new temporality also forces the newspapers' discourse to alter their rituals in order to compromise with this new subjectivity. The breakdown of the media rituals in front of this new temporality will be discussed further when examining the television news reports on the opening event, but the headlines discussed in this section are illustrative of the 'struggle' of the newspapers to resist compromising with the new subjectivity.

On 24th April 2003, one day after the opening of the crossing points, *Simerini* has as a front-page headline, "With passports to our homes. Government's 'No' to Denktash's travel documentations" and other titles in inside pages: "The TCs want to re-enter the Republic of Cyprus. They are asking for identification, birth certificates and passports" and "Where are you going? Tourists at your homes?" (*Simerini*, 24 April 2003). *Haravgi* comes with the headlines "The solution is what we are asking for", "Yesterday's impenetrability. Mass arrivals of TCs and increased visits of GC to the occupied areas", "The wall did not fall" (*Haravgi*, 24 April 2003) in its front-page. *Haravgi* also includes the following titles in its inside pages: "TCs came to see friends...", " 'Freedom at last', was shouting a TC" and "They [referring to the Pancyprian Movement of Citizens] are warning for Denktash's trap" (*Haravgi*, 24 April 2003). *Fileleftheros*' titles are: "Denktash asks for a 'Visa' too now", "We are coming back Pentadaktyle,¹⁷⁶ [hold on] a little bit more", "Four thousands got in and out" and "They [TCs] took breath of freedom" (*Fileleftheros*, 24 April 2003).

¹⁷⁶ *Pentadaktyle* is the northernmost mountain of Cyprus.

A significant observation in relation to the above is that the two first newspapers use a discourse that focuses mainly on the TCs crossing in order to undermine GCs' experience of free movement. Both *Simerini* and *Harangi* describe the desires and feelings of the TCs' crossing. *Simerini*'s title has a dual function. On the one hand, it expresses the desire of the TCs to belong to the Republic of Cyprus showing this way their recognition of the legitimised state and on the other hand it implies their intention to make use of their rights as Cypriot citizens without the GC desired solution. *Harangi*'s headlines and titles also have a similar dual function expressed in a different way when on the one hand it refers to the mass arrivals of TC and "increased visits of GCs" and that the "TCs came to see friends..." implying that they want a solution as the 'we' the GCs do but on the other it reminds its readers that their desire should be the solution and that this measure could be dangerous. At the same time, *Harangi*'s focus on the TCs' movement and not the GCs' one, indicates the TCs' preference towards the Republic of Cyprus instead of the North's Republic, implying this way that the desired solution is the same for the people of both communities. *Fileleftheros*' discourse does not differ much but it does include a title which gives an explicit picture of the number of people from both communities who crossed. Despite this however, *Fileleftheros*' discourse also suggests that the GCs should not cross since it gives recognition to the Republic of the North and that the TCs were always welcome to this side by 'us' the GCs but the Turkish occupation forces prohibited their movement.

Thus all three newspapers, adopt a similar discourse which I define as ideological, in the sense that their discourse aims beyond the production of news, but they come together sharing the same ideology and producing rituals that territorialise their readers' reality.

Let us see now how the GC public television channel, *CyBC*, covered the partial opening of the barricades. For this purpose, the reports of the five first days of the opening will be examined. These reports have been broadcast in the news bulletins of *CyBC* with the title "The wall cracks" and have duration of approximately five minutes¹⁷⁷ each. As mentioned

¹⁷⁷ It should be mentioned here that these reports constitute only one part of *CyBC*'s coverage of the opening of the crossing points event. The coverage also included brief discussions in-between the reports with guests – mainly politicians – at the studio, or over the phone, during the news bulletin. These however, are not available for analysis since *CyBC* archives only the reports that are broadcast in a news bulletin and not the news bulletin per se.

more extensively in the methodology chapter, this broadcast footage will be seen in relation to the media ritual theory (Couldry, 2003b) in order to provide a case study in which “the myth of the mediated centre” breaks.

On 23rd April 2003, the opening of the barricade was received as a shocking experience for the GC community.¹⁷⁸ For most of the people this was firstly a ‘mediated’ experience rather than an immediate one since the news of the TC leader’s decision, Denktash, to open some of the barricades was broadcast and reached the GCs through their television sets.

Even though the information about Denktash’s plan to announce measures regarding the free movement of the two communities across the Green line reached the GCs through media almost a month before their actual application, the realisation of those measures was a massive surprise for the GCs. Demetriou (2007, p.994), argues that this feeling of surprise was caused by what she calls “the moment a new subjectivity leapt into existence”, in other words by the moment in which something that was once impossible gets realised due to the collapsing of limits of possibility that existed until then.¹⁷⁹

Now what I want to suggest with this case study, is that those limits that collapsed in that “momentous leap” that Demetriou describes, had not been caused only by the physical obstruction of free movement that resulted from the 1974 conflict, but that they have been enhanced or transformed into limits of a subjectivity that the GC media presented as ‘the reality’; limits that collapsed at one level when the physical obstructions had collapsed and on another level when the “myth of the mediated centre” had also collapsed and a new reality – which in fact was a “new subjectivity” – was realised by the GC viewers. The ‘reality’ that the GC media had constructed regarding the issue of free movement was the

¹⁷⁸ This was a shocking experience of course not exclusively for the GC community but also for the TC community but this case study focuses on how a GC TV channel covered the opening of the barricades and as a result focuses mainly on the experience of GC community.

¹⁷⁹ Even though what happened in Cyprus with the opening of some barricades in 2003, appears to be similar to events that took place in Germany in 1989, there are also significant differences. There was indeed a form of democratic movement and uprising in northern Cyprus like in GDR. Yet in Germany there was a clash of opposing systems in the context of cold war dynamics while the geopolitical and cultural context in Cyprus was different. In practical terms, the most interesting thing in 2003 were the GCs going to the north rather than simply the TCs coming to the south. Furthermore, the two Cypriot communities were divided by nationalism not by ideological confrontation; and in broader terms East Germany was helpless with the decline of the USSR while the TC regime could still rely in Turkey which was in transformation rather in crisis in that period.

one where something like this was impossible while the Cyprus problem remained unsolved. In other words, the possibility of free movement across the Green Line for the GCs would only come with the ‘demolishing’ of this Line, i.e. with the solution of the Cyprus problem. However, the hegemonic discourse of the GC public sphere, as we have seen in the previous section, presented the solution of the Cyprus problem as the unreachable desire of the GC community due to the unwillingness of the TC community to cooperate for a solution and live in peace with the GCs, making this way the solution – and consequently the free movement issue – look like something impossible or at least a possibility very far from the (current) reality. This subjectivity had been constructed and presented as the reality mainly because the public sphere of Cyprus had been segregated and the media became the basic mediator for the communication of the two communities. At least in the case of the GC community, which is the focus of this research, what Couldry describes as “the myth of the mediated centre” has been adopted; GCs adopted the belief that the media have a privileged relationship with the ‘centre of society’ and their natural role is to represent and frame this centre, i.e. the society’s values and way of life (2003b, p.45).

In the television reports that are the examples analysed in this section, the collapsing of the “myth of the mediated centre” has been possible firstly because the medium of television made possible the transmission of the image – in its literal meaning – of the TC community as it had not been presented before by the GC hegemonic discourse. My intention here of course is not to exaggerate the dynamic of the technology of television as a medium since the transmission was made possible not simply because of the dynamic of the medium but also because of the dynamic of the event itself – that is the collapsing of the physical barrier. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the same powerful event was also presented by the GC press – at least in the first days of the opening – using a discourse that did not focus on the other community but on the possible ‘evil’ plans that might be behind the measures of Denktash. In the case of these television reports though, even if the editorial policy of the channel was again to make as a central point of the report the possible ‘evil’ plans of Denktash, this was not successful due to the powerful image that had been transmitted. When I say powerful image here I do not refer to the advantages of the television’s moving image in comparison to the still image of the press, but to the more complete/live idea of the *other* that was transmitted for the first time.

Specifically, in the report that *CyBC* broadcast on the second day of the barricades' opening, the reporter emphasises the discomfort of the people who tried to cross to the other side – and especially the TCs' discomfort – caused by the slow working process of the TC authorities. The *CyBC* reporter mentions:

The 'pseudo-state's' services have been today too insufficiently staffed which resulted in the creation of endless queues of people and cars. [...] Hundreds of TCs have suffered for hours while the occupying authorities' administrative process was very slow. [...] Showing passports, stamping, paying five pounds insurance cover for big cars, four pounds cover for small cars, discomfort...

The highlighting points of the above extract imply that the TC authorities – intentionally or not – caused discomfort even in a happy event as this one. However, the report includes many messages of hope that derived mainly from people's statements – of both communities – but expanded in the reporter's comments too. In other words, even if the attempt of that report was – through the warnings, innuendo and the tone of the reporter's voice – to create suspicion regarding the 'real' intentions of the other side, the report could not stop there since it had to include images,¹⁸⁰ accompanied with statements that transmitted a positive image for the people of the other community – something that could not be transmitted in the case of the newspaper report. The television report includes 4 statements of 3 TCs and 3 statements of 3 GCs. Even though all 7 statements are characterised by positive feelings about the opening of the crossing points and about the other community I would like to draw attention to one of the statements made by one of the TCs interviewed. She says:

What we lived yesterday and what we saw yesterday is different; there are feelings of deep friendship and I believe that we could live together. I'm very happy and pleased about this.

This statement is significant for two reasons. First, because a TC states that what she saw and experienced on the other side is different from what she thought until then, implying that her real experience differed from the 'reality' constructed by those who until now had the role of the mediator in the communication process of the two communities – and I would also suggest this includes others beside the media like the politicians and the

¹⁸⁰ Even though television images could still be edited, since the coverage to which I refer to was not live, the moving image in combination with the statements exposed GCs to an 'alive version' of *the other* that allowed space for different interpretations than the ones imposed from the until now mediated information to which they were exposed.

education system. This could suggest the message to the GC community that the TC authorities constructed a different reality for the TCs, but at the same time it is a statement that presents to the GC viewers a more humanised image of the ‘other’ that was missing from the hegemonic discourse of the GC public sphere. An image of a human being that is characterised by positive feelings and desires close to the ones of the GCs, an image which came to validate possible nostalgic memories of coexistence for the eldest viewers and to collapse the existing stereotypes of the evil enemy for the younger viewers.

Demetriou argues the events prior to the opening of the barricades did not justify the fact that the opening caused such a feeling of surprise to the GCs but, as she explains, “the fact that it was [surprising] shows that there was no way in which it could have properly been understood other than as a totally shocking event” (2007, p.995). Before attempting to explain what Demetriou means by this, I want to illustrate this surprising feeling with the statement of a GC who was queuing to cross to the north as presented in the *CyBC* report of the third day of the opening (26 April 2003). She says:

This is something much too surprising and of course we are shocked, we are very anxious; yes [is because of] the suddenness, the unpreparedness; [something] that you think that will never happen ... suddenly they tell you that you can go and see your house and personally all these years I didn’t want to go at all. Now I have an enormous desire to go here.

In the context of Demetriou’s comment, the above statement suggests that the GCs were in shock at the opening event because the constructed reality that they used to live in did not include the possibility of such an event. The contradiction in the GC crosser’s two last phrases “personally all these years I didn’t want to go at all. Now I have an enormous desire to go there” could be explained by the fact that ‘the reality’ in which she used to live in with the physical and mental limits of possibilities ‘imposed’ her not to want to go to the other side so the collapsing of those limits and the confrontation with a ‘new reality’ caused the shock and allowed her desire to be transformed.

Another statement in the report of the fifth day of a GC who crossed to visit Kerynia is worth noting. It goes like this:

What happens today is unbelievable and I think it proves that they wrongly kept us [GCs and TCs] apart for about 30 and so years and I think it is time for this place [Cyprus] to get reunited.

This statement is significant for three reasons: One, because it expresses again the shock of the GCs in their attempt to interpret the opening event; two, because it indicates the

realisation that the reality in which the two communities used to live in while they were separated was something constructed when the GC crosser says “it proves that wrongly they kept us apart for 30 and so years” and third because it is an alternative discourse which implies that the suffering of the GC community was not caused by the ‘other’ – the TC community – but by ‘them’, “they kept us apart” as the GC stated.

The quotes included in this section are examples of the ‘non-institutionalised’ experience that the GCs had with the realisation of the free movement measure. As Demetriou contends, “concepts like ‘country’ and ‘authorities’ as discursive tools of subjection were suspended” (2007, p.996) during the period of the opening of the barricades due to the fact that the state was absent. Taking Demetriou’s argument further, I would include the media’s role in the absence or presence of the state in a society since according to Couldry’s “myth of the mediated centre” the media are supposed to have the representative role of the ‘centre’, be it the state or other structure of power that the media attempt to legitimise. In other words, during that period the state or other structures of power that assigned meaning into the concepts like the ones Demetriou mentions were absent because the media – at least the majority of them – were unable to legitimise their discourses.

When Demetriou writes about the absence of the state she means that the state did not do what it usually does, that is to territorialise. “Territorialisation” is a psychoanalytical term coined by Lacan, and in its strict sense it means the process in which the mother through breast-feeding maps the infant’s erogenous zones (Holland, 1999, p.19). However, I refer to the meaning of the term given when its reversed term, ‘deterritorialisation’, was firstly metaphorically used in the social register by Deleuze and Guattari to “define the freeing of labor-power from specific means of production” (ibid) and then referred by Couldry in his attempt to provide post-structuralist positions against social order (2003b, pp.10-11). When the barricades opened in Cyprus in 2003, the state was absent in the sense that a GC’s crossing to the other side was outside the actions mapped as possible by the authority, outside the one territorialised by the state. Now my suggestion for the role of the media and specifically the role of television in the collapsing of the “myth of the mediated centre” and the de-territorialisation process is identifiable in the reports of *CyBC* even when in the following days after the opening of the barricades “the state re-emerged” as Demetriou contends (2007, p.997) and attempts to re-territorialise the event, people’s actions and statements – like the previously mentioned quote – as broadcast by *CyBC* forced it to remain outside the territorialised ones.

The re-territorialisation had been attempted when the GC government on the one hand allowed the people to decide ‘freely’ whether to cross or not, but on the other hand moved further in moralising the crossings by making clear to GCs the acceptable and unacceptable reasons to cross. As Demetriou describes, this moralisation process has been well represented by the GC media and this is also evident in the press examples analysed in the previous section. However, I want to suggest that the medium of television constitutes some kind of exemption from that representation since in the television reports considered here, the moralisation process had been least attempted in comparison to the one attempted by the press and it had not been that successful. That is, in contrast to the press reports, the attempt for moralisation appears in the television report of Day 3 of the opening but until Day 5 it seems to gradually draw back. This moralisation/re-territorialisation process can be identified in the television report of Day 3 when in contrast to the ones of Days 1 and 2, no interviews/statements from TCs who attempted to cross to the South are included and it focuses exclusively on how the TC authorities intricately – deliberately as the report implies – the desire of the GCs to cross in order to visit their homeland in the north.

On the 5th day of the opening however, while the newspapers continued the re-territorialisation process, the television reports seem to draw back from that process and do not represent the authority successfully. The sample from the reports of the 5th day of the opening which follows, implies the ‘failure’ of the medium of television in this ‘moment of leap’ to represent successfully ‘the centre’, to re-territorialise through the moralisation of the crossings. The journalist’s commentary in that day’s report goes like this:

The solution did not arrive yet but the signs of the last few days spread optimism [...] During a walk at Kerynia’s port nobody is able to designate who is a Greek and who is a TC, there is no discomfort at all. On the contrary, the myth of the unfeasibility of coexistence collapses since everyone, young and older feel the wind of the new era.

The words of the reporter express nothing that could be considered as an attempt to moralise the crossings. For the myth of the mediated centre to be valid here the sample should have included some sort of moralisation comments that it does not, indicating this way that through the medium of television the myth collapses – or at least is under a crisis. On the contrary, instead of moralising comments, the message that derives from the reporter’s words is that with the crossings the idea about the impossibility of a peaceful coexistence of the two communities is proving unreal, it is nothing but a myth. It is interesting that the reporter refers directly to this myth that was created and maintained in

the hegemonic GC public sphere without though referring to its ‘creators’ or ‘maintainers’. The GC newspaper *Fileleftheros*, also made an analogous comment on the same day, 28/04/2003, by writing “proving Denktash wrong that GCs and TCs cannot live together”. The difference however between the comment of the press report and the one of the television is that the newspaper reporter charges Denktash with the responsibility of that myth, mapping once again this way the reality for the GCs when the television reporter on the contrary leaves the viewers to decide who to charge with the responsibilities for the creation of this myth.

6.2.4.2. Media rituals of T. Papadopoulos’ live broadcast proclamation: A media event as a re-territorialising process 2004

The proclamation as a text

In this section, Papadopoulos’ – the elected president of the Republic of Cyprus during the Annan Plan referenda¹⁸¹ period – proclamation will be analysed as a text. The text of the proclamation is dominated by pronouns that constitute the ‘us and them’ “deixis” (Billig, 1995), the necessary “vehicle to imagining the nation”, as Madianou states in a case study of banal nationalism in a similar Greek context (2005a, p.79). The pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our’ are used in the political and media context as deictic words that suggest not only the speaker and the audience but their meaning expands to a whole community or a nation (Billig, 1995; Madianou, 2005a).

In the case of the proclamation, the deictic words ‘we’ and ‘our’ are intensively used to differentiate the GCs from the ‘other’, ‘them’ which are mainly used to refer to the Turks but in some cases are even used for the TCs too. The two extracts that follow indicate how the ‘other’ gets different definitions in the proclamation in order to make the ‘deictic’ words ‘we’ and ‘our’ imply different identity each time.

[Extract 1:]

We submitted consensus proposals which served the interests of both sides. *We* reserved the right to raise further demands regarding the territorial issue, the property issue and the return of displaced persons if *the other side* raised such matters. As it happened the *TC side* raised such issues and *our* side, through documents, raised its own counter demands so much for the

¹⁸¹ For more details on the Annan Plan referenda see Chapter 4.

territorial aspect as for the rights of displaced persons and property rights (Papadopoulos' proclamation 7th April 2004, p.2).

[Extract 2:]

I want to stress that all *our* demands, which were fully documented were within the parameters of the Annan plan and did not take away rights that the Annan plan provided to *our* TC compatriots. In contrast, the *Turkish side* (and I say the *Turkish side* and not the TC¹⁸² [side]) submitted eleven demands which affect negatively the interests of the GCs and which have all been adopted in the final Annan plan (Papadopoulos' proclamation 7th April 2004, p.3).

In Extract 1, the 'deictic' pronouns are used to create the common identity of the GCs whose actions, demands and benefits differ from the ones of the TC side. In the case of Extract 2, with the parenthetical comment of Papadopoulos the pronoun 'our' implies a different identity – that of the compatriots – which is more inclusive to the TC side and opposes the Turkish side.

As Madianou contends, the 'we' and 'our' discourse is not used only to remind us who we are but also to tell us who we are not (2005, p.79). Thus, in the above two samples the different use of the pronouns are used to remind the viewers that 'we' are *not* the ones with the maximalistic demands that affect negatively and oppress the rights of the other community, in other words 'we' are not the ones who cause the injustice with our demands but 'we' are the ones who suffer from it.

The injustice feeling is intensified in the GC viewers by the use of extensive references to what the 'other' gains in comparison to 'us' like in the extract that follows:

The TC community gains all the basic demands it made, from the first day of the implementation of the solution. To be exact, 24 hours after the holding of the referenda. It remains uncertain and unclear, however, whether there will be a ratification of the Treaty by the Turkish Parliament, before the Foundation Agreement is implemented. Its entity as a "legal constituent state" is recognised. The invasion and occupation are written off. TC internal constituent state citizenship holders become accepted as legal citizens of the European Union. The TCs gain equal participation in the administration of the new Federal State, with the status of equal "co-presidents" and equivalent and equal participation of the representatives of the TC constituent state in the Council, the European Commission and all the special Committees and Institutions of the European Union.

In contrast, everything that the GC community is aspiring to achieve, even from a bad and painful solution, are postponed without guarantees and depend upon the good will of Turkey to fulfill the obligations it undertakes. They are also subject to the precondition that all will go well (Papadopoulos' proclamation 7th April 2004, p.3).

In the above extract Papadopoulos intensifies the sense of injustice and risk to the GC viewers by emphasising the comparison of what is gained by each side on two points, (a)

¹⁸² Papadopoulos' parenthetical comment is not included in the proclamation text as published by the Press and Information Office of Cyprus but can be heard when watching the broadcast proclamation video at [14:56].

the large amount of things the ‘other’ – meaning the TC community – gains in comparison to the small amount ‘we’ – meaning the GC community – gain and (b) the rapidness in which the ‘other’ – the TCs – gains everything in comparison to the slowness of ‘our’ – GC’s – gain that its implementation lies on Turkey’s ‘good will’.

The proclamation as a television broadcast piece

The focus in this section is the analysis of the proclamation of Papadopoulos as broadcast by the GC television channels.¹⁸³ The issues that will be emphasised here are mainly rituals produced in the context of media – in the context of the medium of television specifically – but not exclusively, since the specific time period of the Annan Plan proclamation and referenda also involved religious practices/services and symbolism for the GCs that cannot be overlooked. The proclamation as a public speech has long been a form of ritual since it signifies a moment of communication between the ‘leader’ and the people. This kind of proclamation/ritual has been known since the 1950s in Cyprus and the archetypal leader of this in the experience of GCs was Archbishop Makarios, *ethnarchi*¹⁸⁴ as he used to be called. Archbishop Makarios used proclamations very often as a way to communicate with people and was known for blending religious and political symbolism in the language used in his proclamations.

Regarding the context of religious symbolism that Papadopoulos’ proclamation involved, it is important to note here that, as mentioned before, the GCs consider themselves ‘good Christians’ and that they have a close relationship with the Church. According to Cyprobarometer 2007, a survey conducted in the Republic controlled areas, “96% of [Greek] Cypriots believe in God and eight in every ten participants consider that the church is not ‘out of fashion’” (Cyprobarometer 2007, p.13). Even though many of the TC participants expressed their belief that the GCs are fanatically religious in the same survey of Cyprusbarometer 2007, it seems that the average GC follows faithfully the rituals of her/his religion, i.e. attends/participates in church ceremonies like weddings, baptisms, funerals and holy liturgies during the festive periods of Christmas and Easter. Specifically,

¹⁸³ Papadopoulos’ proclamation was broadcast live by all the GC television channels.

¹⁸⁴ *Ethnarchi* is a Greek word that means ‘nation’s leader’.

39% of the participants stated that they go to church only in some cases other than the ones mentioned above and only one in every five participants goes to church every Sunday (RAI Consultants, Cyprusbarometer, 2007, p.13). In other words, GCs are faithful to religious rituals, which are definitely an important element of a GC's identity. That is why the analysis that follows will begin by highlighting these religious rituals of the proclamation context.

The proclamation took place on a significant day for the GCs, the Wednesday before Easter, so the time had a symbolic significance. For the Eastern Orthodox Christians, like GCs, each day of the week before Easter – the Holy Week as it is called – represents a different stage of the period that Jesus entered Jerusalem until the day of his resurrection. Furthermore, Easter is part of the popular culture of the GCs in the sense that they get involved in religious practices even if they are not devout Christians or seculars. Hence, that Wednesday – 7th April 2004 – was the Holy Wednesday that represents the day that Judas went to the Sanhedrin to offer them his assistance in leading them to Jesus in exchange for thirty pieces of silver. In other words, that Wednesday is a day about guilt and shame, the day on which man betrayed the sacred. The GCs however, due to their involvement in Easter's religious practices, know that after this feeling of guilt and suffering the sacred overcomes death and the unpleasant feeling is replaced with the joy that comes with Jesus' resurrection.

My intention here of course, is not to critique the degree of GCs' religiosity but to highlight the connection between the religious rituals with the rituals produced by Papadopoulos' proclamation. The key element of that connection is the discourse of hope. When Papadopoulos for example closes his proclamation by wishing "Good Resurrection to everyone" the wish cannot be seen simply from a religious point of view. The wish for a "Good Resurrection" was for the GC viewers – that were agonisingly waiting for their President to advise them what was the right thing to do – is firstly a ritual that regards their social order and then their religious beliefs. In other words, the broadcasting of Papadopoulos' proclamation was a process of territorialisation, a media event that framed social reality for the GCs.

This hope that the suffering will end with resurrection that dominates the Christian religion has been used many times metaphorically to describe the suffering of Cyprus – and in many cases the GCs’ suffering exclusively – and to produce the hope of ‘freedom’¹⁸⁵ that the ‘resurrection’ of Cyprus will bring. Both politicians and the media are using this symbolism widely in the GC public sphere, even though it was more often used before the partial opening of the barricades in 2003 than today. For example, the current Minister of Education and Culture, mentions in his Easter public message¹⁸⁶ on 17/04/2008:

We hope and expect that the light of Resurrection and justice, will soon light up all of the planet’s people in pain, and also our country, that for 34 years now is carrying its own cross, due to the continued Turkish occupation in 34% of its land.

A similar message is expressed even in October (months before Easter) by Photiou, the Minister of Agriculture Natural Resources and Environment during the presidency of Papadopoulos, in his opening speech at a demonstration against Turkish occupation held on 14th October 2007. He ends his opening speech by saying:

Let the Golgotha of this 33-year occupation and lack of our basic human rights and freedoms end and [let] the desirable resurrection of our island come.

Sant Cassia refers to this metaphor of resurrection in the GC public sphere in his book “Bodies of Evidence: Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus” (2007). He illustrates how the missing persons’ families – especially the widows – have become a symbol of the suffering and pain that was waiting for the relief to come with the ‘return’ of their missing husbands and how this has been paralleled with Golgotha – the route of Christ’s suffering – and the expectation of his resurrection. Sant Cassia specifically writes about the speech of Morphou’s Mayor during a missing person’s memorial service:

¹⁸⁵ In the GC public discourse the Greek word *ελευθερία* in English, ‘freedom’ instead of the Greek word *ειρήνη* ‘peace’, has been largely used – at least before the partial opening of the barricades and the election of Christofias as president of the Republic of Cyprus – to describe the wish for a solution of the Cyprus problem. A word that denotes the type of solution that has been dominantly promoted in the GC public sphere, i.e. a solution that would set Cyprus and the GCs free from the Turkish troops and the Turkish Cypriots. On the contrary, the word ‘peace’ that is mainly being used now denotes a solution that includes both Cypriot communities.

¹⁸⁶ In the Republic of Cyprus it is common that the Minister of Education and Culture writes a message about every religious or national festivity to be read publicly in every public and private school of the Republic.

Christian symbolism was predominant. The Mayor of her [the widow's] town mentioned Golgotha, Crucifixion, black exile (*xenitia*), resurrection (*anastasi*), and freedom (*eleftherosi*) (2007, p.210).

Thus, the Easter period is definitely a period of intense ritual significance for the GCs both religiously and nationally. In addition to the significance of the Easter timing of the proclamation, the spatial context has also a significant symbolism for the rituals produced by the broadcasting of the proclamation. When the scene opens with a medium-long shot that lasts for one second Papadopoulos can be seen seated behind his office-table in the presidential palace. The scenery is recognisable to the GC viewers since the large window of the presidential palace is clearly identifiable in the background (Figure 1).

It is important to make a parenthesis at this point and make clear that usually in similar occasions – when the President of the Republic of Cyprus is addressing people from the Presidential Palace in this form of public broadcast speech/*diangelma* – the spatial background used is the Presidential Palace's library instead of the window (Figures 3 and 4). Now, the picture of that window is of great significance for the GC viewers – especially the older ones – since this same picture of the window is likely to have been saved in their minds when the presidential palace was burnt in an attempt to kill the President Archbishop Makarios during the coup d'état on 15th July 1974 (Figure 2).

Thus, having this window as a background¹⁸⁷ during Papadopoulos' proclamation, added to the feeling of solidarity that was created to the GC viewers by this media event. This feeling of solidarity was built around the symbolism of the window that in the viewers' memory was burnt when the demolition of the Republic of Cyprus was once attempted and was now exposed strong and solid symbolising the current status of the Republic - a status however that was again threatened with demolition with the acceptance of the Annan Plan.¹⁸⁸ Elements of a similar spatial symbolism were the two flags that were located

¹⁸⁷ The background could not be accidental but was probably chosen by the Papadopoulos' team since as Figure 3 and 4 show the background usually used for Presidents' public speeches is not the bombarded window.

¹⁸⁸ The framing of the proclamation was commented by the supporters of the Annan Plan. An example of this commentary is an article published on the 16th of April 2004 in the online news portal <typos.com.cy> which suggested that the framing of the proclamation aimed to awake the 'patriotic consciousness' like *ethnarchis* Makarios used to do.

in front of the window, that of the Republic of Cyprus and that of the European Union. One of the main arguments of the anti-Annan Plan supporters in the GC public sphere – including Papadopoulos – during the period of the referenda was the fact that the risks for the GCs would be less if Cyprus joined the European Union as the well established Republic of Cyprus rather than as the newly established federal state that would result from the Annan Plan. Papadopoulos specifically says in his proclamation:

We are called upon to abolish the Republic of Cyprus, the only foothold of our people and the guarantee of our historic character. Shall we do away with our internationally recognised state exactly at the very moment it strengthens its political weight, with its accession to the European Union? We have to assess seriously the dangers from a possible collapse of the new state of affairs, because the facts that will be created will be irreversible. Collapse of the Federal State would mathematically lead to what we all want to avoid: partition through the international recognition of the constituent states. (Papadopoulos' proclamation, 7th April 2004, p.7).

Thus, the two flags together with the window of the presidential palace that constituted the background setting of Papadopoulos proclamation was a spatial context full of symbolism that facilitated the purpose of the proclamation, designed to convince the GCs to reject the Annan Plan.

During the period of the Annan Plan, the GCs have been in a state of uncertainty in which they wanted to know what was the 'right' decision to take; they were in a state of power that they were not prepared for and did not know how to. The GCs had, for the first time in thirty years, the chance to have a solution to the Cyprus problem, to change their social and political reality. This situation (prior to the proclamation), is similar to what Demetriou, describes as a "structure of feeling" (Williams 1977, p.132 cited in Demetriou, 2007, p.994) based on Car pazano's notion of "Waiting". Even though Demetriou refers to this notion in relation to the situation that the Cypriots came into with the partial opening of the barricades in 2003, I suggest that it could be also applied to the case in which GCs had to take a decision for the Annan Plan. According to Car pazano, the notion of "Waiting" means:

to be oriented in time in a special way. It is directed toward the future – not an expansive future, however, but a constricted one that closes in on the present. In waiting, the present is always secondary to the future. It is held in expectation. It is filled with suspense ... In waiting, the present loses its focus in the now. The world in its immediacy slips away; it is derealized. It is without élan, vitality, creative force. It is numb, muted, dead. Its only meaning lies in the future – in the arrival or the non-arrival of the object of waiting (1985, p.44 cited in Demetriou, 2007, p.994).

Thus, while the GCs were 'waiting' for a solution they were living in a state of numbness

from which they were ‘violently’ taken out when the Annan Plan solution arrived and they had to make a decision. In the case that Demetriou describes, in 2003, the absence of the state that could territorialise this situation and frame what was the right thing for the GCs to do, as she argues led to a breakdown of the social order – de-territorialising state I would say – in which the people had to “re-establish the relations of the subjections” (2007, p.1002). I suggest that in the case of the Annan Plan situation, the broadcast proclamation of Papadopoulos was the ritual that came to prevent an analogous case to the 2003 situation for the GCs; it framed the current situation and territorialised their actions around it.



Figure 1. Snap shot of Papadopoulos’ proclamation video showing the background setting.



Figure 2. Snap shot of the bombarded presidential palace video showing the burnt window.



Figure 3. Snapshot of Christofias' proclamation video held on 30th September 2008.



Figure 4. Snapshot proclamation video of the former president Kyprianou in 1987.

6.2.5. Media rituals in the current situation of ‘normalcy’

In periods of normalcy – meaning in periods that are not characterised by ethnic or bicomunal tension – this ideological discourse of the press seems to be less present. When looking for example at the front-pages of *Fileleftheros*, *Simerini* and *Haravgi* on a randomly chosen date (4 November 2009) the Cyprus problem and/or bicomunal relations, even though still present, do not seem to demand much attention, and the journalistic competition of producing news becomes again the main aim of their discourses. The three newspapers for example compete with leading articles on different stories; the impact of economic crisis in Cyprus in the case of *Fileleftheros*, the existence of electronic casinos as a way to avoid the law of prohibiting the opening of casinos in southern Cyprus in the case of *Simerini* and the compensations given to those damaged by a recent tornado in the case of *Haravgi*. Out of the three leading articles only the *Simerini* one makes a reference to the other community through the argument that the way that the government handles the issue of casino prohibitions in the Republic of Cyprus causes economic damage since it pushes both the tourists who visit the island and the GCs to visit the northern part of the island where the casinos are not prohibited. It is important however to note that criticism of the actions of the government is expected from *Simerini* since it is a rightist voice newspaper, and a leftist government had been in power since 2008. Thus, *Simerini*’s coverage of the casino story should be interpreted as an oppositional criticism towards the government rather than as nationalistic one per se. Despite this however, the fact that a socioeconomic issue like the prohibition of casinos is connected with the Cyprus problem cannot be ignored either. Some sort of flagging still exists in *Simerini*’s discourse which I suggest produces rituals in order to territorialise the readers’ reality when writing:

[W]hoever wants can pass without any problem to the occupied areas and practise on gambling without being stopped by anyone. As mentioned yesterday at the meeting of the Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives, tourists can spend their holidays in the occupied areas because they want to gamble in the casinos and as a result the tourist industry loses significant amounts of money. And the GCs though who cross to the occupied areas to gamble leave behind them not less significant amounts of money (*Simerini*, 4 November 2009).

Nevertheless, the articles which refer directly to the Cyprus problem seem to ask for less attention in all three newspapers since both their position on the front-page and their

discourse are less prominent. *Simerini* has two articles that refer directly to the Cyprus problem: one about Ghali's¹⁸⁹ recent statements on the Cyprus problem and one referring on Averof's¹⁹⁰ proposal of Cyprus' partition in 1956. *Harangi* also includes an article about Ghali's statements and an additional article about the negotiations progress between the two communities' leaders on the properties issue and finally *Fileleftheros* refers only to Talat's Plans B and C about the solution of two states.

¹⁸⁹ Boutros-Ghali was a UN Secretary General between 1992-1996.

¹⁹⁰ Evangelos Averof was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece in the 1950s and according to the article during the EOKA struggle in Cyprus he proposed the partition of Cyprus as the only solution.

6.3. Concluding note

The analysis developed in Chapter 5, suggested that through face-to-face communication the GCs break the stereotypes they adopted – subconsciously as their comments indicated – during the period of separation. Building on those suggestions, the analysis of this chapter intended to examine whether those undertaking the role of mediating the communication between the two communities – at least in the GC side – both in times of ‘problematic’ coexistence and separation were also responsible for the formation of the image of the other community and of their own identity.

In exploring the print media, I compared how different newspapers covered historical events of the 20th century that had been significant for the relationship of the two communities. The comparison identified that the discourse developed by the GC press was initially homogenously inclusive towards the TC community but it gradually seemed to reproduce ethnic nationalism with the exception of one or two newspapers with a leftist ideology. The analysis indicated that the gradual shifting in the press’ discourse matches the trajectory of the development of ethnic nationalism on the island that has been elaborated in Chapter 3. The press attempted to organise the collective experience of the GCs through a set of practices that have been produced through its discourse. The attempt was particularly successful in the period of modernisation when the Cypriots – initially the GCs followed by the TCs – have been exposed to new ideas coming both from abroad and the colonial authorities. The success relied on the fact that the press in covering significant events for the relationship of the two communities, enacted rituals through the use of certain language, characterisations and layout that organised the collective experience of the readers through the ethnic identity for the GCs that differentiated them from the TCs. As the analysis showed, during the years of intense nationalism even in days of ‘normalcy’ the press enacted rituals that maintained and reproduced a nationalistic identity for the GCs. That is why, I suggest that when this kind of media rituals are being practiced certain discourses are in a sense legitimised and manage to become hegemonic and naturalised. Thus indicating through the analysis of the selected extracts that certain discourses in comparison to others have been indeed hegemonic¹⁹¹ in certain historical periods in

¹⁹¹ ‘Hegemonic’ has been used throughout the chapter to refer to the discourses that have been dominant in the GC public sphere. Dominant in the sense that the majority of the media has similarly produced this

Cyprus, was a way of proving the existence of a mechanism behind them, that is the media rituals.

The section that analyses the culture created by the medium of radio through the popular program of the Cypriot sketch, provided an example of an alternative voice/discourse in the GC public sphere that encouraged a more inclusive attitude towards the TC community and the formation of a more Cypriot-centric identity for the GCs even in years of intense nationalism. That is why I suggest that, if certain media rituals involve subaltern elements (e.g. the Cypriot linguistic form on radio, a medium of technological advance) then the ritual of the reception of the media message/text has to be seen through its ambiguous role in relation to hegemonic ideology.

Finally, following Couldry's notion of "the myth of the mediated centre" (2003b), the section which analyses the medium of television illustrated how the medium of television in specific historical moments in Cyprus can on the one hand present this myth as a reality and on the other hand showed how it can place it under crisis. The unfolding of the analysis of the television coverage, presented one case in which in a certain historical moment – that of the opening of the barricades that separated the two communities for 29 years – television becomes a medium with an impact different to the one it usually has i.e., to territorialise people's reality. Demetriou's analysis of the opening of the crossing points in 2003, was used as a building block to my analysis since I took her argument – that the moment of leap into a new subjectivity that GCs experienced then was created by the inability of the state to territorialise people's reality – a step further and combined it with the media's role in this process. Furthermore, the 2003 opening has been used in an attempt to illustrate empirically Couldry's argument that when the "myth of the mediated centre" collapses people are able to move beyond media rituals. The analysis of the second case – the proclamation of Papadopoulos on the Annan Plan referenda – demonstrated the opposite and followed Couldry's argument (2003b, Chapter 4) once again, that when media rituals are enacted – especially in their most intense mode like in a "media event" (Dayan and Katz, 1992) – they aim to confirm the "myth of the mediated centre" and to re-territorialise people's reality. This second case also indicated the paradox dynamic that a

discourse, in most of the times this discourse is the official one – i.e. they one supported by the GC political leaders/authorities – and finally adopted by the majority of the GCs.

“media event” produces in societies that lack consensus, like Cyprus: to create the mythical idea of integration among the majority of the people of one community but at the same time deepen the gap between those already in conflict.

In the chapter that follows I will be looking at bicommunal communication as facilitated by a medium which claims to manifest people’s participation rather than representation – that of the Internet – in order to identify what kind of media rituals are created in that context and how they affect the relations of the two Cypriot communities.

Chapter Seven

BICOMMUNAL COMMUNICATION AND COEXISTENCE ON THE INTERNET

7.1. Introduction

This chapter will analyse data produced in online Yahoo Group bicommunal conversations and Facebook bicommunal groups. Email was selected as one of the oldest and most popular Internet tools and Facebook Groups due to its popularity but at the same time as a representative of the more recent social media.

There are three main research questions with which these communication forms will be examined: 1. What is the dynamic of the Internet as a medium, i.e. what kind of rituals are enacted in the context of this medium? 2. Whether in the discussions developed between the people of the two Cypriot communities in these online spaces there are rituals enacted that question the hegemonic discourse, i.e. whether the participants are able to move beyond the “myth of the mediated centre” (Couldry, 2003b) established by the print and broadcast media, and whether these groups could be considered forms of counter-public spheres? 3. What kind of media rituals are developed when members of the two communities coexist in online environments such as Facebook groups but do not necessarily interact, at least in online space?

Even though the centre of attention here are Internet environments, the purpose of the study is not to reduce the meaning of the counter-public spheres to these new spaces that the Internet provides. That is why, when I will talk about the online environments mentioned above, I will not refer to their meaning as environments per se but as online media or Internet tools; giving equal weight in this way to the use – intended or not – of the medium and the dynamic of its form. In other words, the technology of the medium will be looked at as a tool with which people create other contexts in which they communicate and not as “the prime mover in social change” (Garnham, 2000, p.66). Contexts which allow practicing different kinds of rituals from the ones practiced in print and broadcast media; rituals that either help naturalise bicommunality or provide a ‘safe

space' to be enhanced and develop alternative discourses about the relationship between two communities and the Cyprus problem in general.

That is why, when focusing on the potential use of the Internet as a counter-public sphere one needs to pay attention to who is using it and what they are using it for, taking into consideration this way equally all three elements i.e. persons, places and topics and not limiting to one of those which is also considered a deterministic approach and as Asen argues could result to reduce the meaning of the counter-public spheres (2000, p.430). As mentioned in Chapter 2, Asen suggests that the 'counter' of the counter-public spheres lies with the process followed by the participants first, to recognise their exclusion and second, to set themselves against the wider public sphere (2000, p.440). For this reason, while the analysis will concentrate on the counter-public spheres that might be created in the context of the Internet, the focus will have two dimensions: first, identifying whether the participants of online discussions recognise that certain themes are excluded from the dominant public sphere(s) and second, examining if in these online group discussions there are elements which indicate how the participants set – or intend to set – themselves up against the official/dominant public sphere(s). In both case studies explored – Yahoo Group email conversations and Facebook Groups – there seem to be, broadly, two kinds of bicomunal communication: one set of communication is based on what might be called lifestyle/everyday socialising interests while the other is based on conscious political choice.

Introducing the case studies

In the case of email communication during the period that direct contact between the two communities was difficult, a youth group was created out of a workshop organised in Prague in 2001. The bi-communality of the meeting evidently had within it the potential of political engagement since any bicomunal meeting in such a context – i.e. a workshop in the broader field of conflict resolution – before the partial opening of the crossing points in 2003, involved politics, but it is clear from the messages exchanged that the feeling of a group bonding dynamic among young people was also strongly present. This group's bonding dynamic is what I will be calling, a 'lifestyle' form of commonality. However, due to the fact that face-to-face communication was prohibited during that time the group

dynamic acquired also a clearly political dimension – as a conscious political choice to go against the norm – which was evident, as the analysis will show, in the reference to forms of a broader collective identity: to Cypriotism, or to forms of political activism – going to political meetings/lectures, setting up demands, conclusions of the seminars etc.

In the case of Facebook groups – which of course post-date the email conversations since Facebook was founded in 2004 – the ‘pattern’ of the email data is not as apparent. Here there are distinct political and ‘lifestyle’ oriented groups. The political oriented groups seem to be engaged in a form of public discourse/political activism either with people from the other community or within their own community. In the case of engaging with people from the other community, they are in a sense setting up a form of alternative public sphere¹⁹² which is common for both communities and when this is being done within their own community they are creating forms of counter¹⁹³ publics within and against their community’s dominant public sphere. The ‘lifestyle’ – neutral¹⁹⁴ as I will call them – groups that are more numerous, 72% of the total groups that contain the word ‘Cyprus’,¹⁹⁵ include people from both communities and their theme has no link to bicomunal relations or the Cyprus problem. The distinction of those neutral groups has been made based on both the meaning the title of each group connoted and the orientation of the public discussions that it hosted. Currently, in offline life there is of course direct communication, but the unresolved issues of the communal representation and integration of TCs in existing institutions of the Republic of Cyprus or efforts to set up new ones, often create complications. For example, the attempts to unite football and give the chance for both TC and GC authorities to participate in FIFA and UEFA events failed in January 2009 since the TC football authority did not accept that the GC football authority would have the right to veto the former’s participation and actions in FIFA and UEFA matches. In the context of online groups and interests the coexistence of Cypriots is a de facto reality. Clearly these groups are not directly related to politics – at least not subject-wise – but by

¹⁹² Creating a form of alternative public sphere in the sense that they participate/engage in political public discussions something which is not possible in the ‘real’ – not online – world since the Cypriot public sphere is segregated into a GC and a TC one.

¹⁹³ In this chapter I will be using the term counter when I refer to the publics of my case studies since I want to underline the intention of those groups to put themselves against the wider – dominant public sphere.

¹⁹⁴ My use of the term ‘neutral’ does not imply that these groups cannot be positive towards bicomunal realtions. On the contrary, as I will suggest later in this chapter these group are characterised by a positive dynamic of coexistence.

¹⁹⁵ Facebook Groups that contained the word ‘Cyprus’ at the time of the data collection constituted part of the sample of this case study.

being open to both communities they are engaging in sets of practices that may suggest they constitute an alternative form of social life and potentially forms of public sphere; they could be consider as a sign of a subterranean trend of de facto coexistence.

Finally, it is important to note that the quotes that will be analysed in this chapter might include grammatical or spelling mistakes since I have decided to take them verbatim from the two online contexts mentioned above. The reason for this decision is that these kind of linguistic conventions are less important in the Internet context and since this thesis is considering linguistic conventions as a limitative element to the expression of alternative identities – at least in the Cypriot context – presenting the quotes in their original form has been considered significant.

The discussion in the two empirical parts of this chapter that follow, will begin with the presentation of quantitative data that will aim in giving the contextual information of each case study and will then continue by analysing qualitative data to elaborate the arguments.

7.2. Email communication in the separation era: Countering the norms

7.2.1. The context of the email communication case study

The data is comprised of the email exchanges between a group of 40 teenagers (20 from each community) 16-18 years old, from both communities after the end of a bicomunal workshop that took place in Prague from 16-22 April 2001 – a period during which, as mentioned before, direct bicomunal communication was difficult to impossible. The workshop was organised by two bicomunal peace groups, Youth Encounters for Peace (YEP) and Seeds of Peace (SOP).

Youth Encounters for Peace (YEP) – a name given by the young participants in their first workshop – was a Cypriot bicomunal group formed in July 1997 as a project that aimed in bringing the youth of the two main Cypriot communities together. In 1997 three two-day workshops – called YEP1, YEP2 and YEP3 – took place in Ledra Palace¹⁹⁶ in July, October and December in which 150 teenagers participated in total. Their plans for more face-to-face meetings and workshops were stopped after the December 1997 ban of all bicomunal meetings and for this reason, an electronic version of YEP was developed between 1998-2000 in which the participants communicated via email. A third phase of face-to-face workshops began again in 2000 in Pyla¹⁹⁷ and lasted until April 2003, during which YEP 4-15 took place. The workshops continued after the April 2003 easing of restrictions regarding free movement across the Green Line until 2007 when the last YEP workshop, No.29, took place. According to one of the main organisers of the workshops, the workshops stopped due to both personal reasons of the organisers and because as he stated “we felt that these workshops had completed their circle” explaining though that they are now working on something new.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Ledra Palace used to be a hotel before the separation of the two communities with the Green Line. Now the building is in the no man's land area, under the UN's control and occasionally is used for bicomunal activities.

¹⁹⁷ *Pyla* is a village in the eastern part of Cyprus, in the district of Larnaca. It is the only bicomunal village located in the south part and even though in the United Nations buffer zone it is administrated by the Republic of Cyprus.

¹⁹⁸ This statement came to me through a telephone conversation with one of the organisers.

Seeds of Peace (SOP) is an international youth organisation founded in 1993 that organises camps aiming to bring together youth from areas of conflict to discuss and experience coexistence. The organisation started bringing youths from Cyprus together in camps in 1998 and continued until the summer of 2003 – when the funding of the programme stopped for Cyprus – graduating annually about 100 youth from both communities. The participants of the camps continued their communication after their return to Cyprus via email, face-to-face meetings and events that they co-organised with YEP like the Bicommunal Youth Festival which took place in Pergamos¹⁹⁹ park.

The Prague workshop was an idea formed by the organisers/facilitators of the YEP workshops and the SOP in their attempt to think of a way “for the participants to spend days and nights together without the need of moving back and forth to *Pyla* everyday having the chance this way to create something big” as one of the facilitators stated. According to the same facilitator, the idea for something ‘big’ pre-existed the Prague workshop and that was organising a Bicommunal Youth Festival that would involve as many of the bicommunal groups as possible but it needed time and space to be elaborated and the Prague workshop provided both. Thus, if someone would ask for a tangible result of that workshop then that would be the Bicommunal Youth Festival at Pergamos park. The Prague workshop was fully funded²⁰⁰ and supported by the SOP but the facilitation and the coordination of the workshop was fully conducted by Cypriots of both communities.

The email communication of the participants began immediately after their return to Cyprus through a Yahoo group called “Pragueworkshop2000”²⁰¹ that was created by one of the teenager participants. The emails analysed in this chapter were sent by the subscribers of the Yahoo group to the email address²⁰² that was set up for the group and were automatically delivered to the email account of every subscriber, so the emails do not have the format of a personal conversation but one of a public dialogue. It is important to make clear at this point that the quotes that will follow are taken from the actual online

¹⁹⁹ Pergamos is a village just outside Pyla.

²⁰⁰ According to the SOP official website their programmes are funded “by individuals, foundations and corporations. Earmarked funds from the United States government and private sources also help support several Seeds of Peace programs” (<<http://www.seedsofpeace.org/faq#n2803>>, accessed on March 2011).

²⁰¹ The Yahoo group was mistakenly named “Pragueworkshop2000” instead of “Pragueworkshop2001”.


conversations and because as the teenagers communicated in English – a common language used in order for them to communicate – instead of their first languages, (Greek and Turkish) and so spelling and other grammatical mistakes might exist. My access to this email communication was given by one of the main organisers and facilitators of the Prague bicomunal workshop, in his attempt to explain, in the context of his interview, the powerful relationships created in such workshops. After a discussion about the ethics in using this material and because of the difficulty to locate and contact 40 participants of a workshop that took place 7 years ago, it was decided that the subjects studied would be considered as a group of which the organiser/facilitator, as the person in charge during the period of the workshop and their later online communication, would give consent for the use of the material. In addition to this, it was confirmed that the conversations would be kept safe and used only for the purposes of this research and that pseudonyms would be used instead of real names in order to protect the participants' identity.²⁰³

The emails analysed constitute the online conversations of the first days of their return to Cyprus which shows the dynamic of the group immediately after the physical meeting but has limits for more long term implications. That is why this case study will be focusing on data that provide evidence of the relationship created by the workshop, data that indicate the image that members of one community have about the other, and data that show their desired group actions/intentions in relation to the political situation of the island in the wider public domain.

²⁰² <praguelworkshop2000@yahogroups.com>

²⁰³ For more details about the ethical considerations that have been taken on this data refer to Chapter 4.

7.2.2. Ways of seeing the *other*



Graph 1: Ways of relating to the *other* after the Prague Workshop 2001

Even though there is not a direct reference to the image the teenagers used to have about the other before participating in the “Prague Workshop 2001”, there are elements in some of the conversations that could be considered as indications for this matter. The following extracts from the email conversations include such elements.

Victoria, a GC teenager, mentions:

i wanna thank the seeds of peace stuff for all the things they ve done for us..helping us feel more comfortable at the beggining and making us laugh all the time ..

Victoria refers to how the staff of Seeds of Peace helped them feel more comfortable at the beginning of their contact and this could be an indication that the image the participants used to have for the members of the other community before their participation in the workshop was responsible for this uncomfortable feeling.

Onur, a TC participant, mentions in his email:

I THOUGHT ABOUT OUR SITUATION IN CYPRUS DURING ALL TRIP.. AND I ASKED TO MYSELF " WHO CAN GET A RIGHT TO SEPERATE US?WHO CAN GET A RIGHT TO DECIDE OUR COUNTRY?" AND WHO CAN GET A RIGHT TO SHOW MY GOOD FRIENDS AS A TARGET TO ME????? [His use of capital letters].

This last reference of Onur of considering the GC participants as “good friends” or as “targets”, could be also read as an indication of the contrasting images the participant had about the GCs before and after the end of the workshop.

What is more evident in the email conversations, however, is the positive image that the teenagers had about the participants of the other community in the period that the conversations took place, i.e. after the workshop. As appears in Graph 1, a percentage of 95.65% of the teenagers express directly or indirectly the positive image and feelings they have about the participants of the other community. This positive image can be captured by expressions like: “My dear dear dear friends”, “I only want you guys and the relationship we have established and I can live for ever!”, “Thanks for being such a ‘nice family’”. One could argue however that this kind of positive image and feeling is directed only to the teenagers of the other community that participated in the workshop and does not refer to the other community as a whole. Even though there is no direct reference of their feelings towards the other community as a whole, quotations like the ones below give the impression that what changed moves beyond a positive image to the teenagers of the other community that participated in the workshop.

Danae, one of the GC participants, mentions in her email:

I got to know many things about our island’s history and I am very satisfied because I never expected that we would ever get so deep in history and lots of thanks to our facilitators for that.

Emre, a TC teenager mentions:

We still can prove that the only way to overcome a conflict is by communicating, not pointing guns towards each other.

Finally, as shown in Graph 1 all the participants choose to have a personal contact with members of the other community. Due to the difficulties of other means of communication²⁰⁴ between people of the two communities, the participants choose to communicate personally through the Internet. Even though the teenagers appear to be

²⁰⁴ Refer to Chapter 3 for more details on this.

quite comfortable when using Internet tools to communicate with each other they seem to want to have face-to-face contact too. The sections that follow will discuss the Internet communication of the group.

7.2.3. Topics discussed

The topics the participants discussed in their email communication constitute another aspect of the data that is worthy of note since this transitional dynamic of the group is identifiable here too. The different kinds of topics they talked about on a personal level were oriented to: school matters (exams, homework, university concerns), picnic arrangements, flight and airport incidents, football, friendship/bonding, language, weather, Internet tools (ICQ, MIRC, AOL, Hotmail), birthday wishes, Prague trip (photos, Czechs, funny moments), frappe²⁰⁵ (coffees).

On the political level the orientation of the teenagers' conversations was to: the activities of the Prague workshop (experience, impact, discussions/activities), the peace package, political leaders, information about lectures and open discussions on the Cyprus problem, bicommunal activities, participation of some of the TC participants in a radio programme regarding the workshop that had been broadcast by a TC radio station but was audible across the divide,²⁰⁶ desire for the solution of the Cyprus problem/ peace in Cyprus, oppressed right to meet physically in their country, activism engagement, cooperation and future.

As the above indicate there were a variety of topics discussed but even though the email would be expected to facilitate personal communication more, yet it seems that in the absence of other means, it also became a forum for political engagement – or the transformation of personal discussions into more political public issues. If we now consider that in this case the email communication is a continuation of the face-to-face communication then we might consider that the face-to-face communication, i.e. their

²⁰⁵ Frappe is a kind of Greek iced coffee which is very popular among the GCs.

²⁰⁶ However, the language used in the radio programme was Turkish, so the GC teenagers even though as they mentioned in their emails had listened to it, were unable to understand what had been said.

face-to-face contact during the Prague workshop, was constituted by a similar combination of personal and political topics of conversations. The significant thing regarding the categories of topics they talked about, at least in the email communication, is that the participants do not artificially separate the categories in their conversations. On the contrary, they merge topics from both categories in their conversations. For example, Emre writes in one of his emails:

I think Denktas bribed my computer because I have been disconnected from the Internet about couple of hundred times within five minutes and it is pissing me off! The message about frappe didn't go properly thanks to my medieval computer. As far as I remember I said it would be better to bring our food and of course frappe. In case some of you don't pls don't forget to bring the machine).

Onur's email is another example of combining topics from both categories:

Hey how are you??? I hope everything is ok!! My exams were so good today :)))²⁰⁷ I think Prague made me better!! I hope tomorrow I'll do well again [...] and Stavros we are the best and we can do everything if we can be strong.. I believe [trust] you my friends.

Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the teenagers' desire to see each other soon, it is often expressed with phrases like "I love you", "I miss you so much :o(²⁰⁸", "I cannot concentrate on my exams all the time I think about you", "We should be together", expressions that would not be out of place in the context of a sexual relationship.

It seems that their email communication is a convergence of teenagers' innocence, libido, enthusiasm and activism. Thus, it is obvious that the online interactions of the group involved both personal and political dynamics that the analysis, which follows, will attempt to delineate.

7.2.4. Analysis

The relatively big number of the emails sent to the “Pragueworkshop2000” Yahoo group during the first five days after the participants returned to Cyprus is the first noticeable thing. Twenty-three of the forty workshop participants – which means 57.5% – sent a total of 41 emails in the first five days something which indicates the desire to communicate with each other or rather, the desire not to end their newly-established channel of communication. As the teenagers themselves reveal in their email conversation, only hours after their return home they run to their computers in order to ‘reach’ each other. Eser, a TC participant states:

It makes me feel really great to see all of your emails coming so fast this shows how strong friendship we have built among us and it also shows that friendship cannot be limited with those stupid borders.

The above statement – together with similar comments in the emails sent also by other participants both GCs and TCs as the ones that will follow – is evidence of the enthusiasm of the teenagers about the relationships that developed in the group during the workshop. Such an enthusiasm however is a common consequence when a group of people – bicomunal or not and especially teenagers – spend some time and share some experiences together. Thus, the only thing one could interpret by the enthusiasm that appears in the above statement, is that the teenagers valued the bicomunal workshop in Prague as a good experience. At the same time though, the above sample of conversation is a first sign that the participants place their group relationship in the context of the political situation of the island. Even so, presumably this is largely because of the political context of the workshop in which they met, it should not be underestimated since as the unfolding of the discussion will designate the strong ‘lifestyle’ aspect by which the group was characterised is intensively blended with *politics* in their conversations. Furthermore, the quote comprises an indication that the Internet – and email specifically – in this case was not simply used as a medium, or the only medium, of communication between the group after the end of the workshop but also as a way to overcome physical obstacles that could destroy or prevent the development of this relationship like physical barricades, the

²⁰⁷ Emoticon for expressing smiley face.

²⁰⁸ Emoticon for expressing sad face.

“borders” as mentioned in the conversation. Eser’s words suggest that the Internet provides an environment in which relationships that start through face-to-face contact could be maintained even when physical contact is no longer possible. As already mentioned in previous chapters, during the period of separation, 1974-2003, there were very limited –telephoning was extremely difficult and was used only in extreme cases since a phone call had to be transferred from the authorities of one side to the authorities of the other via a telephone line of the United Nations; a similar route had to be followed by a letter that was sent from one side to the other side – contact between the people of the two communities while in Cyprus.

On the other hand, due to the fact that email does not provide an instantaneous communication the participants attempted to achieve a sort of instantaneous communication by exchanging several emails in one day that points out an attempt to achieve the instantaneous communication of face-to-face contact. The need for instant communication could be also the explanation for their decision – which appears in their conversations – to switch to ICQ²⁰⁹ instead of Yahoo Groups as their everyday communication tool. Thus, one could suggest that the Internet contact in this case was used for continuation and supplementary purposes but at the same time as a de facto substitute of the face-to-face contact.

Agathi, a GC participant, also comments on the frequency with which the emails arrived. She writes:

It’s hardly been a day since we got back [from Prague] and we have rough arrangements for a picnic and a peace package.

Her statement even though brief gives useful information about three dimensions. First, it designates the promptness of the communication the teenagers achieved, second it shows their wish to have a face-to-face contact since they seem to attempt to arrange a picnic and

²⁰⁹ ICQ is a homophone of the phrase «I seek you» and is one of the first instant messaging Internet programmes released in 1996. ICQ belongs to America Online (AOL) since 1998 and according to Time Warner by 2001 it celebrated 100 million registered users worldwide (Time Warner Press Release 2001, <<http://www.timewarner.com/corp/newsroom/pr/0,20812,668719,00.html>>, retrieved on 7th of June 2009).

third it gives a hint of their intention to engage in activism since they try to develop further the ideas they initiated at the workshop with the development of what they call a “peace package”. Only hours after their separation the teenagers try to arrange their next face-to-face meeting. Thus, this is an addition to the position that in this case the Internet was used by the group as a substitute for the physical contact. On the other hand, the urge to arrange a picnic, i.e. a face-to-face meeting, immediately after their return could be justified by the fact that the participants were aware that any physical contact would be difficult to impossible to take place in Cyprus – at least for that time being. In other words, this rush for renewed physical contact could be interpreted not simply as an expression of their desire for a face-to-face meeting but as a reaction to their de facto situation that suppressed their desire. Whatever the reason though, it is yet another indication that the group’s initial communication was built around the intense feeling of bonding and consequently their conversations were characterised by such a dynamic.

Ilkay, another TC teenager writes:

It’s really great to hear from almost all of you guys just in a day many times!! I wish it would be like this till the solution!:(:)).

Ilkay’s wish to keep this Internet communication until the solution of the Cyprus problem expresses on the one hand, the difficulty in meeting each other physically under that time’s circumstances and on the other hand, expresses the concern that the intensify of the online communication will inevitably fade and that is why while expressing a faith in the certainty of the solution he implies the need for a face-to-face contact too.

This feeling of bonding however appears to slowly change to a more political dynamic of the group as the email conversation progresses. An interesting point that derives from the email data in relation to this transitional process is that of the feeling of one common identity. The group seems to have developed this feeling of belonging together and sharing the same identity of Cypriotism²¹⁰ since they started talking in an inclusive way towards the other community. In their conversations it seems that ‘we’ starts as the collective identity of the group but then it develops into a larger collective identity that includes the Cypriots

as a whole instead for simply the Prague workshop group or the ethnic community they belong. This can be interpreted from comments that are defining of the 'other' which instead of meaning those who are outside the Prague workshop group it seems to refer to the outsiders of a larger scale that differ from the Cypriots and in this case are the Czechs or the Americans. The following quotes are indicative of this transitional process that the group was undergoing; the pattern goes like this:

Emre, a TC mentions while writing about the arrangement of the picnic:

Since the weather is not like in Prague, I think a picnic is a great idea to conserve the warmth within the group.

A GC teenager, Stavros also comments on the Cypriot weather:

I missed having my coffee here in not so cold Cyprus and I miss my friends too... so see you all really soon I hope.

Then a comment coming from a GC female, Efi, similar to the one made by Eser, a TC male on the coldness of the Czechs; giving in this way an indirect definition of the Cypriot identity of *we* to the *other*. Efi's comment mentions:

It's only half a day after we left Prague and I already miss it so Bad. (Except of the Czech smile of course ☹²¹¹).

Eser in another similarly ironical tone – note the exaggerated use of exclamation marks at the end of the comment – writes:

²¹⁰ A term coined by Mavratsas (1998).

²¹¹ An emoticon used in online conversations that according to Yahoo Messenger Emoticons (<<http://messenger.yahoo.com/features/emoticons>>, retrieved on 6th June 2009) it expresses a «straight face». Microsoft Office in an article on the emoticons notes for this particular emoticon «In a purely unscientific poll of the Office Online team, we couldn't agree on what the third symbol meant. Different people thought that it was a sign either of indifference, frustration, or grumpiness. You be the judge. MSN® Messenger officially calls it disappointed, so we'll use that description for this article» (<http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/help/HA011196081033.aspx>, retrieved on 6th of June 2009). The significance of this emoticon in the participant's comment lies on the fact that it expresses an unpleasant or at least a passive mood which contrasts with the participant's comment about the Czech smile that leads us to the conclusion that the comment was made ironically.

I think we all agree that we had an awesome week together and we all learnt a lot from each other. Moreover we learnt a lot from the Czech people; for example we all learnt from them how kind and warm human beings can be!!!!

Then another TC, Onur, writes: “We [TCs and GCs working together] are the best and we can do everything”.

As we observe, an informal conversation which starts between a group of teenagers with a tenor of referring to everyday issues like the weather or a coffee, builds up and the weather or the coffee suddenly become significant elements of constructing an identity of ‘we’ that differentiates the participants from the ‘other’. What is important here is that both Greek and TC participants made such statements about common elements between the two communities and the fact that the natural environment (in the form of weather for example) – which refers to the common home/habitat of both communities – becomes a point of reference which can be seen as a transition from the group identity of teenagers to a broader identification. Their comments demonstrate that in their minds one common identity for both communities has been constructed. Even though it is not possible to find this out from the email conversations available – since there are not any data referring directly to the beliefs the teenagers had in relation to the concept of identity before participating in the workshop – there are indirect comments that illustrate broadly the feeling/tendency of their beliefs about the other community prior to the workshop. For example Danae mentions:

I got to know many things about our island’s history and I am very satisfied because I never expected that we would ever get so deep in history.

Angelos, another GC participant writes:

When united all politicians and guns and prejudices cannot keep us from changing this situation.

Danae mentions that she learnt many things about the history of Cyprus that she did not know or she used to know differently and Angelos refers to prejudices that cannot and should not keep them apart. Questions arise from those interesting comments; what kind of prejudices could he refer to and where and how have they been created; what things

about history have been unknown to Danae until the workshop and why? According to one of the facilitators of the workshop, the programme through certain activities provided the chance to the teenagers to share the official narrative of their side with the whole group, having this way both sides of the stories heard. Thus, Danae's quotation to unknown things about history could refer to the revelation that this kind of procedures offered. Further answers to the above questions could be given also by combining these quotations with data or literature analysed in previous chapters in relation to historical facts and multiple historical narratives that exist in Cyprus since 1974 (Chapter 3), to the interpersonal/face-to-face communication (Chapter 5) and to print and broadcast communication (Chapter 6). One contextual reason for the observation that these sort of comments have been made mostly by GC participants could be that according to Mavratsas (1998, p.99) the nationalistic ideology was hegemonic in the mid 1990s – the period when the participants were growing up.

7.2.5. The Prague Workshop group's online deliberation as a counter-public sphere

As suggested in the above discussion, the conversations of the group of teenagers indicate both their desire and attempt to maintain their bicomunal relations and political activism that emerged during the workshop in Prague. This is a determining aspect of the participants' identity – that is teenagers of the two opposing Cypriot communities who want to enhance their cross-barricade relationship – and should be further analysed since it is the first characteristic that suggests the emergence of a counter-public sphere in this online context. The reason is that such a group identity was excluded of participation in the dominant public sphere²¹² of the Cypriot society – at least until 2003 – thus based on Fraser's argument it was a group with “[...] no arenas for deliberation among themselves about their needs, objectives, and strategies. They would have no venues in which to undertake communicative processes that were not, as it were, under the supervision of dominant groups” (1990, p.66). The group's identity however is not the only characteristic that excluded the participation of the teenagers from the dominant public sphere. The

²¹² I refer to a singular dominant public sphere of the Cypriot society but it is important to note that since 1963 the Cypriot public sphere was segregated between the two communities. Even though usually such a reference will mainly mean the GC community's public sphere – since as explained in the introduction of this thesis this is the focus of the study – in this case there is evidence that this is what was valid in both communities' public spheres.

topics of the discussion were built up around themes that even today are considered taboo in Cypriot society. As seen in previous chapters (5 and 6) the dominant discourses in the education system, the church and the print and broadcast media did not include any public discussion of a multiplicity of historical narratives instead of one; prejudices of the other and suffering of the opposite community. Even though there is evidence that the Prague workshop group was excluded from the public sphere in terms of its participants' identity, i.e. the bicomunal status of the group and in terms of the topics they discussed, i.e. ways to promote coexistence, according to Asen these elements cannot support on their own the existence of a counter-public sphere; the counter of a counter-public sphere lies on the recognition of the group for its exclusion and on their act of setting themselves towards the wider public sphere (2000, p.437). The group of teenagers that initially developed in the workshop hosted in Prague in 2001 and maintained through a Yahoo group appears to have both of the characteristics identified by Asen. First, the participants often identify in their discussion things that keep them apart and things that make their communication difficult. Angelos, a GC participant, mentions in one of his emails:

I only need you and I know that when united all politicians and guns and prejudices cannot keep us from changing this situation.

Another evidence of awareness of their exclusion – in terms of topics discussed this time – appears in an email sent by Kalia, a female GC participant, regarding some public discussions organised by the University of Cyprus. She writes:

There are also some other very interesting lectures about the causes of our [bicomunal] conflict [...] nobody assures us that what we will hear is absolutely correct or wise but still I think there are a lot to gain.

Kalia's assertion indicates recognition of the fact that their group's knowledge and beliefs on the issue of the Cyprus bicomunal conflict, are excluded from the ones discussed in dominant public discourses of the Cypriot society.

In terms of Asen's second "counter" element of the counter-public spheres, i.e. their action of setting themselves against the wider public sphere, seems to be also identifiable in the Prague workshop Yahoo group. The participants discuss their next possible moves in order

for their group to have an impact on the wider public scene of the Cypriot society. The quote presented above regarding the group's intention to attend an open lecture organised by a public institution, the University of Cyprus, suggests that the group aims to engage itself against the hegemonic discourses of the dominant public. It is important to make clear that it is not implied that the discussions hosted by the University of Cyprus did not allow space for debate but as it appears in Kalia's comment it was kind of expected for issues "not absolutely correct or wise" to be heard at the discussion. One reason for that expectation/ambiguity for what would be heard, which is again contextual, could be that the formal agencies of that period – including the University of Cyprus²¹³ – were usually adopting (consciously or not) the hegemonic discourse, i.e. the official position, of that time which according to Mavratsas during that period meant to express a nationalistic ideology (1998, p.99). In other words, during the period prior to 2003 all the formal agencies in the GC public sphere were practising what I would describe as some sort of 'rituals of political correctness' by avoiding reference to certain historical issues that were not part of the official narrative.

Another example that highlights even more the group's intention to have an energetic role in the wider public is their discussion about the development of their own peace package as a proposed solution of the Cyprus problem. Emre, a male TC participant who came out with this idea writes:

[W]e came out with two pages of ideas as our solution to the Cyprus problem. My suggestion is to turn these ideas into some sort of a peace package by adding political vocabulary and offer it as an agreement that our Prague group has reached. Since we have done an amazingly creative and constructive job, why not offer these ideas to our politicians including Denktas, Klerides, Kofi Annan, George Bush, Tony Blair, Athens, Ankara and EU. Even the existence of such a peace package is enough to make them concerned and even scared to know that there are people working their guts out to create a better future.

²¹³ An incident that illustrates the adoption of this hegemonic discourse by the University of Cyprus was in 1996 when after that time's prime minister of Greece Mr. Simitis visit to the university student demonstrations that took place – excluding the students of the leftist Proodeftiki – that demanded to keep the Greek flag raised at the university. After days of public discussion between the University's Senate, groups of academics, the Attorney General of the Republic and the Minister of Education and Culture, the authorities of the University decided to keep the Greek flag raised as the majority of the students wished (Mavratsas 1998, p.126-130).

The email conversations that I had access to did not provide any information whether the peace package was after all made possible. However, as informed by the facilitator of the workshop and the Yahoo Group email conversation, the ideas that the group had come into during the Prague workshop were developed into a peace package but was never given to the politicians due to difficulties that he did not describe. Despite the fact that the fulfilment of this suggestion as a whole was not possible its significance lies in the intention of the group to set itself against the wider public, as it was then constituted.

This section's discussion has been useful to identify that within the context and the use of the Yahoo Group Email a bicomunal youth group was developed into a counter public that coexisted or most properly counter-existed with the dominant public spheres of the two communities. The Internet as a medium and more specifically the Yahoo Group Email as an online tool was crucial for the existence and maintenance of this counter public. However, this cannot be absolutely aligned to the dynamic of the medium since there were specific social conditions that excluded bicomunal communication during that period. That is why it is important to analyse conversations that took place both under different social conditions, i.e. when bicomunal communication is possible and with the use of another Internet tool as in the section that follows.

7.3. Facebook Groups in the free-movement era: Rituals that challenge the hegemonic discourses and legitimise de facto coexistence

7.3.1. The context of the Facebook groups communication case study

Facebook is a social networking Internet tool founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg and his classmates and roommates Dustin Moskovitz and Chris Hughes while students at Harvard University. The tool consists of a free-access website and social applications that anyone can develop. Facebook's mission as described by its company overview is "to give people the power to share and make the world more open and connected"²¹⁴. Millions of people use Facebook today to create their personal profiles/accounts in order to connect with the profiles of their friends and share photos, links, videos, thoughts, join groups and chat. More specifically, according to the statistics²¹⁵ available in Facebook, there are 200 million active users from which more than 100 million users log on to Facebook at least once a day and an average user has 120 friends on the site. As far as its international growth is concerned, Facebook is translated into more than 50 languages – among them Greek and Turkish – when 40 more are under development since 70% of its users are outside the United States.

The amount of its growth and its popularity in general was the main reason for choosing Facebook for this research rather than any of the other social networking sites available. Even though there are not any statistical data available for the growth of Facebook and its users' engagement in Cyprus, it is rather obvious that at least in the last two years Facebook is the most popular social networking Internet tool in Cyprus too. Despite the frequency of its reference in the everyday life conversations, it is also evident from the growing number of newspaper articles on Facebook related matters in the last two years. Such articles, in the GC newspapers, are concerned with either the results of international scientific researches on the social consequences of Facebook, or with incidents that took place worldwide in Facebook or because of Facebook. On the local level, there have been articles that covered public forums on social networking in which Facebook was the protagonist, like the

²¹⁴<<http://www.facebook.com/facebook?v=info&viewas=586066524#/facebook?v=info&viewas=586066524>> retrieved on 6th of June 2009.

representation of Cypriot media and political persons or parties in Facebook but most importantly social demonstrations that were organised through Facebook – as the demonstration against the “Tree-killings’ in the heart of the city”, in March 2008 (*Sigma Live* article 15682, 23 March 2008)²¹⁶ and the demonstrations that took place in Nicosia and Limassol, in March 2009, against the decision of the Cyprus Criminal Court to acquit ten policemen who were accused for the beating of two students in December 2005 (*Harangi*, 30 March 2009).²¹⁷

The study of the communication facilitated by Facebook groups will start with a presentation of quantitative data in order to give some contextual information about what exists in Facebook in relation to bicomunal relations in Cyprus and the Cyprus problem in general. Then it will focus on the analysis of samples of the discussion produced in the context of the groups, in order to identify how the set of practices enacted by the members of the groups entangle with the hegemonic discourse on bicomunal relations. Furthermore, a special emphasis will be given on the rituals produced when people of the two communities coexist but do not necessarily interact with each other in this context.

The purpose of this analysis is to identify whether the Internet – and in this case study Facebook Groups specifically – facilitate bicomunal communication in Cyprus in a way that they can be considered as part of a counter-public sphere. One of the main issues scholars often are concerned about in relation to the public sphere/s that the Internet could possibly be creating – is that the public discussion produced online²¹⁸ is often not the Habermasian one that rationally aims to a consensus; that even though there are a numerous members in an online forum not all them actively participate in the discussions. Jensen, in a study engaging in the debate on the existence of public spheres on the Internet, concludes with the suggestion that “the democratic dialogue on the Internet continues to resemble the Habermasian coffee house: somewhat qualified and enlightened debates with a limited audience and an even more limited active participants” (2003, p.372). In other

²¹⁵ The statistical information is available online at <<http://www.facebook.com/s.php?q=cyprus&n=-1&k=100000020&sf=r&init=q&sid=4270109a1f06fde408923a6f2f2a74ae#/press/info.php?statistics>>, retrieved on 7th of June 2009.

²¹⁶ Available at <<http://www.sigmalive.com/news/local/15682>>, retrieved on 7th June 2009.

²¹⁷ Available at <<http://www.harangi.com.cy/site-article-23697-gr.php>>, retrieved on 7th of June 2009.

words, the significance of the discussions produced on the Internet does not lie in the fact that a vast number of people are actively participating but in the fact that an online space provides ‘a safety zone’ – due to the specificity of the medium – for being present at an enlightened debate. Furthermore, in relation to whether an online discussion is a rational one that aims to consensus or not – in other words whether it has an impact on the offline life and the society as a whole – the references made in the previous section about how certain social demonstrations have been initiated from online discussions are indicative of the fact that online discussions could indeed aim at consensus.

In the case of Cyprus of course, the dominant public sphere has been segregated between two different public spheres since 1974, thus even in the dominant public sphere the audience is limited per se. For this reason any ‘coffee house’ either offline or online which has a mixed audience – however limited in terms of size or reach – is worth analysis since it appears to be more pluralised even if it is only in this narrow ethno-national sense. What makes the ‘coffee shop phenomenon’ remarkable when it appears in online environments such as the Facebook groups, is that the dynamic of the medium allows it to be used in order to form audiences or publics even under circumstances that it could not be possible (e.g. when physical interaction is not allowed or not ethically and socially approved). Furthermore, in the online context public discourses can be developed both one-to-one and one-to-many but also many-to-many. When one speaks about counter or alternative public spheres then one expects to be confronted with publics that do not have the classic form of public.

Further, let’s not dismiss the great dynamic of the Internet to merge the private with the public domain; such a dynamic is expected to have an impact on every aspect of a public sphere that might be formed in this environment. Dahlgren in his article on the Internet and the public spheres, points towards scholars identifying an alternative perspective about online discussions which places them in the category of “new politics”, “life politics” or “sub-politics” – meaning democratic political discussions held outside the usual parliamentary boundaries (2005, p.154). Thus, when examining the groups in Facebook the focus will be on elements that give evidence of “life-politics” that seem to engage

²¹⁸ This of course does not imply that the same thing does not happen in offline public discussions. What it rather implies is that the phenomenon of lurking – meaning simply watching an online discussion but not actively participating – appears more often in online than offline contexts.

members of both communities in public discussions, something which is not very commonly found²¹⁹ in the dominant public sphere; on those elements that in other words indicate that the discussions – even though not held in the usual political context – refer to public issues and demonstrate the engagement and democratic participation necessary to be considered political. Consequently, the very existence of this bicommunality in public political discussions could be considered as a sign for the existence of counter public spheres in the context of Facebook Groups. At the same time, while studying the bicommunal groups of Facebook that are not per se political – meaning the groups which are created on themes that have nothing to do with bicommunal relations or the Cyprus problem in general – the focus will be on the conscious choice of the participants to coexist with the members of the other community. In these cases, their coexistence will be examined in relation to the concepts of Durkheim's ritual function (1912) and Couldry's media rituals (2003) since, as the unfolding of the discussion will show, the participants' relationships are formed on the basis of their common set of practices that exist in such contexts, instead of their in-between interaction.

In order to discover the groups related to bicommunal relations among the vast number of groups that exist in Facebook, three keywords have been used in the Facebook groups' search engine. The keywords used were 1. 'Cyprus', in order to locate all the groups that contain the word Cyprus in their title or description, 2. the keyword 'Κύπρος' – the Greek word for Cyprus – in order to find any groups related to the bicommunal relations and the Cyprus problem in general, that use the Greek language and 3. the Turkish word for Cyprus i.e. 'Kıbrıs' in order to trace any groups using the Turkish language on the same area.

The group themes that resulted from this search vary; there are groups with several approaches to the Cyprus problem, groups supporting popular singers, football teams, brands, political parties, sexual preferences or groups made specifically about an event that is about to happen in Cyprus. The theme of a group is most of the times denoted by its

²¹⁹ Bicommunal public discussions are more common after the easing of restrictions regarding free movement across the Green Line in 2003 than before but bicommunality is yet not something absorbed in the normalcy of everyday life, at least not in the GC dominant public sphere. The bicommunal discussions held in the offline context of the GC dominant public sphere still have the form of what Fraser (1990, p.67) refers to as «involuntary enclaves», when the ones that exist on Facebook appear to be more open.

title: for example a group titled “Tango Cyprus” clearly defines its theme. In some cases though, the title itself is not enough to characterise the theme of the group; that is why Facebook groups are also labelled by a category that describes the type of the group and they are also accompanied by a related picture (see Figure 5 for more details).




Figure 5: Snapshot showing details of the “extreme Cyprus” group in Facebook.

In spite of this, due to the fact that Facebook Groups can be created by anyone for whatever reason, there are some groups that have a general title, no picture and are labelled with a category that does give details of the theme or purpose of the group (see Figure 6 for more details). So in these cases, one needs to see a more detailed description of the group – if it exists at all – or read part of the discussion hosted in the group if possible in order to understand its purpose.




Figure 6: Snapshot showing details of the “Cyprus 2k8” group in Facebook.

Someone is able to read the discussions hosted in the groups when the group is ‘open’, which means anyone can join it and any discussion going on there is open to the public, and second when the group is ‘closed’ which means that a request and approval is required in order for someone to join or see what happens in the group.

The groups discussed in this case study however are not all the Facebook groups that contain these three keywords but only the ones where their title or their description is

somehow linked to the relations of the two Cypriot communities or have members from both communities. The results of the three searches are automatically divided into three categories according to the language used in the groups, English, Greek or Turkish. Then, each of these categories is referred to in this case study in relation to the three categories they consist of:

1. Groups with a positive approach towards rapprochement
2. Groups with a nationalistic approach towards bicomunal relations
3. Groups with a neutral approach towards bicomunal relations.²²⁰


7.3.2. What exists in Facebook in relation to Cyprus

The first two sections of this subchapter, aim in providing both graphical and textual description of the groups that exist in Facebook²²¹ and are connected to bicomunal relations and the Cyprus problem in general. The second section, which refers to the Facebook Groups that contain the keyword “Cyprus” and their theme connects to bicomunal relations or the Cyprus problem, also includes an analysis of selected samples of the discussions that are hosted in the public walls of the groups. Then the third section discusses the Facebook Groups that contain the keyword “Cyprus” but their theme does not refer to bicomunal relations or the Cyprus problem in general.


7.3.2.1 Facebook Groups that contain keyword ‘Κύπρος’ or ‘Kıbrıs’ and are related to bicomunal relations or the Cyprus problem

²²⁰ These are groups that have both GCs and TCs members but their theme is unrelated to the bicomunal relations or the Cyprus Problem.


²²¹ The results of the searches refer to the period of conducting the empirical research, that is March 2009.



Graph 2: Facebook groups that contain the keyword 'Κύπρος' or 'Κίβρις' and are related to bicomunal relations.



Graph 3: Facebook groups that contain keyword 'Κύπρος'.




Graph 4: Facebook groups that contain keyword 'Κίβρις'.

As appears in Graph 2, there are slightly more groups that are GC oriented and are connected to bicomunal relations in Facebook or the Cyprus problem than the ones that are TC oriented. If the number of the groups should be expected to be proportional to the size of each community then this small difference that appears in Graph 2 deserves interpretation. When looked at together with Graphs 3 and 4, the 'anomaly' that appears in

Graph 3 could lead to the suspicion that the TC oriented groups – that are mainly groups with nationalistic content – are created not only by TCs but also by Turks of Turkey, even though the method used to collect this data cannot validate this suggestion. A parallel tendency is not observed in the case of the GC oriented groups and the Greeks of Greece due to the fact that the GCs that live in the Republic of Cyprus are not as dependent on Greece – at least economically speaking – as the TCs are on Turkey. Thus, this dependence of the TCs to Turkey needs to have the acceptance and support of the Turks at all times and presented with every occasion and one of these occasions is of course the case of the Facebook community. On the other hand again, one could suggest that the above graphs support that the TC community is that more fanatic/nationalistic than the GC community that justifies the increased number of those mode groups that are TC oriented and exist in Facebook. Such a suggestion however, could not be adopted in this thesis because it would contradict with the outcomes derived with the analysis of the face-to-face communication, in Chapter 5 that support the opposite.

The groups on which this thesis concentrates however, are those that facilitate bicomunal relations – i.e. the groups with positive or neutral approach towards the other community. The groups that resulted from this current search and are somehow related to the Cyprus problem or the bicomunal relations, cannot fit this category for two main reasons: 1. Most of them appear to adopt nationalistic approaches either when they are referring to the other community or to their own, 2. The fewer groups that do not share this nationalistic approach and they appear to be more open to the other community use their official languages, i.e. Greek or Turkish, and as a result the bicomunal communication becomes difficult to unachievable. Thus, the discussion that follows will not include conversations of those groups.

7.3.2.2. Facebook Groups that contain keyword ‘Cyprus’ and are related to bicomunal relations or the Cyprus problem



Graph 5: Facebook groups which contain the keyword ‘Cyprus’ and are related to bicomunal relations in Cyprus or the Cyprus problem in general.

Seventy-six groups out of the 550 groups that contained the keyword “Cyprus” are somehow linked to the bicomunal relations in Cyprus; that means a percentage of 13.09% of the results.

It is worth noting that the 76 groups that are related to bicomunal relations are all open groups, so their discussions are public and anyone can join them. These groups have been divided into two categories according to their approach towards the bicomunal relations, as this was expressed in their titles and/or in the groups’ descriptions. The division indicates that 26 out of the 76 groups have a positive approach towards bicomunal relations and the rest 50 groups have a negative approach towards bicomunal relations, which is translated into a percentage of 34.21% versus 65.79% (see Graph 5). As one would expect most of the groups of the first category have members from both communities since they support peaceful coexistence and groups of the second category have members from only one community. An interesting element of the groups, which resulted from this search and are linked to bicomunal relations, is that they are using the English language. Something like this of course is expected to be the case for the groups with a positive approach towards bicomunal relations since English is one common language that the two communities can use to communicate. More surprisingly, however,

English was also used by groups of the second category – those with a negative approach towards bicomunal relations.

Many group titles suggest that the groups of this category support nationalistic ideas, for example “Cyprus is Greek!”, “cyprus belongs to turks”, “Get the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus recognized as a country” or “Enough IS ENOUGH! STOP Assimilation of TurkishCYPRIOTS in north of Cyprus!”. Thus, the fact that the English language is used in these nationalistic groups instead of the native language of the creators, i.e. Greek or Turkish, could be interpreted as an attempt to make a loud statement to the opposite community and cause their reaction.

Then again, not all of the group titles of this category directly suggest/refer to nationalistic ideas. For example there are groups with titles like: “SOS–LOSS OF RELIGIOUS & CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE OCCUPIED AREA OF CYPRUS”, “Sign the petition if you love Cyprus!!” or “Justice for Northern Cyprus”. The titles of those groups sound rather like a statement made more like an urge to attract the attention of the international community than a message towards the other community. Hence, the titles could be interpreted as those groups aim to make their message known to the rest of the (Facebook) world in order to gain their support and enhance their beliefs and/ or struggle.

An observation is that 30 groups out of the 50 of this category are created and facilitated by GCs and the rest 20 are TC oriented. This could have several explanations; for example, a possible answer could be that the GC community is bigger in population than the TC and as a result it is expected that more groups created by GCs than TCs would exist. However, it is worth paying more attention to the fact that this increased number of GC oriented groups is observed in the category of the groups that use mainly the English language. If combined with the argument above, this could indicate a higher tendency of the GC community to call for an international support of their beliefs. This could be explained by the fact that in the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus, which is represented only by the GC community since 1963, the GC community developed the rhetorical approach of appealing to the outside world as a representative of the constitutionally bicomunal Republic – in order to gain support – while internally there is a rather sectarian focus on the GCs as the sole ‘victims’ or the legitimised inhabitants of Cyprus. To make the

argument stronger though, it would be useful to crosscheck it with a further examination of the groups that use the native languages i.e. Greek and Turkish in order to see if there are observations of this kind in these groups too. Even though the multiple discourses that exist in the GC community are part of the scope of this research, the analysis of these discourses will not be conducted using the Facebook groups that are using the Greek language and are somehow connected to bicomunal relations, due to the vast number of these groups. The multiple discourses analysis has been carried out through the study of the different representations of events with bicomunal significance hosted in the GC press (for more details see Chapter 6).

In the case of the groups of the first category, i.e. the groups with a positive approach towards bicomunal relations, the creators/administrators are usually, as one would expect, people from both Cypriot communities. In groups where this is not the case, then in the descriptive/introductory message of the group there is a direct call for members of the other community too. For example the group “english school Cyprus”²²² has only GC administrators but in the group description they state:

English School Bicomunal Group for all GC TC students of the English School, Nicosia (Description of group *english school Cyprus*, accessed in March 2009).

A similar example is the group “MY HOMELAND IS CYPRUS!!!” with a TC administrator but with a more indirect but still open call to members of both communities in the group description since it includes the translation of “My homeland is Cyprus” in both Turkish “BENİM ANAVATANIM KIBRISTIR!!!” and Greek “Η ΜΗΤΕΡΑ-ΠΑΤΡΙΔΑ ΜΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ Η ΚΥΠΡΟΣ!!!!”.²²³

Another observation worth discussing, as shown in Graph 5, is that the number of groups with a positive approach towards bicomunal relations is smaller than those with a negative approach. How is the fact that the groups with a negative approach are almost double the number of the groups with a positive approach to be interpreted? One possible

²²² English School is a historical private school of Nicosia (in the area controlled by the Republic of Cyprus) that both in the period before the separation and after the easing of restrictions was/is bicomunal.

explanation could be that people of the two communities that want to create a group with a positive approach towards bicomunal relations will probably create one common group; on the contrary, people of the two communities that want to express their negative feelings towards the other community will create their groups separately in order to oppose each other. On the other hand, based on the views of those arguing that the Internet is an extension of the offline life (Margolis and Resnick, 2000 within Dahlgren, 2005, p.154) – it could be that the increased number of those groups mirrors the voice that dominates the offline public discourse of Cyprus. For this reason, this study concentrates on the analysis of the discussions produced in groups that seem to support views that could be considered the counterpunch to the ones that dominate the wider public.

Further to the descriptions of the previous sections, the groups with a positive approach towards bicomunal relations (34.21% out of the groups that are “Cyprus problem or bicomunal relations” oriented) constitute spaces/environments open for public political discussions. More than any other group category they provide spaces in which members of both the GC and TC communities feel welcome to express and discuss their views since the positive approach of the groups as stated in their description and the use of the English language create good circumstances for democratic political deliberation.

Even though the approach of these groups is positive towards bicomunal relations, this does not exclude anyone who does not share a similar approach, beliefs or feelings towards the other community to participate in the group discussions. On the contrary, these discussions often include posts or comments of people with a different approach to the one shared by the group members.²²⁴ For example in a discussion hosted on the ‘Wall’ of the Facebook group “ONE CYPRUS - ONE CYPRIOT POPULATION” a GC participant writes:

THERE IS NO CYPRIOT NATION explain to me then, why all our ancestors (1930's and before) considered themselves Greeks? why all those Cypriots people singed up as volunteers

²²³ It is worth mentioning that the exact translation of the Greek title in English is not «My homeland is Cyprus» as it is the original English title of the group but «My motherland is Cyprus».

²²⁴ Even though anyone can participate in the discussion despite not being a member of a group, the people who usually choose to become members of a group are those who share the ideas supported by the group. Obviously, those who participate in the discussion to oppose the ideas expressed in that group, choose to discuss without becoming members.

to the Greek army and went to fight for Greece in the balkans wars, 1st and 2nd world war etc? Why those heroes were signing the *Υμνος στην Ελευθερία*²²⁵ while they were being hung from the English? If you cant understand who you are how do you expect to be able to live with the turks? (Wall post from *ONE CYPRUS – ONE CYPRIOT POPULATION*, 04/01/09, accessed in March 2009).

This diversity of opinions that appears in these groups' discussions opposes the argument that online groups often lead to the formation of "cyber ghettos" (Dahlgren, 2005, p.152) open only for people with similar views, beliefs or concerns and the production of a monolithic discussion that as a result constitute something that cannot be considered counter-public. On the contrary, what at least appears to be the case in the groups with a positive approach towards bicomunal relations, is that the discussions are characterised by heterogeneity and democratic participation even if the majority of the participants share common beliefs. Thus, in terms of inclusion and freedom of speech, that Dahlgren supports that constitutes the structural dimension of the public sphere (2005, p.149), these groups could be considered – at least structurally wise – as counter-public spheres.

In terms of the topics discussed in these groups, it seems that the participants often share information in order to enlighten the knowledge of the rest. The following post is a sample which demonstrates this enlightenment:

During the Ottoman reign, the Turkish leadership did not come and take peoples land (and they could have easily done so). Even during the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 74 (and just prior to it) Turkey had warned Greece (if im not mistaken) 4 times NOT to get involved in Cyprus, or else they would have to step in. Greece ignored these as "empty threats". In a sense, I do agree with Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. For the systematic killing of Turkish people had to be stopped. Even in my village, innocent Turks were killed ONLY because they were Turks! (and vice versa) Now that does not mean that I agree with the 30+ years of this "stalemate". The only way to solve this problem is to have only the "Greek" and "Turkish" speaking communities (as I believe first and foremost that we are Cypriots!) sit down and hammer out a deal. Both sides will lose much, but both sides will also gain as well! (Wall Post from *PEACE IN CYPRUS*, 10/05/08, accessed in March 2009).

What is worth paying attention to in the above sample is that the post is written by a GC participant addressing another GC to whom he reveals that there have been TC killings committed by GCs prior to the 1974 war. As described in Chapter 3, the official GC

²²⁵ Title of the Greek national anthem.

narrative does not include TC killings committed by GCs²²⁶ – especially before 1974 – and as a result many GCs are unaware of such historical facts. The following post is an illustration of the one-sided narrative used in the GC public sphere:

[...] I am not a historian We never had a chance to learn what had happened to the people living at the other side of the green line [i.e. the TCs]. We ALL have been taught we were the only one suffering. It's time to show, say or learn whatever truth is and whatever we do know.. I hope time is not very far to manage to build one Cypriot population.. I don't want to spend the rest of my life with this stupid conflict and restrictions in my country as all our elders did live.. (Wall Post from *Reunification in Cyprus starts with truth and reconciliation*, 02/02/2008, accessed in March 2009).

In addition to the point of new information that can be shared between the participants, the discussions often host topics that are not discussed or are considered radical by the dominant public sphere of Cyprus. For example, the topic of establishing the Cypriot dialect as the official language of the Republic of Cyprus appears as a post in one of these groups:

I think it is important for a united Cyprus if there is a written common language. A historic and unofficial one does exist. But it is considered a dialect and has not been written, preserved and honoured as a dictionary to my knowledge - at least not one accessible to both communities! If there was an available Cypriot dictionary, it will bridge the gap between the two communities. The cypriot language, which our ancestors used when living together, is the only true identity for cypriots. It is a lexical evolution which considers this Cypriot History through language, using Greek, Turkish, Arabic, Italian, as well as many other words of nations which have occupied our country over the last two thousand years! The language is something which is considered inferior by the right wing of the country because they know it is dangerous to contributing to a common identity. It is the only thing that is distinctively Cypriot! IT MUST BE WRITTEN (Wall Post from *ONE CYPRUS - ONE CYPRIOT POPULATION*, 02/12/2008, accessed in March 2009).

Despite their attribute of enlightenment, counter-public spheres are often challenged regarding their openness towards the wider publics. Fraser agrees that counter-publics are not ghettos or enclaves by definition even though she admits that “they [the participants] are often involuntarily enclaved” (1990, p.67). The conversation that follows, illustrates this involuntary enclave but at the same time it shows the participants’ desire for setting themselves against the wider publics (Asen, 2000, p.437).

²²⁶ It is important to note that since the election of Mr. Christofias in the end of February 2008 there have been efforts to change the official approach towards the TC community. One of these efforts is the Minister’s of Education and Culture attempt to change the history of Cyprus textbooks and his initiative to create an atmosphere of reunification in schools.

Both GCs and TCs need to know there is a HUGE movement or reunionists out there, and the tide is turning. We cant hide at Ledra Palace²²⁷ anymore, we have to take it out there. They need to know we are Cypriot and WE run the show, not the fasists and fake nationalists.²²⁸ MEdia etc needs to present us publically, we need to be visible, and break the taboos once and for all, and get rolling (Wall post from *ALL TROOPS OUT OF CYPRUS!*, 23/12/2007, accessed in March 2009).

[...] let me share with you of my experiences... 10 years ago we formed bicomunal choir for peace in cyprus... it was formed at ledra palace but then denktas banned the meetings... so we had to meet at pyla... for rehersals... they were difficult times but very warm... until the opening of 'gates' we gave few concerts... but not in cyprus... but with the opening of the 'gates' the group lost their target or became the tool to some political parties... on both sides... so i gave up 3 years ago... and 2 years ago (Wall post from *ALL TROOPS OUT OF CYPRUS!*, 23/12/2007, accessed in March 2009).

The first post highlights the need to get out of the ‘enclave’ they had to enclose themselves – in this case the participant is using the example of Ledra Palace – in order to make the public they form “visible” in the wider public sphere of Cyprus. One way out of the enclave, according to the author of this post is through the media: “Media etc needs to present us publically [...] and break the taboos once and for all” a statement evidence that even in 2007 bicomunal activities have been excluded by the media. In the second post, the participant draws the attention to the atmosphere created among the members of the bicomunal choir during the period of their ‘enclave’. He describes that even their meetings in Ledra Palace – which is located in no man’s land – were banned; but despite the difficulties the participant emphasises that the atmosphere in the group was warm and that they were focused on their target something that according to the same participant, is not the case since the opening of the barricades. The participant’s statement designates an aspect of the counter-public’s act of enclave that has not been identified before. The fact that counter-publics, by enclosing themselves in enclaves, increase the internal tempo of their group; that is, the bonds between the participants become stronger and the feeling of the common identity they share is enhanced. Additionally, it identifies a certain degree of risk when a counter-public sets itself towards the wider public, the risk of losing its focus.

In spite of this risk though, these groups appear to be willing to place themselves outwards but in a way that would protect their entity. In the following two posts the participant – author of both posts – proposes the organisation of a bicomunal workshop about the

²²⁷ Ledra Palace is a hotel in Nicosia’s buffer zone that since 1974 has been used to host bicomunal activities.

²²⁸ The Greek Cypriot participant probably means ‘patriots’ here instead of ‘nationalists’.

missing persons' issue. What is important to note here is that this participant emphasises the significance of keeping the workshop on the "grassroots level" in order to keep it targeted on the needs of the process of finding information about the missing persons, rather than on simply presenting new findings about this issue to a wider public.

We need such a joint team [like the Cyprus Missing Persons Committee] to work quietly, low profile and it will take years and it will not include any `shows` or `sensation` but real hard work and danger and maybe years later, when the ground is appropriate, such a joint team could make it public their findings...

the important thing about this issue as well as our group `Reunification in Cyprus starts with truth and reconciliation` is at this moment to see what are the needs on the ground... Instead of `idealistic` (we all are of course), if we can, together, work on prioritizing the needs of the process and seeing who can practically and voluntarily work on the needs to be identified, we can make progress without damaging the process. I am ready to facilitate a weekend workshop on this sometime in April - we can also have Achilleas and Emine Erk, if they are interested and others, as well as participants from missing families whom I have introduced to each other and who would be ready to work in a multi-cultural context without playing the game of `blame`... (Discussion Board Post from *Reunification in Cyprus starts with truth and reconciliation*, 14/02/2008, accessed in March 2009).

[...] what I am suggesting is a workshop at the grassroots level of sharing the causes of this group and looking at the needs and concerns, including definitely the victims of the conflict I was talking about this group... (Discussion Board Post from *Reunification in Cyprus starts with truth and reconciliation*, 15/02/2008, accessed in March 2009).

Hence, the participants of these groups appear to be willing to set themselves against the wider public but only when "the ground is appropriate", implying that when the counter-public formed by such a group is strong or ready enough to confront the wider public. Through the comments of this last participant, the purpose of the existence of a counter-public is highlighted, that is not to counter the wider public in order to give an emotional "show" that would eventually harm the internal process of the counter-public, but to provide enlightenment through the expression of their views or revelations.

It is based on this enlightenment feature, that I suggest that the Internet – and Facebook Groups in particular – in the case of bicommunal communication in Cyprus constitutes a medium in which people can move beyond "the myth of the mediated centre" (Couldry, 2003b). In this online context, the myth that the media have a privileged relationship with the centre of society so it has the authority to represent it, cannot go far since the participation of people in the exchange and discussion of social facts proves that the

representation provided by these mediators differs from the ‘reality’ they experience²²⁹ online. Cypriots that participate in bicomunal discussions in these groups subtract in a sense the power concentration from the mass media and other structures that undertook the role of mediating communication between the two Cypriot communities.

Furthermore, the posts indicate that in this online context what Couldry (2000) calls as “ordering” – that strong feature of the print and broadcast media that differentiates media themselves and “media people” from the “ordinary people” – does not seem to exist. Due to this decentralisation of symbolic power that is caused by the option given to the user to participate and distribute information of social facts her/himself, the division line between the ordinary and the media people fades out if not disappearing completely. This is significant not because it illustrates that the Internet is not like any other ‘legacy’ media but because in the case of bicomunal communication in Cyprus this means that the “ordinary people” who participate in these pro-coexistence groups, are in a sense empowered into “media people” since they can share/publish information that are excluded from the dominant public sphere(s) of the island.

In the public wall of another group called, “A UNITED NICOSIA WITHOUT SOLDIERS” a GC’s post instead of simply mentioning information about historical facts on the relations of the two communities that is unknown in the wider public, she provides a link to an alternative media source which gives evidence about such historical facts. She writes:

For those who want to know the true history of Cyprus from both sides. This kind of history is not written in books or even told to the new generations of GCs. All Cypriots please watch this...Journalist/director/peacemaker, Tony Angastiniotis had the courage to expose crimes committed by his own community. The ...documentary exposes the atrocities committed by GC militia against TC villagers during the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974. There are two stories on you-tube. Voice of Blood which is 4 parts and Voice of Blood 2: Searching for Selden which is 5 parts but it is worth watching. Please watch all parts on you-tube and share them around...

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gwEF9H4PChk&feature=related>

²²⁹ Experience both in terms of online coexistence and of finding new information/other views about historical events.



[Figure 7: Snapshot of the documentary as appears on the post].

(Wall post from *A UNITED NICOSIA WITHOUT SOLDIERS*, 16/2/2010, accessed in October 2010).


This particular documentary and its producer, Tony Angastiniotis, have been excluded by the dominant GC public sphere in the sense that the print and broadcast media neither ever included this documentary into their programmes or referred to it, nor did the official institutions – political parties, church or educational organisations. Thus, the Facebook Group in this case provides an alternative channel for broadcasting media material that mass communication media have rejected. Angastiniotis²³⁰ documentary is rejected/excluded by the GC mass communication media because both the documentary and the producer are considered radical. Furthermore, broadcasting the documentary by the GC mass media would mean reversing many of the established narratives about historical events that dominate the official GC public sphere.

Another point of the post that should be highlighted is the final few words with which the user urges the participants of the group not simply to watch the documentary themselves but to “share it” with their friends in their profile too. Unfortunately there is no way to find out the number of the participants that have indeed shared, i.e. published the link for the documentary in their profiles in order to recommend it to their friends, but since this is a YouTube embedded video according to the video statistics, available on YouTube, it has been viewed 2722 times 313 of which has been done via Facebook.

What is important however is simply the fact that Facebook as an Internet tool could be used by a participant to broadcast media material – that would otherwise not be broadcast – her/himself is something that changes the distribution of symbolic power. The user in this case obtains *power* in the context of this medium to be transferred from the world of

“ordinary people” into the one of “media people” since from a simple viewer/reader becomes a broadcaster herself. More importantly as illustrated in the above post, in situations like the dominant GC public sphere that there is no participation but only representation of ‘the other’ plus rejection of presenting controversial material – like the documentary mentioned in the post – Facebook becomes a medium with a more democratic social use at least when compared to print and broadcast media.

7.3.2.3 Facebook Groups that contain keyword ‘Cyprus’ and have a neutral approach towards bicomunal relations



Graph 6: Facebook bicomunal groups that contain keyword ‘Cyprus’.

Now as far as the groups that use the English language have members from both communities – and at the same time have a neutral approach towards bicomunal relations – are concerned, they arguably represent the de facto coexistence of the two Cypriot communities. This is because these groups have members, people of both communities, but the groups themselves are formed around themes that do not connect in any way with bicomunal relations or the Cyprus problem in general. That is why it is interesting to see whether in groups where GCs and TCs coexist for other reasons than building or preventing their in-between interaction and cooperation, bicomunal public communication also exists and at the same time to identify the purposes for which these bicomunal groups are formed. The analysis will first focus on the general characteristics of these groups and especially on their themes. Then the attention will move to the public

²³⁰ Tony Angastiniotis is a GC peace activist who lives both in the northern and southern parts of the island.

discussions produced in these groups – if any – in order to understand the rituals – the set of practices that are enacted within these groups – and their entanglement with bicommunal relations.

As shown in Graph 6, 72% of groups with members of both communities have a neutral approach towards bicommunal relations, a percentage that is higher from either of the other two categories, i.e. the groups with positive and negative approach accordingly; this percentage is even higher of the sum of these other two categories. This could be interpreted as a tendency of the majority of the Cypriot Facebook users to avoid political discussions or groups related to the Cyprus problem in general. The logic behind this interpretation is the fact that as mentioned before in Facebook the majority of the people who use Facebook, want to be recognisable so they reveal their real identity by using their real names which are most of the time accompanied by pictures of themselves. Consequently, this means that a user's involvement in any political group becomes automatically public – which means having her/his real identity exposed²³¹ – not only to her/his social network but also to the members of the group or, in the case of an open group, even to anyone else that might scan through the specific group. This of course, could go against Habermas' notion of a disinterested public which acts outside the sphere of identification. However, this thesis adopts Livingstone's opposition to the idea of mediated situations defined as either private or public which consequently place them either in the sphere of the experience of identity or in the sphere of collective and consensual action (2005, p.17), and supports that in many of today's mediated situations – like in Facebook Groups – the experience is both private and public since it is produced through both individualised/identity actions and collective actions.

The rest of this section, will attempt to analyse the Facebook Groups that on the one hand have members of both communities but on the other, have themes dedicated on other matters/interests of the Cypriot society beyond the scope of the Cyprus problem and the bicommunal communication per se. The analysis will be based on the idea of this in-between private and public domain that the tool of Facebook offers and on the legitimisation produced by the rituals developed in these Facebook Groups; a legitimisation

²³¹ This kind of actions of a Facebook user are announced in her/his profile and in the news feed of her/his friends.

which I will suggest that in the case of these groups, both because of the specificity of the medium and as a result this concurrent private and public experience it offers, is closer to the Durkheimian ritual function of integration than to Couldry's media ritual function of naturalisation of "media social order".

These Facebook groups have a variety of themes, from groups dedicated to car brands like "Peugeot Cyprus" to groups about recreational activities like "Cyprus Shooting Club" or groups created for awareness purposes like "Dyslexia in Cyprus". One could suggest that this group theme variation indicates the high degree of converging interests between the two communities. As appears in Table 3 below, the highest percentage (27.27%) of these groups have a theme dedicated to a geographical place. The significant thing about the groups with such a theme is that some of them have titles that one would expect to be considered, depending on the case, as taboo words by one of the two communities. For example the group "Republic of Cyprus" in which one would expect to find only GC members seems to have TC members too. A similar example is the group "LeFKoSa CyPRuS" which despite the fact that it is a group with a half Turkish name – Lefkoşa is the Turkish name of Nicosia – and as a result one would expect it to have only TC members: surprisingly enough it has GC members too. Analogous cases are groups that have names of places in both the north and south areas of Cyprus; people of both communities join these groups independently of the locale of the place. It seems that the geographical places that these groups are dedicated to, are elements that define the identity of the people of both communities that join them. Similarly to the observation noted in Chapters 5 and 6 – that the physical landscape of Cyprus was and still is an element which offers a collective experience to the two communities – the Facebook groups developed around a geographical space of Cyprus, create/add a common feeling/element to these people's identity, that of belongingness to Cyprus as a whole.

Another group theme that is quite popular for the two Cypriot communities is that of music. Groups with such a theme are somehow related with certain types of music. The thing drawing the attention here is that in this category there are also groups about specific radio stations in the north or the south part of Cyprus. This is an important observation since it indicates that in certain cases the two communities form common media audiences. Such examples are the "Deejay Radio (Cyprus)" and the "CYPRUS CLUB BEATS"

groups, which are related to GC and TC radio stations accordingly. The people of the two communities who join these groups seem to listen to these radio stations since they share similar music preferences without concerning themselves with the station's origin. Based on this indication, one could suggest that when these bicomunal radio audiences form groups in an environment in which interaction and dialogue is possible, what they create really is a kind of public sphere which runs counter to the one exists in the physical environment of the Cypriot society – i.e. the segregated public sphere in which interaction is difficult to impossible and the existence of the “other” is invisible. In other words, these audiences form counter-publics in which they can develop social bonds with each other, share their personal interests or even concerns in a way similar to what Durkheim (1912) described as a ritual solidarity function. This ritual solidarity might be the reason for the emergence of groups dedicated on other themes that appear proportionally high on Table 3 like sexuality, recreational or extreme sports, nightlife and cars.

In fact, when looking at Facebook groups in general one identifies that one of the main purposes of their existence lies somewhere between offering ritual solidarity and media rituals (Couldry, 2003b), meaning the creation of a public sphere that on the one hand encloses its members in a ‘sacred space’ in order to offer mutual understanding and enhance their shared beliefs and on the other, a space that offers to its members moments of publicity that counter the ones not offered in dominant the public spheres.

However, what differentiates the media rituals that are developed within this context in comparison to the ones produced in the print and broadcast media is the legitimisation they offer: in the case of these groups and in contrast to the print and broadcast media, what is being legitimised is the coexistence of the two communities rather than the legitimisation that naturalises the inequalities within different social aspects such as ethnic, gender, class or sexual differences. This significant difference among the media rituals developed within this online context has a lot to do with the specificity of the medium and the uses it can be put to. Unlike the print and broadcast media, the Internet as a medium and the Facebook Groups as an Internet tool specifically, not only allow coexistence and the option for participation in an integrated public but also legitimise this integration due to the sacred theme around which each group is built. Durkheim, sees rituals not as being transcendental in a metaphysical way but in the way “human beings imagining the absolute

nature of the bond they share as members of a social group” (1995, cited in Couldry, 2003b, p.135). Thus, what I suggest here is that the rituals practised in the context of these Facebook Groups legitimise an alternative reality for the two communities that is the absolute nature of the bond they share as members of those specific groups. This legitimisation of bicomunal coexistence is not to be seen of course as the deterministic consequence of the technology of the Internet as a medium, but as the result of the use of this medium.

Furthermore, what deserves attention is the way in which the groups’ members – GCs and TCs amongst them – share this ritual solidarity and legitimise their coexistence. Even though one would expect that this would be expressed through dialogue, a surprising observation occurs when one focuses on the public conversations hosted in the groups; the number of the posts in the public wall or the discussion board is very low proportionally to the number of the groups’ members. For example, in one of the groups about homosexuality in Cyprus – called “Gay Cyprus” with 182 members – the number of the posts on its public wall is 39, from which 6 are advertisement posts and the rest do not seem to relate/reply to each other. A similar example is the case of “Deejay Radio (Cyprus)”, a group dedicated to a GC radio station. Despite the fact that the group has 828 members, there are only 17 posts in the public wall of the group that again are more like independent statements rather than posts that initiate a conversation. Even the post “Im Turkish But i like DeeJay Radio :) Enjoy” (Wall Post from group *Deejay Radio (Cyprus)*, 28/12/2008 accessed on 30/03/2009) of a TC – or a Turkish living in Cyprus – member did not trigger any conversation.

How could then, this absence of conversational interaction be explained? A possible answer could be that through these groups people have the chance to add each other to their social network and consequently they might engage in conversations privately. Then again, if we attempt to see/interpret this absence of public communication through the lens of the Durkheimian ritual function, what happens in these groups is similar to what happens when people gather in religious spaces for ritual services; their relationship is built not necessarily through the interaction with each other but through their similar ritual acts towards the ‘sacred’. One could suggest then, that the purpose of these groups is not the discussion that will lead them to consensus but the participation/ presence in a space in

which their beliefs, preferences, distinctiveness become the main substitute of a collective integrated identity.

Table 3: Themes of Facebook Groups that contain the word “Cyprus” and have a neutral approach towards bicomunal relations and/or the Cyprus problem.

Theme	Number of Groups	Percentage
Place Oriented	21	27.27%
Sexuality Oriented	6	7.79%
Nightlife Oriented	7	9.09%
Type of Music/Radio Station	8	10.38%
Cars	7	7.79%
Recreational/ Sports	8	10.38%
Business/ Organisation	3	3.89%
Students	2	2.59%
Arts	3	3.89%
Activism/ Awareness/ Non Profit Organisations	3	3.89%
Fan Clubs	3	3.89%
Political Parties	1	1.29%
Other	5	6.49%
Total Number: 77		

7.4. Concluding note

An argument of this chapter is that in the case of de facto geographical divisions – as before 2003 – Internet communication can create virtual spaces for alternative forms of the public – even at the boundary of the personal and the political/public. In this context, the medium – due to its specificity – can be said to help transcend the divisions of geography and state politics/policies and hegemonic ideologies.

With social networking tools it is evident that part of the discourse that exists outside the Internet is carried online also – as an extension of those arguments. It is also true however, that groups whose voices or discourses are excluded from the public domain/sphere can find here alternative forms of organising and debate, which places them – at least as far as this medium is concerned – on an equal footing with discourses sanctioned by *power* and hegemonic institutions such as the print and broadcast media. This can be done because the users of these online tools can provide information or broadcast material that has been excluded by the print and broadcast media of the dominant public sphere. In this sense, the new media are tools that could be used to produce counter-publics of a different kind from the Habermasian public sphere since they are developed between the private and public domain but can be publics that as the analysis showed, that are more open in debate.

The most interesting possibility might be groups in which people from the two communities coexist de facto on the basis of their interests – rather than as a conscious political decision to promote certain views. In this case, the medium facilitates bicomunal coexistence and we might say that forms of collective solidarity are born on the basis of rituals of participating in these groups who share a common ‘sacred’ interest.

Even though my two case studies have the limitation of not providing me with a clear picture of those users/members of the online groups – especially in the case of the Facebook Groups – who are actually committed in participating in the Group and those who are just ‘passing by’ or whether there is bicomunal communication either via online chat or offline, it seems that the media rituals in this context function differently that they do in print and broadcast media. The differentiation lays on the fact that in the context of these groups what is legitimised is the coexistence of the two communities rather than their

differences and to an extent their separation, which is expressed either with the discussion of otherwise excluded aspects of the Cyprus issue or by sharing identities that are created based on elements beyond ethnicity or religion.

Chapter Eight

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND BEYOND

Although the Cyprus problem and several aspects of the history of bicomunal relations in Cyprus have been extensively studied in the past few decades, the changes in the communication media and how they affected both the relations between the two communities and the perceptions of each community within the other have remained relatively unexplored. This thesis is an attempt to study these dynamics by exploring different types of communication – face-to-face, print and broadcast, and new media – by relating them to different historical periods in which each type of medium has been ‘dominant’ as a mode of communication.

The focus of my starting questions has been twofold: on the one hand, there was an effort to decipher how certain meanings about the other community²³¹ have been constructed – and how each medium shaped this process. The central question here obviously has been to what an extent and in what ways the constructed perceptions and discourses have encouraged bicomunal cooperation or conflict. At the same time, there was an effort to see how these discourses were organised in the public sphere.

Recounting the theoretical path

The questions that I set about to explore had several dimensions: there was a focus on how meanings are constructed, but there was also an emphasis on how they are interpreted and how rival discourses compete. The question of power was central: Was power – as organised in society in terms of institutions and class relations for example – the key determinant of how discourses were constructed? Or was there a dynamic in the medium itself or in the way the medium was used in society?

²³¹ This has been mainly done from a GC perspective.

The initial theoretical framework was shaped by the exploration of two traditions: the tradition of analysis focusing on the impact of the media as forms or as institutions and the tradition of analysis focusing on the way the media become vehicles for the articulation of rival – dominant and counter-hegemonic – discourses in the public sphere. There was in this sense an effort to link two seemingly distant traditions – the one emphasising the impact of the media as forms and the other analysing the framework organised by the media as a forum for public discourse in Modernity.

1. In the first tradition the focus has moved away from the transmission model as Carey called it, to models that emphasised the impact of the media in shaping the environment within which information is transmitted and interpreted. In this context the discussion involved an evaluation of theories emphasising forms of technological determinism (such as McLuhan) to theoretical accounts that are putting back ‘intention’ into the equation of media and society (such as Williams). The model adopted eventually, is one acknowledging the impact of the media as forms but which situates this impact in the context of institutional and cultural dynamics by utilising Couldry’s theory of “the myth of the mediated centre” (2003b, p.2).

Couldry’s (2003b) “Media Rituals” was my entry point into this approach. In this work, Couldry suggests that media rituals are mechanisms that when enacted reinforce or reproduce the legitimacy of the belief that the media is our access point to the moral “centre of society”. Couldry calls this belief “the myth of the mediated centre” and this is where he locates the media’s power. “The myth of the mediated centre” underlies two dimensions: (a) that the print and broadcast media – and increasingly the Internet – have a privileged relationship with the so called “centre of society” and (b) that due to this privileged relationship the media have the ‘natural’ role/‘right’ to represent that centre. This, together with previous work of Couldry on locating the media’s power (2000b) which emphasised the media’s role in “ordering”, i.e. to reproduce a hierarchical boundary between the “ordinary world” and the “media world”, seemed to provide an approach to tackle my multidimensional research question. This approach is more encompassing in the sense that it does not centre on one aspect of media on which it locates its power but it rather focuses on the different dimensions involved in the cultural process of mediated communication. Thus it can be used to explore how certain discourses and identities were

legitimised when the dominant mode of communication moved from oral/face-to-face communication to print and broadcast communication that encouraged rituals of separation and ethnic division. At the same time it allows for seeing a dynamic interaction between text-medium-audience.

2. As far as the other dimension is concerned – the construction of the public sphere and the competition/conflict of rival discourses for hegemony – the discussion originated obviously from Habermas' seminal work on the issue and proceeded with the discussions (and amendments) that followed his argument. In this context, theories indicating the emergence of multiple and counter public spheres (Negt & Kluge 1993 [1972]; Fraser 1990; Downey & Fenton 2003) formed by groups that are excluded participation – due to class, gender, race or other socioeconomic reasons – to the bourgeois public sphere have been discussed.

Initially the focus of the discussion about the public sphere was on the particularity of the Cypriot public sphere, i.e. the way it was constructed and partitioned due to the linguistic differences in the print media of the two communities, something which in effect created an oppositional framework of public discussion to the one that had existed when the oral/face-to-face communication was dominant. But subsequently the focus turned also on the existence of rival discourses on relations with the other community. Thus, the discussion of the public sphere turned into a discussion of how certain discourses were legitimised in specific historical contexts, how others – excluded discourses – tried to utilise non-dominant forms of media programmes and how the process followed by these excluded discourses facilitated the construction of alternative/counter public spheres.

Considering the plurality of the media uses in such periods of intense socio-historical circumstances as the ones that characterised the 20th century and in some rare occasions the beginning of the 21st century in Cyprus, leads to the conclusion that more than one public sphere exist(ed) in the island. Thus, when examining the relationship between those multiple public spheres a critical discourse analytic method has been adopted in the sense that I considered that there is an uneven dynamic and consequently some sort of dominance enacted by certain publics – and discourses – against others.

Even though this thesis focused on the representation of *otherness* in Cyprus while defining the *other* exclusively as the member of the other community, i.e. TC or GC, it should be noted that in recent times in Cyprus there has been a shift in the reality and representation of *otherness*. This shift lies on the fact that after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus in the European Union a new dynamic has emerged in the formation of the identities of *self* and *otherness*. For example apart from the ethnic, religious or ideological elements that have been used until 2004 to define themselves, Cypriots have since then the European element added in the process of defining their identities. Furthermore, certain historical events of the recent times of Cyprus like the ‘free movement’ measure across the Green Line in 2003 and the uprisings of the TC community both in 2003 and 2010 have contributed in shifting the representations of the *other* exclusively as the member of the other community, at least in the GC public sphere. Finally of course the presence of foreign workers has added new twists to the issue of *self* and *otherness*.

I will try subsequently to see the conclusions of the empirical research in the light of the initial theoretical explorations.

Face-to-face bicommunal communication: forming an alternative public sphere that moves beyond “the myth of the mediated centre”

My first empirical study analysed interviews of GCs and TCs who had face-to-face bicommunal communication in any of the following three different broad periods of the history of bicommunal relations: (a) before separation, (b) during separation and (c) after the regulations of crossing to the northern and southern parts of the island.

Historically speaking, oral/face-to-face communication was the dominant medium of communication among the majority of the population until the first half of the 20th century – and the existence of a local linguistic form that was understood by both communities helped in a more direct communication between them. Thus the exploration of the impact of face-to-face communication on bicommunal relations had two goals: on the one hand it aimed at exploring – to the degree possible – the memories of that oral culture – and on the other hand it aimed to explore the impact of face-to-face communication after the separation of the two communities in the periods after 1963 and 1974.

In this chapter (5), it has been argued that whenever face-to-face communication was possible among the people of the two communities their relationship was built around ‘rituals’ that prevented – or at least made more difficult the development – of (a) negative perceptions about the *other* and (b) conflicting identities. These sorts of rituals are developed either due to personal, cultural and political background or due to the common experiences of people who coexisted in mixed villages or neighbourhoods. On the contrary, the lack of face-to-face bicommunal communication – as for example during the period of separation – inevitably made people rely almost exclusively on discourses produced by media and other structures for their communication with the other community, something which enhanced or at least reinforced conflicting identities and negative perceptions about the *other*. Thus, the way the participants – who lacked bicommunal contact before separation – experienced their first contact with the *other* can be seen as an example in which mythology became apparent. In other words, the sense of a centre remained while at the same time these participants became distanced from it or even antagonistic towards it. Hence, the collapse of the negative perceptions and of the conflicting identities of *self* and *otherness* eventually led to the realisation that the media and

other political and social structures – on which they relied for making meaning of the *other* – do not have a privileged relationship with the moral “centre of society” and they cannot be considered as access mechanisms to this centre. And a realisation at the same time, that this moral “centre of society” actually exist only in the context of this mediated myth that the print and broadcast media produce.

On another level, the exploration of how people experienced the rare occasions of bicommunal face-to-face contacts during the period of separation was used in order to reconstruct, in part, the historical trajectory of the process of rapprochement between the two communities. The very existence of bicommunal groups during the 1990s – but also the exclusion of any bicommunal activity from the Cypriot dominant public sphere(s) make those bicommunal contacts constitute an alternative public sphere, which existed parallel, and in some occasions counter to the official one(s). This alternative public sphere consisted – initially at least – of the people who realised that the idea of “the mediated centre” was indeed a myth and they wanted (had to) to move beyond it.

Representation of the *Other* in the Greek-Cypriot print and broadcast media: Moments of enhancing and collapsing of “the myth of the mediated centre”

This empirical study aimed at identifying the shifts of the hegemonic discourses in the GC public sphere and the media rituals that are/were enacted for the legitimisation – or questioning – of these discourses. The analysis here has been historical in an effort to trace the shifts created by the introduction of print and broadcast media in the 20th century. Thus selected dates were explored through these media in order to identify and analyse the media rituals that developed around the issue of bicomunal relations. The term “media rituals” is used in this thesis as Couldry (2003b) defines it, i.e. as the power effects of the process of mediating the social world. Media in this sense become mechanisms that produce ‘rituals’ through which people imagine themselves connected to the social world (Couldry, 2003b, p.2). Through the analysis of these rituals it became clear how the “myth of the mediated centre” constructed a different reality from the one experienced on the level of everydayness/ordinary life, encouraging in the process the division of the local population. On the other hand, though, we saw also how rival and counter-hegemonic discourses developed in the public sphere, which drew their inspiration from historical coexistence, and by virtue of their existence often posed questions on the legitimacy of the hegemonic ideology, but also – even if indirectly – on the myth that the media constituted the society’s mediated centre.

As the analyses of media discourses with rightist ideological background showed, there has been a shift of the rightist discourse in Cyprus through the years. This shift has been evident when examining the 1990s conflict resolution activities since GC rightists/liberals have been pioneers in such activities. Additionally, the recent uprisings of the TCs have also influenced this shift of the GC right’s discourse of *otherness*. Thus the rightist discourse in the GC community shifted from being singularly nationalist to being divided between a nationalistic and a reconciliation discourse. Furthermore, the discourses of *otherness* in the GC rightist context has also changed due to the broader shifts such as globalisation and the rise of xenophobia that we experience in many countries. Such xenophobic discourses that are diffused in the GC public sphere shifted in a sense the discourse of *otherness* of the extreme Right and transformed its definition from representing (or targeting) exclusively the TCs to (representing) focusing also on migrants in Cyprus. It should be noted also that

in the northern part of the island, the issue of *self* and *otherness* has taken new complex dimensions as the TCs seem to resent immigration from Turkey, seeing it as a ‘danger’ to their ‘identity’. This dimension that involves political (the impact of Turkey on northern Cyprus) rather than racist arguments, it still has an undertone of conflict over the definition of identity even within the alleged unity of “Turks”.

The analysis of two “media events” from broadcast media was used as a sample of the process of legitimisation and crisis of “the myth of the mediated centre”. In this context, I analysed the television coverage of two significant historical moments in the recent history of Cyprus. As I argued, these two events even though they have the characteristics of what Dayan and Katz (1992) call “media events” did not have the social integrative effect in the sense that the authors described it. In the case of the first media event – that of the openings for crossing to the northern and southern parts of the island – I suggested that there was a collapse of “the myth of the mediated centre” and a de-territorialisation of people’s reality. As the analysis of the television reports showed, the television discourse – similarly with that of the press – initially attempts to territorialise people’s reality through certain rituals conveyed by its discourse. However, this failed due to the shock that the people experienced when they realised that their current reality was far different from the one built by the media until then and that is why television eventually was in a way forced to shift its discourse and follow the flow of the people’s experiences of crossing. The newspapers shifted slightly as we saw, but in general they maintained a more distant view and in the long run they functioned to reconstruct the images of separation that collapsed along with “the mediated centre” those days.

The analysis of the second media event, that of the television coverage of Tassos Papadopoulos’ proclamation, identifies the rituals enacted both by the way the proclamation was presented on television and by the text of the proclamation itself in order to legitimise the dominant discourse. In many ways, this case is illustrative of how rituals are entangled in media discourses in order to establish “the myth of the mediated centre”.

Bicommunal communication through the Internet: Demolishing the boundaries between the “media world” and “the ordinary world”

The last empirical study focused on the way Yahoo Group Emails and Facebook Groups have been used in order to facilitate bicommunal communication. This empirical study had also a historical parallel: if the first study was an attempt to recapture the experience of ‘traditional’ oral/face-to-face culture, and the second was an effort to investigate the way modern print and broadcast media came to create, dominate, and partition the local public sphere through the rituals of the mediated centre, this study was an attempt to investigate the process of reunification which picked up momentum while the new media tools were spreading in Cypriot society.

The first case study analysed the use of Yahoo Group Emails by a bicommunal group of teenagers in 2001, a period in which face-to-face contact was prohibited on the island. After analysing the teenagers’ online conversations, the group was using Yahoo Group Emails in order to overcome their exclusion from the official public sphere(s) of Cyprus. As it appears in the email conversations, the teenagers seemed to understand that their exclusion had to do with the bicommunality of the group but they also expressed their intention to maintain their communication even if it meant acting counter to the official public sphere(s). Thus, I argued that this group could be seen as an example of people of the two communities who after realising that the idea of “the mediated centre” is a myth, attempt to find alternative ways to move beyond it. Communicating through Yahoo Group Emails in order to organise their future actions was an alternative – and subterranean – way to do it since in that particular time, anything bicommunal – at least on the people’s level – was both prohibited and people who participated were marginalised.

When examining Cyprus related groups in Facebook, it emerged that apart from the groups that are intentionally bicommunal – like for example the pro-peace and pro-reunification groups – there are several other groups in which Cypriots of the two communities coexisted without necessarily interacting with each other. Such groups are the ones that are built around certain themes and as I suggested these themes constitute forms of centres around of which alternative identities are created that are inclusive for both communities.

The dynamic of the pro-peace Facebook groups lies again on the fact that an alternative public sphere is organised through a medium that allows bicommunal communication. This argument however, should not be considered as a statement that differentiates the Internet from other media. The point I tried to make is on the use that this Internet tool has been put to. As discussed in section 7.3.2.2 the members of those groups are using this tool in order to become broadcasters of information and audiovisual material that is excluded by the print and broadcast media and other institutional structures of the island. It is in this sense that I argued that the boundary between the “media world” and “ordinary world” is redrawn; the users of those bicommunal groups on Facebook move beyond the myth of the power of “media world” and make the “ordinary world” as powerful as the “media world” connotes.

Extensions and implications of the argument

It could be argued that more emphasis should have been paid to how alternative discourses existed in the dominant public sphere: either the leftist press (or more broadly the leftist subculture in both communities) for example, or cases like the Cypriot sketch in which alternative – to the hegemonic – themes seem to emerge even in the context of dominant media. But this would have focus only on how forms of resistance to “the myth of the mediated centre” coalesced and often, in specific historical circumstances – how for example after 1974 the GC community managed to transform elements of the hegemonic discourse itself.

The goal of this work though focused primarily on how bicomunal communication was facilitated or disrupted – and thus enhanced the separation of the two communities – by different media in order to get some sense of the power each of them exerts and how this influence has affected the relationship of the two communities. In this context, the historical emphasis has been on how “the myth of the mediated centre” was constructed and how it was maintained and in this framework the forces challenging it, and the circumstances helping in its collapse at certain historical moments or incorporating elements of the rival discourses were explored.

One of the clear limitations of this research is the fact that it did not examine the representation of the *other* in the TC print and broadcast media. As explained in the Chapter 4 though, analysing material only from the GC print and broadcast media is to some extent justifiable because of the segregation of the Cypriot public sphere that was caused by the use of only one language – Greek or Turkish – in these media and eventually by the physical separation of the two communities. But if I would start thinking of how to expand my research in the future, analysing the GCs’ representation in the TC media would definitely be my entry point. This would paint the other half of the picture about the impact of media rituals on bicomunal relations in Cyprus.

Furthermore, there could have been more emphasis on how the Cypriot case might be an indicative for other divided communities/nations. It would also be very interesting to

extend the project by looking at the Cypriot divide from outside of the island, whether in Greece or Turkey or in the wider international community.

Nevertheless, a significant finding of this thesis is that the Internet provides a virtual space in which the two communities coexist. This is not only interesting in terms of recapturing a common Cypriot public sphere for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities but also because it shows that new media are creating bonds beyond the perceptions constructed by a century of hegemonic discourses alienating – largely – the two communities, or at least leading them in different directions. So a question that could be posed for future research is whether new forms of “the myth of the mediated centre” will emerge or whether the multiplicity of media will allow more space for alternative discourses to be developed or enhanced.

On another level, the coexistence on the Internet but also the seemingly profound impact of face-to-face communication in local culture, indicate that despite problems still in finding a solution on the level of politicians, on the level of ordinary reality there is a reverse process already to that of the separation, which began in the middle of the last century. This is because of the continuities and similarities of bicomunal face-to-face communication and online communication, mainly to demolish stereotypes about the *other*, to provide alternative accounts on aspects of the conflict and to create inclusive identities that are not necessarily built on the basis of ethnicity or religion. Thus, McLuhan was probably right for his profound optimism about the impact of new technology but for the wrong reasons; As the findings of this thesis indicate, it is not the technology of the medium as such that determines communication and shapes social reality but the impact or the consequences of the rituals produced by the discourses which are using it. That is why, I am looking forward to examining further the way *power* is entangled in media discourses and be further surprised by the way this dialectical relationship between the media and society works.

An important contribution of this research is that it places the media’s role into the picture of bicomunal conflict in Cyprus and shows how media’s discourses produced rituals that intensified conflict between the two Cypriot communities and how those dominant discourses shifted in specific historical periods in order to reflect the tensions of that time.

Such a contribution is not significant only for the Cypriot case of conflict but it could be used by researches of similar cases of bicomunal conflict in areas like the ones mentioned in the introduction. For example this thesis could inspire research focusing on the impact (whether there was a similar kind of domination) of certain dominant media discourses that reinforced elements of difference such as religious and ethnicity – over others that did not cause violence between the communities for years – and produced conflicting identities that intensified tensions.

I introduced this thesis by briefly describing my personal experience and highlighting the rival meanings that were confusing me as a GC child that was growing up in the post separation era. In 2011, the final year of writing up this thesis, not many things have changed in that concern, certain discourses are still persisting for dominance in the GC public sphere. The completion of this research however, makes me understand that the main difference is that today, despite the persistence of certain discourses to produce the nationalistic meanings, the establishment of these meanings is more difficult than it was before, because alternative accounts are more easily distributed in the public sphere. These alternative accounts are now more easily heard through the use of new media tools and as a result Cypriots are now more exposed to information that could make persisting meanings and discourses less convincing and dominant. As some of the findings of this thesis suggest, such information would otherwise remain part of oral stories of those who actually experienced them, like the ones my elder participants have referred to during their interviews. In other words, what if the exercise books of the GC public elementary schools still have the same picture of the old port of *Kyrenia* and the same slogan as reminders of the bicomunal conflict? *Kyrenia* can now become more than just a nostalgic memory of a life that has been violently ‘taken away’ from the *other*, it can be *redefined* through either alternative discourses that are diffused from online spaces (as the one discussed in Chapter 7) to the public sphere or through the personal relationship that can be developed with TCs that come from or live in *Kyrenia*.

Thus, with the completion of this thesis I can surely say that I know something that I did not know before: that for as long as the Internet does not claim to have the role of representing ‘the centre of society’ something, which is actually hard to happen since new tools of sharing information are constantly being developed, then the dominance of certain discourses over others and the exclusion of groups with alternative beliefs will become

more difficult to achieve. Even though the narrow case studies included in this research leave little space for grand claims, I would like to close this thesis by drawing upon Couldry's argument saying that:

[...] it is clear that the Internet (or aspects of the Internet) will be fundamental to any shift in our dominant metaphors for understanding media (2003b, p.140)

and suggest that this shift will also improve relationships between conflicting communities like the ones in Cyprus in which most of the people would otherwise have no other choice but receiving messages and images of 'the represented centre'.

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Paratiritis: 31 October 1940.

Simerini: 12 August 1996, 17 August 1996, 19 May 1997, 4 November 1999, 22 April 2003, 23 April 2003, 24 April 2003, 4 November 2009.

APPENDIX A

Interviewees' Profile

Participants	Community	Gender	Age	Current Place of Residence	Refugee	Occupation	Bicommunal Involvement
“Arzu”	Turkish-Cypriot	Female	24	UK	Yes	Unemployed	Participated in bicommunal youth activities.
“Azime”	Turkish-Cypriot	Female	35	Nicosia (North)	Yes	TV presenter in the South.	Presenting a bicommunal TV programme on <i>CyBC</i> .
“Cemile”	Turkish-Cypriot	Female	50	Nicosia (North)	Yes	Pensioner (she used to be a teacher)	Used to live in a mixed village before the separation.
“Chara”	Greek-Cypriot	Female	47	Nicosia (South)	Yes	Elected Official	Participation in bicommunal activities organised by <i>AKEL</i> .
“Costas”	Greek-Cypriot	Male	58	Nicosia (South)	No	Member of <i>AKEL</i> 's central committee	Participation in bicommunal activities organised by <i>AKEL</i> .

Pseudonym	Community	Gender	Age	Current Place of Residence	Refugee	Occupation	Bicommunal Involvement
“Demetris”	Greek-Cypriot	Male	50	Aradippou (South)	No	Teacher of Economics at a private high school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - He used to have TC classmates before separation. - Organiser and facilitator of bicommunal youth activities after separation.
“Enis”	Turkish-Cypriot	Male	25	Baltimore, USA	Yes	PhD student	Participated in bicommunal youth activities.
“Erkan”	Turkish-Cypriot	Male	35	Nicosia (South)	No	General secretary of <i>Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi</i> (New Cyprus Party)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Participation in bicommunal activities through <i>YKP</i> - Married with a GC. - Currently living in the Republic of Cyprus controlled side.
“Georgia”	Greek-Cypriot	Female	17	Aradippou (South)	No	High school student	Participation in bicommunal youth activities.

Pseudonym	Community	Gender	Age	Current Place of Residence	Refugee	Occupation	Bicommunal Involvement
“Ilhami”	Turkish-Cypriot	Male	51	Morfou (North)	No	Lorry driver	- He used to live in a mixed town before 1974. - Frequent crossings to the other side.
“Kerim”	Turkish-Cypriot	Male	29	Nicosia (North)	No	Computer Engineer (also studied Psychology)/ Businessman	Doing business in both sides.
“Latif”	Turkish-Cypriot	Male	72	Nicosia (North)	No	Pensioner	- Used to live in a mixed village before 1963. - Participated in rapprochement activities in the 90’s.
“Lefteris”	Greek-Cypriot	Male	50	Limassol (South)	No	Elementary school headmaster	Headmaster at the only mixed elementary school in Limassol.
“Marina”	Greek-Cypriot	Female	66	Meneou (South)	No	Politician	Participation in rapprochement activities in the 90’s.

Pseudonym	Community	Gender	Age	Current Place of Residence	Refugee	Occupation	Bicommunal Involvement
“Nina”	Greek-Cypriot	Female	38	Nicosia (South)	No	Accountant	Frequent crossings to the other side after 2003.
“Niki”	Greek-Cypriot	Female	83	Limassol (South)	No	Pensioner	Used to live in a mixed neighborhood until 1958.
“Nurcan”	Turkish-Cypriot	Female	25	Nicosia (North)	Yes	Consultant at a management centre.	Participated in bicommunal youth activities.
“Pavlos”	Greek-Cypriot	Male	34	Nicosia (South) (South)	Yes	Politician <i>EDON</i>	Participation in bicommunal activities through organised by <i>AKEL</i> and <i>EDON</i> .
“Pembe”	Turkish-Cypriot	Female	28	Kerynia (North)	No	University student	- Crossings to the other side. - She is doing a PhD research related to the Cyprus problem.

Pseudonym	Community	Gender	Age	Current Place of Residence	Refugee	Occupation	Bicommunal Involvement
“Petros”	Greek-Cypriot	Male	58	Nicosia (South)	Yes	Courier	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - He was born and lived for a few years in a mixed town before 1974. - He also lived in the mixed Cypriot community in London after 1974. - Frequent crossings to the other side after 2003.
“Savvas”	Greek-Cypriot	Male	35	Nicosia (South)	No	Teacher at a public elementary school	Frequent crossings to the other side after 2003.
“Simos”	Greek-Cypriot	Male	26	Limassol (South)	Yes	University student	Frequent crossings to the other side after 2003.
“Yurtsev”	Turkish-Cypriot	Male	50	Kioneli	No	Banker	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Used to live in a mixed town before 1974. - Frequent crossings to the other side.

Pseudonym	Community	Gender	Age	Current Place of Residence	Refugee	Occupation	Bicommunal Involvement
“Volcan”	Turkish-Cypriot	Male	28	Nicosia (North)	NA	Lawyer	Lawyer in both sides.

APPENDIX B

Brief Description of Newspapers Used

1. NAME: *ALITHIA*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1952 (weekly), 1982 – today (daily)

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Started circulating, as a weekly newspaper to become a daily one in 1982. It is ideologically linked to the right-wing party *DISI* – it expresses (in its editorial commentary) the liberal pro-solution stance of the leadership of the party.

2. NAME: *ANEXARTITOS*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1938

It started as an independent newspaper which came to be associated soon with leftist views. In the first period of its publication (late 30's) the Cypriot communist party was illegal and *AKEL* was not yet formed, so the newspaper functioned as a forum which published articles by leftist activists. Subsequently, in the early 40's, it became an unofficial voice of the Left until 1946 when *Democratis*, a more officially leftist newspaper, was published. *Anexartitos* continued for a long time subsequently to be published as a weekly newspaper.

3. NAME: *DEMOCRATIS/ NEOS DEMOCRATIS*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1946-1949 and 1949-1955

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: *Democratis* was published as a leftist newspaper linked to *AKEL*. In 1949 it was closed after a conflict with the colonial authorities. *Neos Democratis* was published as a continuation of *Democratis*. *Neos Democratis* was banned by the colonial authorities in 1955 in the context of the effort to set leftist organizations and media linked to *AKEL*, illegal. The name *Neos Democratis* was preserved subsequently for the theoretical journal of *AKEL*.

4. NAME: *ELEFThERIA*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1906-1974

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: It has been one of the oldest Greek-Cypriot newspapers. It started as a weekly independent newspaper in the midst of the archbishopric issue of the first decade of the 20th century and became daily in 1936. During the 1940's it was close to the Right but it tried to maintain some balance in the midst of fierce ideological conflicts of the period. Subsequently its role, as a "voice of seriousness", declined and so did its readership leading to its closing in the 70's.

5. NAME: *ERGATI KO VIMA*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1956 – today

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Founded as a voice of the leftist trade union PEO.

6. NAME: *FILELEFTHEROS*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1955 – today

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Founded in 1955 as a non-party newspaper. It was widely perceived to express the views of President Makarios – and its popularity derives in part from that role, as non-party pro-Makarios newspaper. It should be noted also, though, that both its founder and the journalistic group around him had a long pedigree in Cypriot journalism. Today, it is still not linked ideologically with any political party and has the largest circulation figures.

7. NAME: *FONI TIS KYPROU*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1887 - 1952

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: One of the oldest Greek-Cypriot newspapers. It developed out of another newspaper *Stasinós* which was published in 1881. During the archbishopric issue of 1900-10 it was considered to be close to the camp of the Kyrenia bishop – expressing views which were considered moderate in relation to the rising nationalism of the other camp/party. The newspaper continued to be weekly till it ceased publication in 1952

8. NAME: *HARAVGI*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1957 – today

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Founded in 1956 and it is ideologically linked to the left-wing party *AKEL*.

9. NAME: *IMAHI*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1960 – 1980 and 1992 – today

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Founded in 1960 by Nicos Sampson, who in 1974 became the *de facto* president of Cyprus when with the help of Greek junta overthrew President Makarios. The newspaper ceased to be published in 1980 to begin circulating again with *Tharros* as a weekly edition by the son of Nicos Sampson who is a *DISI* MP. For a period it was published again as a daily but recently it went back to the weekly model. It is considered to express the extreme right wing within the rightist party. Before 1974, though, it was considered it expressed the “voice” (with some tabloid leanings) of a right wing leader rather than the voice of extremism within the Greek-Cypriot community. The extreme right wing was then expressed by other newspapers. Nicos Sampson, though, has been considered by the Turkish-Cypriots as responsible for the murder of Turkish-Cypriots in the battles in the Nicosia region in 1963-64.

10. NAME: *KYPRIAKOS FYLAX / NEOS KYPRIAKOS FYLAX*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1906

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: It was published in the midst of the archbishopric issue as a voice for the nationalist camp/party. It continued to be the voice of N. Katalanos, leader of the current, till 1921. It stopped for a period and then it was republished. In 1935 it became a daily with the name *Neos Kypriakos Fylax*. In the late forties it gave expression to the extreme right – some of its violent proclamations against the Left have become characteristic of the fanaticism of the period.

11. NAME: *PAFOS*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: NA

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Local magazine published in Pafos. It encouraged the development of local modernist currents with a focus on continuing the local cultural traditions.

12. NAME: *PARATIRITIS*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1928-1932

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Published by Panos Fasouliotis a modernist intellectual who had contributed also to the organisation of the first trade union circles in Limassol in the 1920's. He subsequently moved away from leftist politics but he remained an engaged journalist publishing *Paratiritis* in different forms – in the period 1925-28 it was published as an English-Greek newspaper (*Paratiritis-Observer*). Then it became a weekly Greek newspaper *Paratiritis* and it played a significant role in supporting modernist currents. Subsequently, in 1933 *Paratiritis* was merged with another newspaper, *Hronos*.

13. NAME: *SIMERINI*

PERIOD OF CIRCULATION: 1976–today

BRIEF DESCRIPTION: It started publishing as the voice of the Right and *DISI* after the crisis of the Right in 1974. By the early 1980's though it passed to the ownership of one person who went ahead to form the media conglomerate *DIAS*. Today it is owned by *DIAS* Publishing Company and it is believed to express the conservative right wing voice of the Greek-Cypriot community. Its main line is rejectionist of efforts at solution of the Cyprus problem – and in this context it appeals also to sections of the rejectionist centre parties. In its most successful period, in the 1990's, it attempted to forge an alliance on the basis of rejectionist spreading from the Centre to the Right. In that period it often came into confrontation with the more liberal voice of the right wing party – *Alithia*.

APPENDIX C

The Cypriot Media Landscape

During the first months of the British colonial rule in Cyprus, in 1878, the first newspaper entitled *ΚΥΠΡΟΣ* – *CYPRUS* appeared on the island. The newspaper was published using both English and Greek language. The first Cypriot newspapers that followed soon after that had a weekly circulation and according to Sofokleous (2010, p.53) their content included telegraphs received from international news agencies, copies of articles from the Greek press and letters of people from the villages. The daily press was established in Cyprus in the 30s and included more news and analyses. Until 1950, every town in Cyprus had its local newspapers but this stopped in 1960 with the independence of the island (Sofokleous, 2010, p.54). Small-scale local newspapers appeared again in the 90s a period in which the GC press was transformed in terms of content, circulation and appearance.

Today, there are 6 daily newspapers – 1 of which is English – and 29 weekly newspapers – 3 of which are English and 2 Russian²³² – circulating in the GC community. In the TC community there are 13 daily newspapers, which is proportionally one of the largest circulations in the world (Hadjisoteriou, 2010, p.59). Furthermore, there are 3 monthly newspapers that are published by the Armenian-Cypriot community, 1 of which is published in both the Armenian and Greek language and some other non-Cypriot newspapers that have appeared in Cyprus in different periods and few of which there are circulating until today. In the 80s for example, conflicts in the nearby areas like Lebanon and the West Bank caused the appearance of some Arab newspapers²³³ in Cyprus. Another more recent example is the appearance of newspapers in Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian and Filipino due to the large numbers of people from these countries that migrated in Cyprus in the last few years.

²³² There are 3 Russian newspapers that circulating in the GC community, 2 weekly and 1 monthly. The readers of these newspapers are mainly Russians who migrated to Cyprus after the collapse of the Russian Soviet Union.

²³³ Today, there is only one monthly Arab newspaper called AL SOUT AL ARABI circulating in Cyprus.

As far as the broadcast media is concerned, *CyBC*²³⁴ (*RIK*) was the first radio and television broadcaster in the island. The first radio programmes have been aired in 1953 and the first television programmes in 1957. Today, *CyBC* is the public broadcaster of the Republic of Cyprus with 4 radio channels – 1 of which broadcasts programmes in English, Turkish and Armenian – and 2 television channels, 1 of which includes daily brief news bulletins in English and Turkish.

By the end of 1980, the first private radio broadcasters appeared in the Republic of Cyprus and the first private television channels broadcast in the early 1990s. Today, there are 6 private television channels and 9 private radio channels that broadcast in the whole island and many local private broadcast channels (8 television and 41 radio channels).

In the so called *Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)* there are 5 television channels. *Bayrak Radio Television Corporation (BRTK)* is the official broadcasting corporation of «TRNC», its foundation dates back to 1963 and follows government policies (Christophorou, Şahin & Pavlou, 2010, Appendix II).

The Press Information Office (*PIO*), which exists in the Republic of Cyprus today, was established towards the end of World War II by the colonialists as a way of providing information about the British Governor's actions to the newspapers of the island. During the years of *EOKA* struggle in 1955-59, *PIO* was transformed into a centre of propaganda of the British rule (Gavrielidi, 2010, p.69) and in 1960, after the independence of Cyprus, it became responsible for covering and informing the media about the President's and Vice-President's actions. After the separation of the two communities in 1963, *PIO*'s role was transformed from a centre of informing the media into a centre of 'enlightening' the international community about the Cyprus problem. This enlightening process however had a propagandistic form since it was solely produced by the GC community.

The first attempts for the creation of a News Agency in Cyprus date back to 1959 and had been made by Archbishop Makarios who wanted to create a centre of information that would help *EOKA*'s anti-colonial struggle (Konstantinou, 2010, p.91). The Cyprus News Agency (*CNA*) was

²³⁴ *CyBC* stands for CYPRUS BROADCASTING CORPORATION but was initially named CYPRUS BROADCASTING SERVICE.

officially established in 1976 and it initially distributed the news in English and not in Greek. According to Konstantinou, the reason behind this was that *CNA* was created in order to inform the international community about the Cypriots' struggle against Turkish invasion and occupation and that is why most of the news it distributed had to do with the Cyprus problem (2010, p.92). The first news bulletins in Greek have been produced by *CNA* in 1991 and in 2002 it also started providing news bulletins in Turkish too. Today, *CNA*'s role is to distribute news bulletins in all three languages, English, Greek and Turkish to media organisations in Cyprus and abroad.

APPENDIX D

Interview Request Letter

Christiana Karayianni

7 Andrea Charalambidi St., Apt. 101,

2015 Nicosia

email: christiana.k@gmail.com

Tel.: 99 806997

January 2008

Dear Mr/Ms _____,

I am a PhD student at the University of Sussex in the UK, working on a research project entitled *The impact of different forms of communication on bicommunal relations in Cyprus*. I am writing to you to ask if you would be willing to give me an interview in relation to this project.

This study has as a broad field of inquiry the impact of media on bicommunal communication in Cyprus and as a result the relationships formed between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities. The research includes a study of three modes of communication: 1. interpersonal (i.e. face-to-face) communication between people from the two communities, 2. communication through conventional media (i.e. press and broadcasting), 3. communication through the new media (i.e. Internet). The emphasis of the study will be on the impact of these media on social relations, with a special focus on communication through new media.

I am currently studying the first mode of communication, the face-to-face communication and I am seeking to interview people that are/ had been communicating with members of the opposite community. I am keen to interview you because of your participation in rapprochement activities and your experience as an author and a researcher of bicommunal issues.

I would be very grateful if you could give me a brief interview (no more than one hour) regarding your experience of communication in the bicommunal context mentioned above.

Please reply at your earliest convenience and do get in touch if you would like any further information.

Thank you very much in advance.

Sincerely,
Christiana Karayianni

APPENDIX E

Interview Questions

1. Could you say a few things about yourself? (a)age, (b)where from, (c)where do you live, (d)where are your parents from, (e)what do you do? (anything else you think is important for me to know)
2. When did you first meet with members of the other community?
3. Did you have any kind of other interaction/communication before your face-to-face meeting?
 - (a)If yes, how did this interaction/communication make you feel?
 - (i)Did you create an image for that person/s?
 - (ii)Can you describe it?
 - (b)If not, what was the image you had (if any) for Greek Cypriots before meeting with them?
4. Who initiated the meeting? (Was it your decision or was it in the context of an organised event? Were you invited to participate to a bicomunal event? How did you first feel about the invitation? Did you accept the invitation straight away? Why?)
5. What was the purpose of the meeting?
6. Do you remember what your first feelings were during the meeting?
7. Did you expect to feel this way?
8. Do you think you felt the same way throughout the meeting?
 - (a)If no, how did it changed? And what do you think caused the change?Would you say that you noticed (if you made that observation at all) more differences or similarities (generally/ at all levels) with GCs/TCs?
9. Where did you meet? Did you feel comfortable in this space?
 - (a) Were there any symbols or anything else that was disturbing for you?
10. In which language did you communicate? How did this make you feel?
11. What did you first talk about?
12. Did you keep contact with GCs/TCs you met on the first meeting?

- (a) If yes, for how long?
 - (b) If no, could you please explain why not?
13. Today, do you have any kind of contact with GCs/TCs (same people you met on the first meeting or others)?
- (a) If yes, what kind of contact?
 - (b) If you do not have any contact, why is that?
14. How did the easing of restrictions regarding free movement in April 2003 made you feel?
- (a) Did it affect your communication/relationship with Greek Cypriots at all?
 - (i) If yes, in what ways?
 - (ii) If not, why not?
16. Do you visit the other (south/north) side?
- (a) If yes, how often?
 - (b) If no, could you please explain why not?
17. Are there any symbols or maybe behavior that have been disturbing for you in the south/north?
18. How did the rejection of the Annan Plan by the GC community in 2004 make you feel?
- (a) Did it affect your communication/relationship with GCs/TCS at all?
 - (i) If yes, in what ways?
 - (ii) If not, why not?
 - (b) How do you feel today about this?
19. How did the election of Mr. Demetris Christofias as president of the Republic of Cyprus make you feel?
20. What kind of medium/media do you use to get informed and why?

THANK YOU.

APPENDIX F

**Copy of the Signed Consent Form for Accessing the Email Conversations of the “Prague
Workshop 2000” Yahoo Email Group (See Next Page)**